^{Page 243 note 1} For three presentations of this malaise as perceived by its victims see: Nyerere's, Julius K. McDougall Memorial Lecture to F.A.O. in 1963, in Freedom and Unity (Dar es Salaam, 1966), pp. 231–51;Google ScholarMates, L., ‘International Trade and the Developing Countries’, in Burton, D. W. (ed.), Non-Alignment (London, 1966), p. 106;Google Scholar and Prebisch, R., Towards a New Trade Policy for Development (New York, 1964),Google Scholar the Secretary-General's opening report to U.N.C.T.A.D.

^{Page 245 note 1} Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in Geneva, 23 March— 16 June 1964 (New York, 1964–1965), 8 vols.Google Scholar

^{Page 245 note 2} For a fuller exposition of this point see Green, R. H. and Seidman, A., Unity of Poverty: the economic logic of pan-Africanism (London, 1967), parts I and II;Google ScholarGreen, , L'Economie de Ia Republique Fédérale du Caméroun (Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, forthcoming), chs. 3–5;Google Scholar and Clairmonte, F. (ed), Essays on the African Economy (Penguin, forthcoming).Google Scholar

^{Page 245 note 3} See, for example, Julius K. Nyerere, op. cit., and The Arusha Declaration (Dar es Salaam, 1967), pp. 16–17 and 21–5.Google Scholar

^{Page 245 note 4} Prebisch, op. cit. p. 3.

^{Page 246 note 1} Cf. Trade and Development, vols. II, III, and IV. For an earlier and somewhat more systematic presentation see Seers, D., ‘A Model of Comparative Rates of Growth in the World Economy’, in The Economic Journal (London), 03 1962.Google Scholar

^{Page 246 note 2} Cf. e.g. Seers, D., ‘International Trade and Development—The Special Interest of Africa’, in Stewart, I. and Ord, H. (eds.), African Primary Products and International Trade (Edinburgh, 1965).Google Scholar African experience was quite mixed, by commodity, by country, and by year. Excluding metals, some deterioration in terms took place, but not on a scale suggesting that it was the major problem in the development of African export earnings.

^{Page 246 note 3} Trade and Development, vols. II and v.

^{Page 246 note 4} Ibid. vols. VI and VII.

^{Page 248 note 1} The European Economic Community as a whole was clearly less narrow and rigid in its approach than France. Federal Germany and the Netherlands individually tended to be more in favour of free trade and laissez-faire.

^{Page 250 note 1} The ‘cause’ part of the argument is valid. Increased C.M.E.A. consumption has certainly helped to limit price declines in cotton, coffee, citrus fruit, cocoa, rubber, sugar, and sisal to a not inconsiderable extent. The ‘benefit’ half is patently false—C.M.E.A. import prices are virtually always related to the going world price and are sometimes significantly below it as a result of shrewd timing of the purchase agreement or expert bargaining with a weak seller. The Seventy-Five and the C.M.E.A. members ended in rather sharp disagreement on commodity and finance policy, with Yugoslavia apparently one of the more vocal critics of the centrally planned countries’ policy.

^{Page 250 note 2} Oddly, E.C.A. appears to have swung towards the promotion of resource transfers, relying less on trade expansion, since 1964. The Organisation of African Unity has placed much more emphasis on ‘trade not aid’, but its significance for economic policy is rather doubtful.

^{Page 251 note 1} The 1967 meetings of the Council of Association have concentrated on this issue. The whole concept of association appears to be in the melting pot; a series of E.E.C.-Individual Associate agreements may be a possible successor in 1969 to the unitary Yaoundé Convention of Association. This process could either dilute E.E.C.'s preferences to vanishing point— which is probably what the Commission, Netherlands, and Federal Germany seek—or could result in most of the Tiers Monde offering preferences to E.E.C. at the expense of other industrial countries—which presumably fits the Gaullist view of Little Europe dominating the world scene. An intermediate possibility would tie most of Africa (and the Middle East?) to E.E.C.—and Latin America, in reaction, to the U.S.A.—which would leave the U.K., Japan, and Scandinavia as losers among the industrial countries, while the developing countries would probably be seriously hampered by their loss of flexibility in securing access to the lowest-cost markets for their imports and of effective bargaining positions for their exports.

^{Page 251 note 2} The latter point can be overstated. An examination of export destination and growth figures suggests that E.E.C. preferences are not of critical significance to Gabon, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast, Congo (Kinshasa), or Malagasy, and no longer to Algeria or Tunisia (which has already de facto lost them), though they probably are to the other dozen-odd Associates and to Morocco.

^{Page 253 note 1} U.N.C T.A.D.'s five continuing committees are: (1) Commodity Problems, (2) Manufactures and Semi-Manufactures, (3) Invisible and Financing, (4) Institutional Arrangements, (5) Trade Expansion Development, and Regional Grouping. In Trade and Development, vol. III relates to Commodity Trade, IV to Trade in Manufactures, v to Financing, Invisibles, and Institutional Arrangements, and vols. VI and VII to Trade Expansion (including projections of the ‘trade gap’) and Regional Groupings.

