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Appendix VI: - Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2018

Marc P. Berenson
Affiliation:
King's College London

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Taxes and Trust
From Coercion to Compliance in Poland, Russia and Ukraine
, pp. 312 - 315
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NC
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Appendix VI: Ukraine Taxpayer Compliance Attitudinal Surveys Logit Analysis of Tax Compliance Attitudes (DV = Whether One Would Follow the Tax Laws Even If Personally Considered To Be Unfair) Coefficients and (Standard Errors)313314315

Ukraine 2005 (1)Ukraine 2005 (1) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2005 (2)Ukraine 2005 (2) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2005 (3)Ukraine 2005 (3) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2005 (4)Ukraine 2005 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it−0.48***
(0.08)
−0.12***−0.49***
(0.08)
−0.12***−0.47***
(0.08)
−0.12***−0.47***
(0.08)
−0.12***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale10.09**
(0.04)
0.02**0.09**
(0.04)
0.02**
Trusts president0.10
(0.19)
0.030.14
(0.19)
0.03
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament−0.09
(0.21)
−0.02−0.11
(0.21)
−0.03
Trusts government0.16
(0.25)
0.040.15
(0.25)
0.04
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats−0.43***
(0.16)
−0.11***−0.44***
(0.16)
−0.11***−0.39**
(0.16)
−0.09***−0.41***
(0.16)
−0.10***
Many people evade taxes0.12
(0.16)
0.030.13
(0.16)
0.030.11
(0.16)
0.030.12
(0.16)
0.03
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats−0.06
(0.11)
−0.02−0.04
(0.11)
−0.01−0.11
(0.11)
−0.03−0.08
(0.11)
−0.02
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income0.51**
(0.22)
0.05**0.54**
(0.22)
0.05***0.46**
(0.22)
0.04**0.49**
(0.22)
0.05**
I file my income taxes myself−0.32**
(0.15)
−0.08**−0.26
(0.16)
−0.07**−0.26*
(0.15)
−0.06**−0.19
(0.16)
−0.05
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)−0.24
(0.18)
−0.06−0.26
(0.18)
−0.06*
Male−0.10
(0.08)
−0.03−0.08
(0.08)
−0.02−0.06
(0.08)
−0.02−0.05
(0.08)
−0.01
Age0.002
(0.002)
0.020.002
(0.002)
0.020.002
(0.002)
0.020.002
(0.002)
0.02
Education0.34**
(0.18)
0.08**0.37**
(0.19)
0.09***0.42**
(0.18)
0.11***0.46**
(0.18)
0.11***
Constant−0.08
(0.24)
−0.11
(0.24)
−0.03
(0.23)
−0.06
(0.23)
N2,8912,8912,8732,8732,8912,8912,8732,873
Missing observationsMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replace

*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their mean.

1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, parliament and government and of trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

Ukraine 2010 (1)Ukraine 2010 (1) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2010 (2)Ukraine 2010 (2) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2010 (3)Ukraine 2010 (3) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2010 (4)Ukraine 2010 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it−0.12
(0.08)
−0.03*−0.12
(0.08)
−0.03*−0.11
(0.08)
−0.03*−0.11
(0.08)
−0.03*
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale10.32***
(0.04)
0.08***0.33***
(0.04)
0.08***
Trusts president0.001
(0.21)
−0.00020.002
(0.21)
0.001
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament0.50**
(0.24)
0.13***0.51**
(0.24)
0.13***
Trusts government0.39
(0.26)
0.09*0.39
(0.26)
0.09*
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats−0.46***
(0.15)
−0.11***−0.46***
(0.15)
−0.11***−0.43***
(0.15)
−0.10***−0.43***
(0.15)
−0.10***
Many people evade taxes0.12
(0.15)
0.030.11
(0.15)
0.030.11
(0.15)
0.030.12
(0.15)
0.03
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats−0.15
(0.11)
−0.04*−0.18
(0.12)
−0.04*−0.14
(0.11)
−0.04*−0.17
(0.12)
−0.04*
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income0.21
(0.32)
0.050.23
(0.32)
0.050.19
(0.32)
0.050.21
(0.32)
0.05
I file my income taxes myself−0.06**
(0.024)
−0.01***−0.06**
(0.024)
−0.01***−0.06**
(0.02)
−0.01***−0.06**
(0.02)
−0.01***
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)0.13
(0.17)
0.030.12
(0.17)
0.03
Male−0.03
(0.07)
−0.007−0.03
(0.07)
−0.008−0.02
(0.07)
−0.005−0.03
(0.07)
−0.006
Age0.0009
(0.002)
0.0080.0009
(0.002)
0.0080.0007
(0.002)
0.0060.0008
(0.002)
0.006
Education0.16
(0.18)
0.040.14
(0.18)
0.040.17
(0.18)
0.040.15
(0.18)
0.04
Constant−0.08
(0.22)
−0.08
(0.22)
0.28
(0.21)
0.29
(0.21)
N3,2213,2213,2123,2123,2213,2213,2123,212
Missing observationsMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replace

