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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
It has become fashionable to try to prove the impossibility of there being a God. Findlay's celebrated ontological disproof has in the past quarter century given rise to vigorous controversy. More recently James Rachels has offered a moral argument intended to show that there could not be a being worthy of worship. In this paper I shall examine the position Rachels is arguing for in some detail. I shall endeavor to show that his argument is unsound and, more interestingly, that the genuine philosophical perplexity which motivates it can be dispelled without too much difficulty.
page 265 note 1 Findlay, J. N., ‘Can God's Existence Be Disproved?’ in New Essays in Philosophical Theology (ed. Flew, A. and Maclntyre, A.), New York, 1964.Google Scholar See discussion in the replies to Findlay by Hughes, G. E. and Rainer, A. C. in New Essays in Philosophical TheologyGoogle Scholar and in Appleby, P. C., ‘On Religious Attitudes’, Religious Studies 6, pp. 359–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 265 note 2 Rachels, J., ‘God and Human Attitudes’, Religious Studies 7, pp. 325–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 265 note 3 Ibid., p. 335. The argument (1)–(3) is expressed in Rachels' own words.
page 265 note 4 Ibid., p. 325.
page 266 note 1 My strategy is to reconstruct Rachels' arguments so that they turn out to be valid in order to focus my criticism on the truth value of their premisses. I have, therefore, checked to be sure that the reconstructed arguments are formally valid at least in the Feys system T and the Lewis systems S4 and S5.
page 266 note 2 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 333.Google Scholar
page 266 note 3 Ibid., p. 334.
page 267 note 1 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 333.Google Scholar
page 267 note 2 Ibid., p. 332.
page 267 note 3 Ibid., p. 334.
page 267 note 4 Idem.
page 268 note 1 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 335.Google Scholar
page 270 note 1 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 325.Google Scholar
page 270 note 2 Ibid., p. 335.
page 270 note 3 Ibid., p. 335–6.
page 271 note 1 However, some theists, the socalled divine command theorists, among whom Descartes and perhaps Ockham are to be numbered, come perilously close to such a commitment.
page 272 count 1 A similar critical point has been elaborated in some detail in Oakes, R. A., ‘Reply to Professor Rachels’, Religious Studies 8, pp. 165–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
page 273 count 1 For criticism of the Kierkegaardian interpretation see Outka, G., ‘Religious and Moral Duty: Notes on Fear and Trembling’ in Religion and Morality (ed. Outka, G. and Reeder, J. P.), Garden City, 1973.Google Scholar
page 273 count 2 Genesis 21: 1–3.
page 274 count 1 Kant, I., Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (tr. Greene, T. M. and Hudson, H. H.), New York, 1960, p. 175.Google Scholar Kant also says: ‘That I ought not to kill my good son is certain beyond a shadow of a doubt; that you, as you appear to be, are God, I am not convinced and will never be even if your voice would resound from the (visible) heavens’. This remark from Der Streit der Facultäten is cited in Outka, G., op. cit., p. 235.Google Scholar
page 274 count 2 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 336.Google Scholar
page 276 count 1 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 337.Google Scholar
page 277 count 1 Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation (tr. Henderson, A. M. and Parsons, T.), New York, 1964, p. 327.Google Scholar
page 277 count 2 Rachels, , op. cit., p. 334.Google Scholar
page 280 count 1 There are several variants of the divine command theory which might then be considered. For suggestive discussion see Adams, R. M., ‘A Modified Divine Command Theory of Ethical Wrongness’ in Religion and Morality (ed. Outka, G. and Reeder, J. P.), Garden City, 1973.Google Scholar
1 It is a pleasure to thank my colleagues D. W. Brock and J. W. Lenz for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
