No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Fischer on the Fragilist Account of Alternative Possibilities
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2013
Abstract
One response to the Frankfurtian attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities is to advert to the observation that the agent’s actual action (or the particular event resulting from that action) is numerically distinct from the corresponding action (or the resultant event) he would have generated in the relevant counterfactual scenario. Since this response is based on taking actions and events to be fragile, I shall call it the fragilist account of alternative possibilities. This paper addresses an anti-fragilist argument delivered by John Martin Fischer. I contend that, on close examination, Fischer’s counterargument does not undermine the fragilist account.
Une des réponses possibles à l’attaque frankfurtiene contre le principe des possibilités alternatives consiste à attirer l’attention sur le fait que l’action réelle de l’agent (ou l’événement spécifique résultant de cette action) se distingue numériquement de l’action que ledit agent aurait généré dans la situation contrefactuelle correspondante (ou de l’événement qui en découle). Dans la mesure où cette réponse repose sur le fait de concevoir l’action et les événements comme fragiles, je la qualifierai d’explication fragiliste des possibilités alternatives. Cet article est consacré à l’argument anti-fragiliste soutenu par John Martin Fischer. Après un examen minutieux, j’affirme que le contre-argument de Fischer n’ébranle pas l’explication fragiliste.
- Type
- Article
- Information
- Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 787 - 800
- Copyright
- Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2013
References
Berofsky, Bernard 2003 Classical Compatibilism: Not Dead Yet. In McKenna, Michael and Widerker, David (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Campbell, Joseph Keim 1997 A Compatibilist Theory of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 88, 319–330.Google Scholar
Fischer, John Martin 1986 Responsibility and Control. In Fischer, John Martin (ed.), Moral Responsibility. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Fischer, John Martin 1994 The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Fischer, John Martin and Ravizza, Mark 1998 Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, Harry 1969 The Principle of Alternate Possibilities. Journal of Philosophy, 66, 829–839.Google Scholar
Lewis, David 1986 Postscripts to “Causation”. In Lewis, David (ed.), Philosophical Papers, volume II. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pereboom, Derk 2003 Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities. In McKenna, Michael and Widerker, David (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Steward, Helen 2006 ‘Could Have Done Otherwise’, Action Sentences and Anaphora. Analysis, 66, 95–101.Google Scholar
Vihvelin, Kadri 2004 Free Will Demystified: A Dispositional Account. Philosophical Topics, 32, 427–450.Google Scholar
Widerker, David 1995 Libertarianism and Frankfurt’s Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Philosophical Review, 104, 247–261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar