¹ The records of solar eclipses in the Han Dynasty are primarily reliable, see Pankenier, David, “On the Reliability of Han Dynasty (206 BCE – 220 CE) Solar Eclipse Records,” the Journal of Astronomical History and Heritage 15.3 (2012), pp. 200–212 Google Scholar.

² Gu, Ban 班固, Hanshu 漢書 [The History of the Western Han Dynasty] (Beijing, 1987), 66.2890–92 Google Scholar.

³ This view of the function of moral cosmology has been repeated by several scholars. See, for example, Dubs, Homer H., trans., The History of the Former Han (Baltimore, 1955), 3, pp. 546–559 Google Scholar; Bielenstein, Hans, “An Interpretation of the Portents in the ‘Ts’ien-Han-Shu’”, Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, vol. 22 (1950), pp. 127–143 Google Scholar; Wm. De Bary, Theodore and Bloom, Irene (compilers), Sources of Chinese Tradition: From Earliest Times to 1600, 2nd edition (New York, 1999), 1, pp. 305–306 Google Scholar; Wang, Aihe, Cosmology and Political Culture in Early China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 172–180 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ In this article, I do not translate ru into Confucians, as ru identity remained an on-going construction project in pre-imperial and early imperial China. On the one hand, as some scholars point out, during the Han the ru constituted a heterogeneous group with a variety of intellectual orientations. On the other hand, ru made up a social group distinguished from others by their educational background. The rubric ru was used in a rather consistent way in pre-Han and Han texts, designating men who immersed themselves in the Five Classics. More importantly, thinkers in pre-imperial and early imperial China, such as Xunzi 荀子, Sima Qian 司馬遷, Ban Gu 班固, and Wang Chong 王充, all actively reflected on what it meant to be a ru, inevitably treating Confucius as their exemplary forebear, and industriously constructing ru identity so as to differentiate them from other social groups. For the debate regarding the relationship between ru and Confucius, see Eno, Robert, The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery (Albany, 1990), pp. 6–7 Google Scholar; Jensen, Lionel M., Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal Civilization (Durham, NC, 1997), pp. 3–28 Google Scholar; Nylan, Michael, “A Problematic Model: The Han ‘Orthodox Synthesis’, Then and Now”, in Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines, Texts, and Hermeneutics, (eds.) Chow, Kai-wing, Ng, On-cho and Henderson, John B. (Albany, 1999), pp. 17–56 Google Scholar; Nylan, Michael, The Five “Confucian” Classics (New Haven, CT, 2001), pp. 32–33 Google Scholar; Zufferey, Nicolas, To the Origins of Confucianism: The “Ru” in Pre-Qin Times and during the Early Han Dynasty (Bern, 2003), pp. 165–375 Google Scholar. For pre-Han and Han scholars’ construction of ru identity, see Cheng, Anne, “What Did It Mean to Be a Ru in Han Times?”, Asia Major, vol. 14 (2001), pp. 101–118 Google Scholar; Lai, Chen and Xin, Yan, “‘Ru’: Xunzi's Thoughts on Ru and Its Significance”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vol. 4, no. 2 (2009), pp. 157–179 Google Scholar. Cai, Liang, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire (Albany, 2014), Chapter 2Google Scholar.

⁵ Sociologists define “social closure” as a strategy used by professionals to help them achieve authority in a specific area, effectively barring outsiders whom they define as inferior and ineligible from intruding. See Weber, Max, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, (eds.) Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (Berkeley, 1978), 1, pp. 43–46, 339–348, 926–955Google Scholar.

⁶ Assuming that a discourse has autonomous power, scholars often fail to appreciate the significance of the social conditions within which words are employed. See Bourdieu, Pierre, “The Social Conditions for the Effectiveness of Ritual Discourse”, in Language and Symbolic Power, (ed.) Thompson, John B., translated. Raymond, Gino and Adamson, Matthew (Cambridge, 1991), p. 107 Google Scholar.

⁷ Hanshu, 27a.1317; see also, Loewe, Michael, Dong Zhongshu, a Confucian Heritage and the “Chunqiu fanlu” (Leiden and Boston, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. Chapter 2.

⁸ An alternative translation could be: “If, after being warned and informed, the rule is still not conscious of the changes”.

⁹ Zhongshu, Dong 董仲舒, Chunqiu fanlu zhu zi suoyin 春秋繁露逐字索引 [A Concordance to the “Chunqiu fanlu”], (eds.) Lau, D. C. and Fangzheng, Chen 陳方正 (Hong Kong, 1994)Google Scholar, 8.4/40/26.

¹⁰ Huang Zhaoji traces this tradition back to the “Jin Teng” 金滕 section in The Documents and “Shiyue zhijiao” 十月之交 in The Songs [Mao #193]. See Zhaoji, Huang 黃肇基, Handai Gongyang xue zaiyi lilun yanjiu 漢代公羊學災異理論研究 [Studies of the Theory of Disasters in Han-Era Scholarship on “The Gongyang”] (Taipei, 1998), pp. 67–69 Google Scholar.

¹¹ Bojun, Yang 楊伯峻, (ed.), Chunqiu Zuozhuan zhu 春秋左傳注 [The Annotated Zuo's Commentary to “The Chunqiu”] (Beijing, 1981), 4, p. 1288 Google Scholar.

¹² Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, pp. 143–177.

¹³ Ibid ., p. 174.

¹⁴ It is an influential thesis to divide ruler and his officials into two opposed camps and interpret the struggle between them as competition between imperial power and moral authority. Yu Yingshi’ work on shi 士culture is one of representatives. This thesis has been deeply influenced by the work on intellectuals carried out by modern sociologists, such as Edward Shils. See Yingshi, Yu 余英時, Shi yu Zhongguo wenhua 士與中國文化 [The “shi” and Chinese Culture] (Shanghai, 1987), pp. 1–11; 84–113Google Scholar. See also Xu Zhuoyun 許倬雲, “Qin Han zhishi fenzi” 秦漢知識份子 [“Intellectuals of the Qin and Han Periods”], in Zhongyang yanjiuyuan guoji Hanxue huiyi lunwenji: Lishi kaogu zu 中央研究院國際漢學會議論文集: 歷史考古組 [Collection of Papers Given at Academia Sinica's International Colloquium on Chinese Studies: The Archaeology and History Group] (Taipei, 1981), pp. 495–496; Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, pp. 173–180. Ruirong, Lu 盧瑞容, Xi Han rujia zhengzhi sixiang yu xianshi zhengzhi de hudong: yi zouyi wei zhongxin de kaocha 西漢儒家政治思想與現實政治的互動：以奏議為中心的考察 [The Mutual Influence of Political Thought and Practical Politics in the Western Han: Research Based Principally on Memorials] (Taipei, 2009), p. 161 Google Scholar. See also Shils, Edward, “The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 1, no. 1 (1958), pp. 5–22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁵ The Grand Scribe's Records ends around 100 bce, almost a decade before the transition between Emperor Wu and Emperor Zhao. While it records various omens and their interpretations, those cases seldom affected the power configuration in the court. Namely, I could not locate a single case where officials were blamed for bringing disasters and thereby removed from their positions or even put to death. This accords with the records in The History of the Western Han, as in the latter omen interpretations that led to shuffles of the political power generally happened after Emperor Wu. This indicates that the political embracement of correlative thinking over omens did not happen until the last half of the Western Han dynasty (87 bce – 23ce). We can furthermore validate this judgment when considering Dong Zhongshu's case. While this renowned ru provided the most important theoretical foundation for later omen politics, he was almost executed by Emperor Wu when commenting on a fire that damaged the shrine of Emperor Gao (135 bce). It is said that thereafter Dong elected not to talk about disasters and portents anymore. For discussion on the historical turning point when the application of omen discourse in daily administration became a standard practice, see Liang Cai, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire, Chapter 4.