^{Page 254 note 1} Trade and Development, vol. I.

^{Page 254 note 2} In practice, ‘stabilisation’ means, for primary exporters, either raising prices or fixing them at present levels; whereas importers use the same word to mean guaranteeing prices against sharp increases and/or protecting them against very drastic short-run falls. While making agreement on the principle of agreements easy—except for the U.S.A. and socialist states, who both usually object to participation, but on different grounds—the loose and inaccurate use of ‘stabilisation’ multiplies the difficulties of actual negotiations.

^{Page 254 note 3} The International Coffee Agreement survives, but is only marginally satisfactory—it does avert chaotic cut-throat competition. The main gainers are Brazil, francophone West and Central Africa, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and possibly Columbia and Ethiopia. Kenya and Tanzania are on balance losers, because their quotas took no account of normal production on immature or inadequately tended acreage—only of actual 1959–61 production —leaving them with a rapidly growing non-quota output to sell at ‘residual market’ prices depressed by the I.C.A.'s creation of a dual market system.

^{Page 255 note 1} In June 1967, E.E.C. tariffs on hides were nil, on leather 9 per cent and on leather products 16 per cent. If 40 per cent of the value of the product is hides, 25 per cent processing the leather, and 35 per cent manufacturing the leather, the effective protection for each stage of processing is shown in the following table:

^{Page 255 note 2} Virtually all beet sugar is more costly than tropical cane sugar. Much European grain and meat, and some U.S.A. wheat and possibly meat, would also be unable to compete with exports from the economies listed, without their subsidies and protective measures, based on a policy of ‘self-sfficiency’,

^{Page 256 note 1} Fragmentary data suggest that profits (after tax) on head office investment in tropical African branches usually run at 75–150 per cent annually and are very largely repatriated, not reinvested, under normal circumstances.

^{Page 257 note 1} International Monetary Issues and the Developing Countries (The Kahn Report), TD/B/32 (Geneva, 1965).Google Scholar The ‘Ten’ are U.S.A., Canada, U.K., Sweden, France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy, and Japan.

^{Page 258 note 1} Tied aid is costly because it prevents using funds in the lowest-price market. Bids may vary by 30–40 per cent on major contracts; a detailed study in the case of Pakistan showed that tied-source projects cost up to 51 per cent more than competitive prices. On balance both aid tied to lenders' exports and contractor credits are likely to raise capital costs by at least o per cent on average, unless extremely shrewd bargaining precedes the agreement; cf. Helleiner, G. K., ‘Trade and Aid in Tanzania’, in East Africa Journal (Nairobi), 04 1967.Google Scholar

^{Page 258 note 2} American aid policy is also affected by the foreign exchange cost of the Vietnam war, and the French by the cost of the nuclear programme and of the force de frappe. The effectiveness of aid from the U.S.A., U.K., France, and the socialist countries is reduced by the ways in which military ‘hardware’ is given or sold. These tend to raise Tiers-Monde military bills, increase regional tensions, and divert attention from development; yet there is little if any net gain to national security from either the donor's or the recipient's point of view.

^{Page 259 note 1} U.N.C.T.A.D. has prepared a thoughtful and comprehensive study, Trade Expansion and Economic Integration among Developing Countries (Geneva, 1966), TD/B/85.Google Scholar

^{Page 259 note 2} See Robson, P., ‘Economic Integration in Equatorial Africa’, in Hazlewood, A. (ed.), African Integration and Disintegration: political and economic case studies (O.U.P., for Royal Institute of International Affairs, forthcoming).Google Scholar

^{Page 259 note 3} See Treaty for East African Co-operation (Nairobi, 1967).Google Scholar

^{Page 259 note 4} Cf. Hayter, T., French Aid (London, 1966).Google Scholar

^{Page 260 note 1} The French position is partly based on political prestige considerations and E.E.C. support for it is linked to power distribution within the I.M.F. However, in large measure France's aim is to strengthen its position as a world industrial economy both alone and as the dominant figure in E.E.C.

^{Page 260 note 2} In the I.M.F., at least, developing-country members have enough votes to block any major proposals—something E.E.C. does not now have. In G.A.T.T., they have at times been able to institute Charter changes, which suggests a potential ability to influence the agenda of negotiating sessions.

^{Page 262 note 1} This line of action has been suggested by Prebisch and endorsed in principle by the member states of the Economic Commission for Africa. See, e.g. ‘Report of the Extraordinary Joint Meeting of the E.C.A. Working Party on Intra-African Trade and O.A.U. Ad Hoc Committee of Fourteen on Trade and Development, Geneva, 22–26 August 1966’ (Addis Ababa, 1966), E/CN 14/361.

^{Page 263 note 1} Ibid. Annex v.

^{Page 264 note 1} The Tiers Monde can improve its bargaining position if the major producers agree on penal export taxes on the unprocessed material. Malaya, even before World War II, forcefully promoted domestic tin smelting by just such a tax on tin concentrates, to offset the protection of smelting in overseas countries which charged higher import duties on metals than on concentrates.

^{Page 265 note 1} This point was accepted at Rio de Janeiro.