*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnote #28 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Note: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.

1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president and parliament and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

Ukraine 2015 (1)Ukraine 2015 (1) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2015 (2)Ukraine 2015 (2) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2015 (3)Ukraine 2015 (3) Sub. EffectsUkraine 2015 (4)Ukraine 2015 (4) Sub. Effects
Deterrence
Evasion OK if could get away with it−0.40***
(0.08)
−0.10***−0.39***
(0.08)
−0.09***−0.40***
(0.08)
−0.10***−0.39***
(0.08)
−0.10***
Quasi-voluntary
Trust in the State scale10.21***
(0.05)
0.05***0.21***
(0.05)
0.05***
Trusts president0.74***
(0.20)
0.18***0.74***
(0.20)
0.18***
Trusts prime minister
Trusts parliament−0.37
(0.28)
−0.09*−0.36
(0.28)
−0.09
Trusts government0.23
(0.26)
0.050.22
(0.26)
0.05
Many dishonest tax bureaucrats−0.43***
(0.14)
−0.11***−0.42***
(0.14)
−0.10***−0.45***
(0.14)
−0.11***−0.44***
(0.14)
−0.11***
Many people evade taxes0.69***
(0.15)
0.17***0.71***
(0.15)
0.17***0.68***
(0.15)
0.17***0.71***
(0.15)
0.17***
Prior contact
Previous contact with tax bureaucrats0.03
(0.10)
0.0060.03
(0.10)
0.0060.02
(0.10)
0.0040.02
(0.10)
0.004
Socio-economic, additional effects
Income0.44*
(0.25)
0.10**0.45*
(0.25)
0.11**0.43*
(0.25)
0.10*0.44*
(0.25)
0.10**
I file my income taxes myself0.08
(0.13)
0.020.08
(0.13)
0.020.06
(0.14)
0.020.06
(0.14)
0.01
Occupation (managers, entrepreneurs)−0.007
(0.19)
−0.0040.006
(0.19)
0.002
Male−0.09
(0.07)
−0.02−0.08
(0.07)
−0.02−0.09
(0.07)
−0.02−0.08
(0.07)
−0.02
Age0.004*
(0.002)
0.04**0.005**
(0.002)
0.04**0.005**
(0.002)
0.04**0.005**
(0.002)
0.04
Education0.09
(0.18)
0.020.09
(0.18)
0.020.11
(0.18)
0.030.11
(0.18)
0.02
Constant−0.36
(0.22)
−0.18
(0.21)
−0.35
(0.22)
−0.18
(0.21)
N3,1573,1573,1573,1573,1343,1343,1343,134
Missing observationsMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replaceMean replace

*p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01. See Footnotes #21 and #22 in Chapter 6 for an explanation of the p-values for the substantive effects.

Notes: The substantive effect measured for “Age” is the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when the “Age” variable is shifted from one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean while holding all other variables even at their mean. All other substantive effects measured are the change in likelihood for stating that one would obey the tax laws when variables are shifted from their minimum to their maximum value and all other variables are held even at their means.

1 The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2005 survey is a composite of trust in the president, in parliament and in government and trust in the government to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens. The Trust in the State scale for the Ukraine 2010 and 2015 surveys includes trust in the president, the parliament and the government and trust in the state to do what is right and to fulfil its obligations to citizens.

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