¹⁶ Hanshu, 36.1932.

¹⁷ Ibid ., 36.1932–1947.

¹⁸ Ibid ., 36.1948.

¹⁹ Su can also mean “custom” or “petty”. The context here suggests that it refers to the general view in court. It is interesting to ask who controlled common opinion in the Western Han. As the ensuing analysis will show, without professionalising the interpretation of omens or institutionalising hermeneutic rules, popular opinion regarding omens was shaped largely by the politically powerful.

²⁰ That Han thinkers called ministers to account for disasters is not a new discovery—many previous scholars have pointed this out. See Yexin, Chen 陳業新, Zaihai yu liang Han shehui yanjiu 災害與兩漢社會研究 [A Study of Disasters and Society in the Han Dynasty] (Shanghai, 2004), pp. 198–204 Google Scholar.

²¹ Hanshu, 92. 4088.

²² Lau, D. C., (ed.), Han Shi waizhuan zhuzi suoyin 韓詩外傳逐字索引 [A Concordance to the Outer Commentary on the Han Edition of the Songs] (Hong Kong, 1992), 8.19/61/10–12Google Scholar; Han Shih Wai Chuan: Han Ying's Illustrations of the Didactic Application of “The Classic of Songs” (The Shih Ching), translated by James Robert Hightower (Cambridge, 1952), p. 247.

²³ Lau, D. C. and Zhihua, He 何志華, (eds.), Shangshu dazhuan zhu zi suoyin 尚書大傳逐字索引 [A Concordance to “The Great Commentary on ‘The Documents’”] (Hong Kong, 1994), 1.1/5/16–17Google Scholar.

²⁴ Although under Emperor Cheng a certain Zhang Kuang 張匡 stated in a memorial that Emperor Wen 文帝 had dismissed Chancellor Zhou Bo 周勃 because of a solar eclipse, I have been unable to substantiate the claim from any contemporary records. Use of omen discourse to dismiss high officials, chancellors in particular, started with Emperor Yuan. See Hanshu, 82.3372; Chen Yexin, Zaihai yu Liang Han, p. 201.

²⁵ Hanshu, 83.3393, 84.3423.

²⁶ Ibid., 81.3358, 86.3507. Sometimes, it was not the emperor himself but those controlling the real power at court who intended to removed chancellors from power.

²⁷ The emperor, of course, could easily protect a minister. As examples described in the following sections show, the ruler could simply hold himself responsible for disasters. In both cases, omen theory was invoked. See Hanshu, 84.3424. Also see Jiegang, Gu 顧頡剛, Qin Han de fangshi yu rusheng 秦漢的方士與儒生 [Masters of Methods and “Ru” of the Qin and Han Dynasties] (Shanghai, 2005), pp. 20–21 Google Scholar.

²⁸ Han officials did use omens to criticise the emperor, but the efficacy of those criticisms was determined by the political power that the utterer controlled.

²⁹ These two levels of narratives constitute a sharp contrast. The fact that ru did not help their fellows invites contemporary ru to reflect on their own political positions and calls for a unified ru group in the political world. For the Ru identity suppressed by political conflicts, see also Cai, Liang, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire, Chapter 2Google Scholar.

³⁰ Hanshu, 77.3251, 36.1947.

³¹ Ibid ., 93.3729.

³² Chunqiu fanlu zhu zi suoyin, 8.4/40/28. See also Yu Zhiping 余治平, “Dong Zhongshu de ruixiang zaiyi zhi shuo yu chenwei liubian” 董仲舒的瑞祥災異之說與讖緯流變 [Dong Zhongshu's Theory of Auspiciousness and Disasters and Development of Apocrypha], Jishou daxue xuebao 吉首大學學報, vol. 24, no. 2 (2003), pp. 47–51.

³³ These examples can easily be multiplied: see Hanshu, 60.2671–72, 72.3087, 75.3173, 82.3372–75.

³⁴ Hanshu, 27cb.1484.

³⁵ Aihe Wang has carefully studied Ban Gu's “Treaty on the Five Phases”. See Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, pp. 130–145. See also Nylan, Michael, The Shifting Center: The Original “Great Plan” and Later Readings (Sankt Augustin, Germany, 1992), pp. 1–50 Google Scholar.

³⁶ Hanshu, 27a.1339.

³⁷ The incoherence of “A Treaty on the Five Phases” has long been criticised. See Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, p. 134.

³⁸ Hanshu, 27a.1342.

³⁹ Ibid ., 27a.1343–44.

⁴⁰ Ibid ., 75. 3160.

⁴¹ Ibid ., 75.3167–68. For modern studies of Yi Feng's theory, see Jiyi, Gao 郜積意, “Qishi ‘wuji’ shuo de ‘yinli’ beijing: jianshi ‘Hanshu: Yi Feng zhuan’ zhong de liuqing zhan” 齊詩「五際」說的「殷曆」背景: 兼釋《漢書•翼奉傳》中的六情占, Taida wenshizhe xuebao 臺大文史哲學報, vol. 68 (2008), pp. 1–38 Google Scholar.

⁴² Although Jing Fang the younger's interpretation of The Changes became an influential tradition, it did not have significant impact in the Western Han. His interpretations of omens were seldom accepted by the emperor. See, e.g., Hanshu, 75.3167. On the transmission of Jing's version of The Changes, see Yu, Guo 郭彧, Jing shi Yi yuanliu京氏易源流 [The Origins and Subsequent History of Jing's Commentary on “The Changes”] (Beijing, 2007), pp. 127–189 Google Scholar; Cai, Liang, “Excavating the Genealogy of Classical Studies in the Western Han Dynasty (206 bce–8 ce)”, Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 131, no. 3 (2011), pp. 371–394Google Scholar.

⁴³ This is a topic carefully elaborated by Kidder Smith and subsequently addressed by scholars such as Mark Lewis, Marc Kalinowski and Aihe Wang. See Smith, Kidder Jr., “ Zhouyi Interpretation from Accounts in the Zuozhuan ”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, vol. 49 (1989), pp. 424–463 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lewis, Mark, Writing and Authority in Early China (Albany, 1999), pp. 243–251 Google Scholar; Kalinowski, Marc, “Diviners and Astrologers under the Eastern Zhou: Transmitted Texts and Recent Archaeological Discoveries”, in Early Chinese Religion: Part One: Shang through Han (1250 BC–220 AD), (eds.) Lagerwey, John and Kalinowski, Marc (Leiden, 2009), pp. 341–3Google Scholar, esp. 348–354, 362–363; Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, pp. 173–184.

⁴⁴ Diviners (bu卜) and invocators (zhu 祝), as technical bureaucrats, had official positions in both local and central governments. While their status was hereditary, their training and employment had been regulated by the law in Qin-Han era. See Li Xueqin 李學勤, “Shishuo Zhangjiashan hanjian ‘Shi lü’” 試說張家山漢簡《史律》, Wenwu 文物, 2002.4, pp. 67–72. Yates, Robin, “Soldiers, Scribes, and Women: Literacy among the Lower Orders in Early China.” In Writing and Literacy in Early China, edited by Feng, Li and Branner, David (Seattle, 2011), pp. 339–369 Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Hanshu, 62.2732.

⁴⁶ In The History of the Western Han Dynasty, the activities of astrologers appear in “A Treaty on Astrology” (Tianwen zhi 天文志). Records reveal institutionalised procedures in interpreting the abnormal movement of stars. Interpretation of abnormal stellar movements began with a description of the phenomenon, then a divination was performed, and finally a prediction (and sometimes a verification) followed. Sharply contrasting with the scholar officials’ expounding omens that constantly requested direct political actions, these interpretations seldom related to concrete administrative affairs or policies. See Kern, Martin, “Religious Anxiety and Political Interest in Western Han Omen Interpretation: The Case of the Han Wudi Period (141–87 B.C.)”, Chûgoku shigaku 中國史學 [Chinese History], vol. 10 (2000), pp. 1–31 Google Scholar, esp., pp. 10–14.

