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FROM NIEO TO NOW AND THE UNFINISHABLE STORY OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2013

Margot E Salomon*
Affiliation:
Centre for the Study of Human Rights and Law Department, London School of Economics and Political Science, m.e.salomon@lse.ac.uk.

Abstract

Why have attempts to bring development aspirations to bear on international law over a period of 50 years come to far less than any reasonable person would hope? The early claims for a New International Economic Order and permanent sovereignty by developing countries over their natural resources, efforts to delineate a body of international development law, followed by the affirmation of a human right to development, were all attempts to have economic justice reflected in international law. Figures on world poverty and inequality suggest that international law accommodated no such restructuring. This article explores why it is international law has failed the poor of the world, and what interests it has served in their stead.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2013

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References

1 This paper uses the terms ‘developed States or countries’, ‘industrialized States or countries’, and the ‘North’, largely interchangeably. Similarly, the terms ‘developing States or countries’ and the ‘South’ are used interchangeably. References to the ‘West’ and the ‘Third World’ are relied on when necessary to capture the sentiment or language of the period.

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3 GA res 3201 (S-VI), Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1 May 1974, preambular para 1.

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6 World Bank at <http://www.worldbank.org> (Poverty Net). The World Bank (not uncontroversially), uses reference lines set at USD 1.25 and USD 2.00 a day 2005 purchasing power parity terms.

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12 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (n 3), preambular para 1.

13 Charter of the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS XVI, art 2; GA res 2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

14 The right of every State freely to choose its economic system as an aspect of the (economic) sovereign equality of States was introduced in the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States. See further, Report of the Secretary-General, Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law Relating to a New International Economic Order, UN Doc A/39/504/Add.1, 23 October 1984, para 3.

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17 Hossain (n 2) 5–6; Bradlow (n 15) 206.

18 On trade see Trachtman, JP, ‘Legal Aspects of the Poverty Agenda at the WTO: Trade Law and “Global Apartheid”’ (2003) 6 JIEL 4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Prowse, S (DfID), ‘Trade and Poverty Panel’, Does International Law Mean Business: A Partnership for Progress?, International Law Association, British Branch Annual Conference, London, May 2008Google Scholar; Statement of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (Twenty-first session 1999), UN Doc E/C.12/1999/9, para 6.

19 Robert Wade rightly makes this point in the context of contemporary international arrangements generally, in Wade, RH, ‘Globalization, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment, and Imperialism’ in Ravenhill, J (ed), Global Political Economy (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 403Google Scholar; and Trachtman (n 18) 4.

20 UN Charter (n 13) arts 1(3), 55, 56.

21 ibid art 2(5) in this provision the duty is to cooperate with the Organization itself in the maintenance of peace and security.

22 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res 217A (III), 10 December 1948, UN Doc A/810 art 28; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), entered into force 3 January 1976, GA res A/RES/2200A (XXI), 993 UNTS 3, art 2(1); Declaration on the Right to Development, GA res 41/128, annex, UN GAOR, Forty-first session, Supp. No 53, at 186, UN Doc A/41/53 (1986); Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), entered into force 2 September 1990, GA res A/RES/44/25, annex 44, UN GAOR Supp (No 49) at 167, UN Doc A/44/49 (1989) art 4.

23 Covenant of the League of Nations, 225 Consolidated Treaty Series (CTS) 195, art 23(e).

24 UN Charter (n 13), art 1(3).

25 ibid art 55.

26 ibid art 62.

27 ibid art 57.

28 ibid art 53.

29 For a comprehensive study, see Salomon, ME, Global Responsibility for Human Rights: World Poverty and the Development of International Law (Oxford University Press 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Even if no one believes in ‘trickle down’ anymore, questions remain as to whether in practice it is a ‘neoliberal idea that refuses to die’. Kaul, N, How Many Zeros are there in a Trillion? On Economic Neoliberalism and Economic Justice, OpenDemocracyGoogle Scholar, 23 March 2011 <http://www.opendemocracy.net > ; and Stiglitz, JE, ‘Is there a Post-Washington Consensus?’ in Serra, N and Stiglitz, JE (eds), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance (Oxford University Press 2008) 47Google Scholar.

31 See Abi-Saab, G, ‘Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources’ in Bedjaoui, M (ed), International Law: Achievements and Prospects (UNESCO/Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 600Google Scholar. On the formative post-World War II years generally, see Schrijver, N, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties (Cambridge University Press 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 36ff.

32 For a comprehensive overview of the NIEO demands see Ellis, ME, ‘The New International Economic Order: The Debate over the Legal Effects of General Assembly Resolutions Revisited’ (1985) 15 CalWIntlLJ 658Google Scholar.

