The relationship between citizens and leaders is the core concern of democratic theory and the primary focus of students of democratic politics. Competitive elections are typically assigned the principal role in structuring this relationship. They are a means by which the public can make government officials accountable and influence the policy directions of government. The case for how elections should link public and leaders is a familiar one. Not so obvious is the strength of this link, particularly the extent to which mass electoral forces may make for fundamental changes in the behaviour of leaders and the policies of governments.

In the last two decades, the prevailing orthodoxy in comparative studies has been the sociological view that public policy outcomes are primarily a reflection of what can loosely be described as ‘environmental’ factors: the demographic structure of the population, the incremental logic of policy programmes, and, most important of all, the level of economic development. This paper has two main objectives: first, to demonstrate that the sociological orthodoxy is methodologically and empirically unsound in its central tenet that politics does not matter, and, second, to provide a more detailed, and political, explanation of the particularly high levels of public welfare provision that characterize the Scandinavian countries.

The history of the Supreme Court tends to be divided into historical slices coterminous with individual Chief Justiceships. One speaks of the Taft Court, the Hughes Court, the Stone Court, the Vinson Court, and the Warren Court. Behind these titles lies the implication that they can be differentiated in terms of something more than merely temporal variation; the Chief Justice himself must be the catalyst which is supposed to make each era special. But, in what senses can a period of Supreme Court history be thought of as specifically associated with its current Chief Justice?

In this paper I shall present a very simple version of a bargaining model based on assumptions of limited information and limited capacity to make rational decisions. The justification for my work lies in the inadequacies both of the formal models in the microeconomic literature and of accounts of bargaining and other conflicts where power or closely related concepts lie at the basis of the discussion.

Forecasting elections has long been regarded by political scientists as an interesting problem in its own right. But it assumes special importance for those countries that do not have fixed election dates. In Britain, for example, it is up to the prime minister to choose the date, within the statutory five year limit. Correct timing can clearly be crucial to the outcome, and the prime minister can be expected to go to considerable lengths to ensure that the election is called for the date most favourable to his party. But there lies the prime minister's problem: elections must be called three to four weeks before polling day. With what degree of accuracy can the result be forecast at the time the election is called?

A small but interesting literature on election forecasting has emerged in recent years. The forecasting techniques used in this literature vary widely, from crude extrapolation to sophisticated model building. Up to now the emphasis has been on election night forecasting, in which the basic problem involves extracting the maximum amount of information from electoral returns, in order to forecast the outcome a few hours before it is finally known. For obvious reasons the techniques utilized in this context are of little use prior to election day.

This Note is concerned with a neglected aspect of American party politics in the last decade: the sources of development or decay in local and state organizations. In the wake of much research into the transformation of the American electorate during this period, it might seem surprising that changes in organizational politics should have attracted such scant attention. Nevertheless, this is easily explained once it is recalled how virtually all American politics textbooks analyse parties. In the first place, they compartmentalize problems about parties into ones affecting either ‘the party-in-the-electorate’ or ‘the party organization’ or ‘the partyin-government’. One consequence of conceiving parties in this way has been to obscure an obvious fact: party organizations both affect and reflect electoral decomposition, and they partly define the potential for cohesion between a party's public office-holders. When the concept of party is taken to be a ‘confederate’ trinity of concepts, it is only to be expected that rigid boundaries will be established separating what are seen as being the major problem areas of electoral politics from those of organizational and governmental politics. Secondly, party organizations in America are usually dismissed as ‘disorganizations’. They are bodies that perform the minimum necessary electoral functions, but are incapable of becoming anything more and could scarcely be anything less without ceasing to exist. From this perspective both the alleged decline of party machines and the rise of amateur politics are merely interesting phenomena, ones that are unconnected in any important ways with the party-in-the-electorate or the party-in-government.

Most explanations of variations in electoral support for the National Front involve some consideration of the importance of resentment and fear of coloured people among whites, the level of which is conditional upon the local incidence of coloured populations. Some writers, notably Harrop and Zimmerman and Whiteley, have suggested that National Front support, in so far as it can be explained by white ‘backlash’, may be considered as directly related to the relative size of the coloured population in different locales. Their argument is that, the higher the proportion of the population which is coloured, the greater the extent that their presence will be resented, and the higher the level of National Front support. Other commentators have advanced a rather different interpretation. Although agreeing that the National Front will do worst in areas with small or non-existent coloured populations, they argue that the party might do better in areas with moderate-sized coloured populations than in those with large ones. The existence of a moderate-sized coloured population, it is held, indicates that the area is ‘vulnerable’ to further migration or immigration, particularly where there are large coloured communities in neighbouring areas, and that whites may express their ‘exaggerated fears of the likely effects of immigrants moving in’ by supporting the National Front. These fears are regarded as being more important in mobilizing National Front support than the actuality of living in an area with a very large coloured population.