⁴⁷ In the Spring and Autumn period, diviners were regarded as those who understood the Way of Heaven. As Duke Xiang 襄公 replied to Marquis of Lu: “I am neither a blind musician nor an astrologer. How should I know the Way of Heaven” 吾非瞽史, 焉知天道？ See Guoyu 國語 (Shanghai, 1978), pp. 90–91.

⁴⁸ Hanshu, 8.245; 10.236; 60.2673.

⁴⁹ Hanshu, 75.3195.

⁵⁰ Mark Lewis points out that the wide dissemination of knowledge about The Changes depended on the use of writing. See his Writing and Authority, p. 243.

⁵¹ Qian, Sima 司馬遷, Shiji 史記 (Beijing, 1959), 121.3128Google Scholar. See also Loewe, Michael, Divination, Mythology, and Monarchy in Han China, (Cambridge, 1996), pp. 142–159 Google Scholar.

⁵² Hanshu, 36.1963.

⁵³ For examples, see Hanshu, 75.3185, 84.3421.

⁵⁴ For examples, see Hanshu, 75.3179, 84.3421. Ban Gu indicates three groups of people offered omen interpretations during the Western Han dynasty. First were the official diviners and astrologers. Those technical specialists, whose origins can be traced back to the Shang dynasty, had institutionalised positions in the court. Although their explanations of omens no longer had much weight, they still performed regular divinations and predictions, records of which are preserved in “The Treaty on Astrology” (Tianwen zhi 天文志). The second group comprised Masters of Methods (fangshi 方士), who sought the trust of the emperor by claiming to communicate with the spirits of the dead and by pursuing the recipe for immortality. Emperors Wen, Wu, and Cheng 成 were all famous for the largesse they displayed towards the last-named specialists. These Master of Methods were hired by the emperor as his personal consultants, who directed the throne to sacrifice to spirits and to achieve immortality. Their interpretation of omens, most of which were irrelevant to daily administration and politics, were primarily preserved in “The Treaty on Suburban Sacrifices” (Jiao si zhi 郊祀志). The last group to provide explanations of omens was made up of scholar officials. Besides the biographies that Ban Gu devoted to the famous omen interpreters, “A Treaty on the Five Phases” systemised their theories and interpretations in this field. The majority of those cases, as this paper shows, directly pointed to political figures and daily operations of the bureaucracy. On the tensions between folk religion specialists and scholar officials, see Wang, Cosmology and Political Power; on the different interpretative models the three groups used to explain omens, see Kern, “Religious Anxiety and Political Interest”, pp. 1–31.

⁵⁵ Hanshu, 88.3600.

⁵⁶ Ibid ., 81.3351.

⁵⁷ Kalinowski, “Diviners and Astrologers”, pp. 372–373; Lewis, Writing and Authority, pp. 243–251.

⁵⁸ Regarding the hereditary posts of diviners and astrologers, see Lewis, Writing and Authority, p. 243. Robin Yates, “Soldiers, Scribes, and Women”, pp. 345–350.

⁵⁹ Ibid. From the available sources, we can observe that the omen interpretation in Han court was based more on the Five Classics than on diviners or astrologers. For critiques on Lewis's claim of the unparalleled authority of writing in early China, see Nylan, Michael, “Textual Authority in Pre-Han and Han,” Early China 25 (2000), pp. 205–258 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁰ Wang, Cosmology and Political Culture, pp. 175–177.

⁶¹ Hanshu, 67.2927, 83.3400, 71.3039, 72.3084.

