Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-skm99 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-25T08:33:10.962Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Belling the cat: Why reuse theory is not enough

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2010

Oscar Vilarroya
Oscar Vilarroya
Affiliation:
Unitat de Recerca en Neurociència Cognitiva, Departament de Psiquiatria i Medicina Legal, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, and Fundació IMIM, Barcelona 08193, Spain. oscar.vilarroya@uab.cat
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

I agree with Anderson's approach to reuse theories. My main concern is twofold. Anderson assumes certain nomological regularities in reuse phenomena that are simply conjectures supported by thin evidence. On the other hand, a biological theory of reuse is insufficient, in and of itself, to address the evaluation of particular models of cognition, such as concept empiricism or conceptual metaphor.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , August 2010 , pp. 293 - 294
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Jacob, F. (1977) Evolution and tinkering. Science 196(4295):1161–66.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Vilarroya, O. (2001) From functional “mess” to bounded functionality. Minds and Machines 11:239–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vilarroya, O. (2002) “Two” many optimalities. Biology and Philosophy 17(2):251–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar