Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-xtgtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T09:16:40.441Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Enabling Ivan Karamazov: responding to Mark Murphy's God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 November 2017

KRISTEN IRWIN
KRISTEN IRWIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago, IL, 60613, USA
*
e-mail: kirwin@luc.edu
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

God's Own Ethics introduces a number of philosophical subfields into conversation with philosophy of religion and metaethics in an attempt to discern the ethics of God. While its conception of the divine being is itself controversial, I here take issue with the claim that the divine being described in God's Own Ethics would be one worthy of worship and allegiance. Specifically, I argue that a God lacking in moral perfection of the sort familiar to humans is either unrecognizable as God, or is open to the ‘Ivan Karamazov’ objection that such a God deserves neither worship nor allegiance.

Type
Book Symposium
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 557 - 563
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, Marilyn McCord (1999) Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press).Google Scholar
Dostoevsky, Fyodor (2002) The Brothers Karamazov, Pevear, R. & Volokhonsky, L. (trs) (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux).Google Scholar
Moser, Paul (2010) The Evidence for God: Religious Epistemology Reexamined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).Google Scholar
Murphy, Mark C. (2017) God's Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar