On February 27, 1973, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics indicated its intention to accede to the Universal Copyright Convention (UCC). Soon thereafter, Soviet copyright legislation was substantially amended. Many of the consequences of Soviet accession to the UCC and of the new Soviet copyright legislation could be deduced immediately from the relevant provisions of Soviet and American law and the UCC itself. Nevertheless, many completely erroneous analyses of the legal significance of the Soviet action were published in the press of the United States and Western Europe. How the USSR would implement its copyright policy

The month of October, 1973, brought with it Arab coercion in two forms: the first was the military attack against Israeli forces begun on October 6 ; the second was the use of economic coercion against countries that, in Arab eyes, either supported Israel or did not support the Arabs in their present quests (which include the return of claimed “Arab” lands, favorable settlement of the Palestinian peoples' claim for self-determination, and other political and military objectives).

The most distinctive feature of the European Convention on Human Rights is the optional procedure under Article 25, whereby an individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of one of the rights guaranteed by the Convention may present a complaint against his own (or another) government to the European Commission of Human Rights for investigation. Thus the individual is given direct access to an international tribunal and is recognized as having the standing necessary to pursue his rights under international law.

At its Twenty-Fifth Session the International Law Commission determined to allot some of its limited time to each of the active subjects on its agenda. The decision was the child of necessity. The Draft Articles on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations had taken up most of the Commissions sessions in 1969, 1970, and 1971, and the Twenty-Fourth Session in 1972 had, under forced draft, produced the draft articles on the Succession of States to Treaties and on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Diplomatic Agents and Other Internationally Protected Persons. The inevitable byproduct was a mounting pressure, both within the Commission and from the General Assembly, for intensive examination of the draft articles and commentaries on State Responsibility, Succession of States in Matters Other Than Treaties, the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, and the Report on Treaties Concluded Between States and International Organizations.

A few years ago expert opinion seemed to be veering sharply toward the conclusion that the multinational enterprise had put national sovereignties “at bay.” As astute an observer as Raymond Vernon was writing that “sovereign states are feeling naked,” that concepts such as national sovereignty and economic strength appeared to be “drained of meaning,” that the consequent sense of “nakedness and dependence” had focussed interest on the “institutions which are thought to be the main agents of the change,” and that prominentamong these was the “multinational enterprise.”