33 Bedjaoui, M, Towards a New International Economic Order (UNESCO/Holmes and Meier 1979) 24Google Scholar.

34 See Henkin, L, International Law: Politics and Values (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 156; see also Castañeda (n 16) 591.

35 GA res 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.

36 GA res 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 120 votes in favour; 6 against; 10 abstentions. Those States that voted against the resolution were Belgium, Denmark, German Federal Republic, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

37 Faundez, J, ‘International Economic Law and Development before and after Neo-Liberalism’ in Faundez, J and Tan, C (eds), International Law, Economic Globalization and Development (Edward Elgar 2010) 16Google Scholar. On the shortcomings of the voluntary principles and standards for responsible business conduct of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprise see P Muchlinski, ‘Holistic Approaches to Development and International Investment Law: The Role of International Investment Agreements’ in J Faundez and C Tan (eds), ibid 193 and J Ruggie, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/97, 22 February 2006, para 41.

38 United States, West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom. Bulajic, M, Principles of International Development Law (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993) 271CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

39 The shift in the position of Western states points to changes introduced by developing countries into the two 1974 NIEO resolutions, most notably the exclusion of any reference to international law, which as Subedi notes, is a break with the more balanced provisions of Resolution 1803 of 1962 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR). In particular, the NIEO Charter does not require that any regulation, nationalization or expropriation be in accordance with international law, with article 2 of the Charter representing the most controversial provision in this regard. See Subedi, SP, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (Hart Publishing 2008)Google Scholar 26; see further Veilleville, DE and Vasani, BS, ‘Sovereignty over Natural Resources versus Rights under Investment Contracts: Which One Prevails?’ (2008) 5 TDM 4–5Google Scholar.

40 See Cassese, A, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2005) 507Google Scholar.

41 See M Bennouna, ‘International Law and Development’ in M Bedjaoui (ed), (n 16) 621; and Cassese (n 40) 509.

42 GA res A/Res/545 (VI) of 5 February 1952, Inclusion in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights of an Article Relating to the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, paras 1–2.

43 Abi-Saab (n 31) 603; and, Zakariya, HS, ‘Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the Search for A New International Economic Order’ in Hossain, K (ed), Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order (Frances Pinter Publishers Ltd 1980) 209Google Scholar. The first resolution on the subject was that of the General Assembly, GA res 626 (VII) of 21 December 1952, The Right to Exploit Freely Natural Wealth and Resources. See, Report of the Secretary-General, Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law relating to a New International Economic Order (n 14) para 54.

44 Years later, a formulation preferred by developing countries was inserted as article 47 of the ICCPR and article 25 of the ICESCR (n 22) (‘Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.’).

45 For a concise summary of the drafting history, see further Brownlie, I, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 539–41Google Scholar. On the motivations and shifts in the UN between the language of peoples (those under foreign occupation, colonial domination or apartheid) to that of developing countries or States (post-decolonization) as subjects of sovereignty over natural resources, see Schrijver (n 31) 166.

46 See Fidler, DP, ‘Revolt Against or From Within the West: TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law’ (2003) 2(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 Anghie, A, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2004) 213 and 212–16Google Scholar.

48 Pahuja, S, Decolonising International Law: Development, Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press 2011) 149CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On arguments by colonized States that compensation should take into account the manner in which concessions were obtained as well as the profits made by the colonial power or trading company from the exploitation of the resources, see Anghie (n 47) 212–13.

49 See Subedi (n 39) 21–3; and, Sornarajah, M, The International Law on Foreign Investment (3rd edn, Cambridge University Press 2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar 445ff.

50 Chimni explains that: ‘The 1962 Declaration does not … incorporate a balance between the interests of capital-exporting and capital-importing countries. [Any] positive assessment is based, first, on the understanding that the rights claimed by the Third World countries on the basis of PSNR render foreign capital vulnerable to a less than fair treatment. Second, that the value of foreign capital is now universally recognized … .’. Chimni, BS, ‘The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Toward a Radical Interpretation’ (1998) 38 IJIL 213–14Google Scholar.

51 Abi-Saab (n 31) 602; see also, Pahuja (n 48) 125.

52 See generally, Fidler (n 46) 54; Sornarajah, M, The Clash of Globalisations and the International Law on Foreign Investment, The Simon Reisman Lecture in International Trade Policy, Centre for Trade Policy and Law, Ottawa 2002, 3Google Scholar.

53 Brownlie (n 45) 525.

54 ‘The claim to full or adequate compensation is supported by the majority of capital-exporting states, for the obvious reason that it affords the best protection for the capital which leaves these states as foreign investment.’ The concept of ‘full compensation’ includes consideration of future profits the investment would have made. Sornarajah (n 49) 412 and 414.

