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Performance and Risks in the Defense Procurement Sector

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2010

JEAN-MICHEL OUDOT
JEAN-MICHEL OUDOT
Affiliation:
French Ministry of DefenceMinistère de la défenseDirection des affaires financières / QEFI14, rue Saint-Dominique75700 Paris SP07France Phone: +33 6 74 67 17 21; Fax: +33 1 42 19 42 15 e-mail: oudot@univ-paris1.fr
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Abstract

Risks that emerge during the implementation and enforcement stages of defense procurement help explain procurement outcomes. Adverse events have impacts on the timing, cost and quality of goods supplied. The procurement process is analyzed on the basis of an original dataset covering 48 defense procurement contracts signed by the French Ministry of Defense with 18 European contractors. Contractual problems create the most adverse events in this sector, while technological risk is the second most significant risk. Although opportunism takes various forms, it is found only rarely in these defense contracts.

Keywords

Performancerisk assessmentdefense procurementtransaction cost economicsopportunism
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Public Policy , Volume 30 , Issue 2 , August 2010 , pp. 201 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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