⁶² For studies of shifa, see Mingsheng, Wang 王明盛, Shiqi shi shangque 十七史商榷 (Shanghai, 1937), p. 27 Google Scholar; Xirui, Pi 皮錫瑞, Jingxue lishi 經學歷史 (Beijing, 1959), p. 136 Google Scholar; Mu, Qian 錢穆, “Liang Han boshi jiafa kao” 兩漢博士家法考, in Liang Han jingxue jinguwen ping yi 兩漢經學今古文平議 (Beijing, 2001), pp. 181–261 Google Scholar, esp. 223–230; Yen-zen Tsai, ‘Ching’ and ‘Chuan’: Towards Defining the Confucian Scripture in Han China (206 BCE–220 CE), unpublished Ph.D., Harvard University, 1993, p. 126; David Elstein, Friend or Father? Competing Visions of Master-Student Relations in Early China, unpublished Ph.D., University of Michigan, 2006, pp. 183–186; Liang Cai, “Excavating the Genealogy”, esp. pp. 391–392.

⁶³ Hanshu, 85.3472.

⁶⁴ These cases show a disjoint between the intellectual realm and political one.

⁶⁵ Hanshu, 75.3161–62.

⁶⁶ This does not mean that omen interpretations in pre-ru times were autonomous activities. They must have been subject to hermeneutical manipulation too. But this subject is beyond the scope of this paper and calls for separate studies. It is also of historical significance to locate the turning point when ru became the major interpreters of omens. While in the Zuo Chronicles, we observe the trend that administrative officials and nobilities relied more on the Five Classics than the diviners to interpret omens, it is under Emperor Xuan and Yuan that ru became the major players in the omen interpretation enterprise. For the acceptance of correlative cosmology in the political realm and the rise of ru in imperial court, see Liang Cai, Witchcraft and the Rise of the First Confucian Empire, Chapter 4.

⁶⁷ Social closure created by professionals can help them achieve authority in a field and close off the opportunity to outsider they defined as inferior and ineligible. See Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 43–46, 339–348, 926–955.

⁶⁸ Hanshu, 82.3372–75.

⁶⁹ Ibid ., 85.3443–65, esp. 3465.

⁷⁰ Ibid ., 85.3451.

⁷¹ Here the sage refers to Confucius, as it alluded to a passage preserved in the Analects.

⁷² Hanshu, 81.3351.

⁷³ Ibid ., 81.3348–49.

⁷⁴ Hanshu, 98.4023.

⁷⁵ Ibid ., 98.4023.

⁷⁶ Ibid ., 84.3375.

⁷⁷ Ibid ., 85.3479.

⁷⁸ Ibid ., 82.3371.

⁷⁹ Yantie lun jiaozhu 鹽鉄論校註, annot. Wang Liqi 王利器 (Beijing, 1992), 1, p. 428.

⁸⁰ Hanshu, 27Bb.1417–19.

⁸¹ Ibid ., 99c.4174.

⁸² Ibid ., 99b.4144. See also Qiuju, Ye 葉秋菊, “Handai de zaiyi ruxiang zhaoshu” 漢代的災異瑞祥詔書, Shixue yuekan 史學月刊 (2010), 5, pp. 119–122 Google Scholar.

⁸³ Chartterjee, Partha, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? (London, 1986), p. vii Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ This article has explored the value of omen interpretation within the bureaucratic administration, an approach that leads us to read omens as political warnings and hence to the period just after the reign of Emperor Wu. Although disasters can be manipulated to serve as either auspicious signs or prophetic messages, the field generally treats auspicious omen and inauspicious ones as two independent areas of study. Over the 200 years of the Western Han, omen interpretation underwent significant changes: as Martin Kerns contends, we need to reconstruct “different ideological positions from different phases of the dynasty”. See Kern, “Religious Anxiety”, pp. 10–14. For studies of omens under Emperor Wu, see ibid., pp. 1–31. For studies of apocryphal omens, see Sukhu, Gopal, “Yao, Shun, and Prefiguration: the Origins and Ideology of the Han Imperial Genealogy”, Early China, vol. 30 (2005–2006), pp. 91–142 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jack L. Dull, A Historical Introduction to the Apocryphal (Ch’an-wei) Texts of the Han Dynasty, unpublished Ph.D., University of Washington, 1966.