55 Pahuja (n 48) 151.

56 See, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ and the ‘Right to Regulate’ in International Investment Law, OECD Working Papers on International Investment, No 2004/4, 2.

57 Zakariya (n 42) 216–18.

58 E Jiminez de Arechaga, ‘Application of the Rules of State Responsibility to the Nationalization of Foreign-Owned Property’ in K. Hossain (ed), (n 2) 229–30.

59 Subedi (n 39) 104.

60 In the absence of a global treaty on international investment, in addition to BITs, other public international law instruments that deal with foreign investment are: regional treaties such as the North American Free Trade Agreement; and (bilateral) Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), as well as, the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), and its General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

61 Subedi (n 39) 104.

62 I thank Anthea Roberts for her reflections on this point. Compare, for example, Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, 6 March 2006, para 255 and Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v Mexico, ICSID Case No ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, paras 116 and 121. Mann highlights that provisions on the right to regulate in the public interest, such as measures to meet health, safety or environmental concerns, can be rendered ‘legally useless’ by the introduction of qualifying language that requires that those measures ‘are consistent’ with the International Investment Agreement. Mann, H, International Investment Agreements, Business and Human Rights: Key Issues and Opportunities (International Institute for Sustainable Development 2008) 19Google Scholar.

63 Subedi (n 39) 104.

64 See The Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, 31 August 2010. The Statement was prepared and is supported by academics with expertise relating to investment law, arbitration and regulation and is available in English, French, Spanish and Russian at <http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement > . (‘We have a shared concern for the harm done to the public welfare by the international investment regime, as currently structured, especially its hampering of the ability of governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development and environmental sustainability.’).

65 See Abi-Saab (n 31) 613–14; G Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, Society of International Economic Law Working Paper No 22/08 (2008); see further, Van Harten, G, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the Rule of Law’ in Schill, SW (ed), International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (Oxford University Press 2010) 627CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

66 Sornarajah (n 52) 4–5. Sornarajah elaborates: ‘The sudden rush for foreign investment-based assets was necessary, as aid had dried up, as had the availability of loans from banks after the petro-dollar crisis. Globalisation was the catch-cry of the times and liberalisation of markets was seen as the way to prosperity. … The picture changed dramatically as the new millennium was beginning. A succession of economic crisis called into question the virtues of liberalisation and capital markets.’ ibid.

67 Rethinking Investment Treaty Law: A Policy Perspective, London School of Economics, Transnational Law Project, Public Lecture, 23 May 2011.

68 Randall Williams, Chief Director at the South-African Trade and Industry Department, ibid.

69 Muchlinski (n 37) 186. And on the perceived benefits flowing from FDI, F Macmillan, ‘The World Trade Organization and the Turbulent Legacy of International Economic Law-Making in the Long Twentieth Century’ in J Faundez and C Tan (eds), (n 37) 170.

70 Muchlinski (n 37) 181–2.

71 ibid 190.

72 For a thoughtful overview of how International Investment Agreements could be recalibrated, see ibid 180; for a proposed new model for IIAs with rights and obligations for investors, home States, and host States see H Mann et al, IISD Model International Agreement on Investment For Sustainable Development, art 1: ‘The objective of this Agreement is to promote foreign investment that supports sustainable development, in particular in developing and least-developed countries’.

73 Macmillan (n 69) 158.

74 Chimni (n 50) 211. Chimni asserts that ‘the general character of contemporary international law … is neo-colonial’. ibid.

75 Abi-Saab (n 31) 614–15.

76 See The Declaration on the Right to Development (n 22), art 1(2).

77 See, the Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (n 64) para 5. Common article 1(2) of the Human Rights Covenants would seem to qualify the right of peoples over their natural wealth and resources when stating that it is ‘without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law’. Although, this qualification sits uncomfortably alongside common articles 47 (ICCPR) and 25 (ICESCR) which provide that: ‘Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.’ The Committees have not offered much clarification, and in so far as they have interpreted the article, have done so (not insignificantly), as regards peoples' right to sovereignty over their natural resources as applied to indigenous peoples within a given State.

78 Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, Ch II (n 36), art 18.

79 ibid Ch. III (Common Responsibilities towards the International Community) art 29.

