Despite the growing interest in the theme of corruption, one cannot yet speak of a body of research and analysis sufficient to the creation of inductive theory. This is not to say that there has not been interesting empirical and theoretical work done. However, most of this work has dealt with variations to the legal definition of corruption as being the illegal use of public office for private gain or, as V. O. Key, Jr. put it, the uninstitutionalized influence of wealth in a political system. The relationship between “power” and corruption has been a subject of analytical speculation since Plato posed, and Machiavelli revived, the “dirty hands” dilemma.

The central thesis of this paper is that the resources and conditions, both external and regional, for the continuation of traditional Caribbean subregionalized cooperation and integration processes no longer exist. Whereas in the past there existed a number of rationalizations and justifications for restricting and limiting the scope of regional initiatives, the scenario of the 1990s — regional, Hemispheric, and global — is one in which neither regional actors nor external hegemons can afford not to cooperate beyond the limitations of the past.

Moreover, the impetus for this change of direction is not only regional but sectoral: it includes civil society (business, labor, non-governmental organizations or NGOs) in a way never seen before.

The end of the Cold War raises many questions about the role of Third World states in the emerging “New World Order.” During the “old” world order, however, Latin America played a crucial role in the US sphere of influence. This alone merits study of its recent foreign policy behavior, not only because the region is home to many of the newly industrializing states, but also because it will undoubtedly be an important player in regional and global politics into the 21st century (Brysk, 1992; Lowenthal, 1993). How will Latin Americans respond to a Hemisphere dominated by the United States? Will they resist or endorse the trend towards open markets and economies? This article investigates this question with regard to Ecuador, exploring whether Ecuador's foreign policymakers are in the process of shifting towards embrace of a US-dominated Hemisphere governed by free-market economic ideals or, rather, are developing policies in accordance with their own ideological predilections.

One of the principal criticisms of the neoliberal direction that guides most economic policymaking in Latin America today is that the structural adjustments now being imposed will increase the level of social inequity and decrease the already low standard of living of poor citizens. The Comisión Económica para América Latina (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) studied the changes that took place across the region during the 1980s and found that the distribution of wealth became increasingly inequitable while the level of poverty increased, to which Argentina was no exception (CEPAL, 1991b and 1991c). In the latter case, where President Carlos Menem has spearheaded a radical restructuring of his country's economy, the rise of poverty was a prominent domestic issue in the early 1990s, yet there was little electoral response to this issue, nor did political pressure succeed in changing the course of Menem's policies.

During 1995, the 50th anniversary year of the United Nations (UN), news of the failure of its peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda dominated the media and political rhetoric. In El Salvador, however, a UN mission with a legitimate claim to success was able to close its doors on 30 April 1995. How is this remarkable achievement to be explained? And, what are the lessons — positive and negative — that can be learned from the 45 months during which the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (Misión de Obseruadores de las Naciones Unidas en El Salvador or ONUSAL) oversaw a transition from war to peace and verified a lengthy set of peace accords?

The success of ONUSAL was anything but assured when it began in July 1991, some six months before there was even a cease-fire.