80 Fidler (n 46) 44.

81 Trachtman, JP, ‘The Missing Link: Coherence and Poverty and the WTO’ (2005) 8 JIEL 619CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, Trachtman (n 18) 10–11 (‘It appears that the concept of ‘Special and Differential Treatment’ (S&D), at least as applied so far, has limited utility. S&D is a complex phenomenon – some aspects of S&D are undoubtedly beneficial. However, this concept seems to mask the fact that the international trade system has done little specifically intended to alleviate poverty: it is not special and differential enough.’); Ismail, F, Mainstreaming Development in the WTO: Developing Countries in the Doha Round (CUTS/FES 2007)Google Scholar iii (‘[T]he concept of S&DT, while recognizing the need to take into account the special needs of developing countries, is by itself ineffective and serves as a palliative for unfair and imbalanced trade rules.’)

82 Fidler (n 46) 46; see also JT Gathii, ‘Third World Approaches to International Economic Governance’ in R Falk, B Rajagopal and J Stephens (eds), (n 11) 260–1.

83 Fidler (n 46) 44–6.

84 ibid 54–5; Chimni (n 50) 215.

85 Fidler (n 46) 55.

86 Bennouna (n 41) 621. Developing countries were also accused of ‘excessive politicization’ of problems within international organizations and of being irresponsible in the examination of world problems. See Bedjaoui (n 33) 144.

87 Bradlow (n 15) 198.

88 Bennouna (n 41) 621.

89 See Faundez (n 37) 13.

90 The NIEO demands included a strong and effective voice for developing countries in the decision-making of international economic institutions; see the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, Ch. II, art 10. Recent reform of World Bank and IMF voting has seen emerging economies make the greatest gains, less so for the low-income countries that are their borrowers or are reliant on their policy prescriptions or approval. See New Rules for Global Finance at <http://www.new-rules.org> and Bradlow, DD, ‘The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment’ in Cissé, H, Bradlow, DD and Kingsbury, B (eds), The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance, Vol 3 (World Bank 2012) 41Google Scholar.

91 ‘Norway Takes Aim at the G20: One of the Greatest Setbacks Since World War II’, Der Spiegel Interview with the Norwegian Foreign Minister, 6 June 2010; and, RH Wade and J Vestergaard, ‘G20 + 5 Reinforces the Problem of Arbitrary Mechanisms’, The Financial Times (International) 18 April 2011.

92 See, among others, Macmillan (n 69) 158; R Howse, Mainstreaming the Right to Development into International Trade Law and Policy at the World Trade Organization, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/17 (2004) paras 37–9.

93 See generally Report of the 2009 Social Forum (31 August – 2 September 2009), UN Doc A/HRC/13/51.

94 Commission of Experts of the President of the General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial Systems, 19 March 2009, UN Doc A/63/XXX.

95 Koskenniemi, M, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 MLR 23CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

96 Comparable views can be found in: Peters, P, ‘Recent Developments in International Development Law’ in Chowdury, SR et al. (eds), The Right to Development in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1992) 113CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sarkar, R, International Development Law: Rule of Law, Human Rights, and Global Finance (Oxford University Press 2009) 77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and, Bennouna (n 41) 621.

97 Paul, JCN, ‘The United Nations and the Creation of an International Development Law’ (1995) 38 HarvIntlLJ 319Google Scholar.

98 UN Charter (n 13), art 13(1).

99 Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (n 3), preambular para 3; Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States (n 36), preambular para 4.

100 See Bradlow (n 15) 196.

101 Report of the High-Level Task Force on the Iimplementation of the Right to Development on its Sixth Session (14–22 January 2010), UN Doc A/HRC/15/WG.2/task force/2, para 77.

102 Bulajic (n 38) 43.

103 See, for example, Beyond Technology Transfer: Protecting Human Rights in a Climate-Constrained World (International Council on Human Rights Policy 2011) Summary and Recommendations.

104 Bradlow (n 15) 196–7.

105 This former view as outlined by Fukuda-Parr holds that: ‘economic growth is not only a necessary but a sufficient condition for improving human welfare.’ S Fukuda-Parr, Global Partnerships for Development. Paper delivered at: 25 Years of the Right to Development: Achievements and Challenges, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung/OHCHR, Berlin 24–25 February 2011; and see P Patnaik, ‘A Left Approach to Development’ XLV Economic and Political Weekly, 24 July 2010; Salomon (n 29) 128–32.

106 Bradlow (n 15) 207; and see R Danino Legal Opinion on Human Rights and the Work of the World Bank, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, World Bank, 27 January 2006, para 7.

107 Fukuda-Parr (n 105).

108 Kadri, A, ‘An Outline for the Right to Economic Development in the Arab World’ (2011) 56 Real-World Economics Review 2Google Scholar.

109 DRD (n 22) art 2(1).

110 Marks, SP, ‘The Human Right to Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality’ (2004) 17 HarvHumRtsJ 143Google Scholar.

111 DRD (n 22) preambular para 15.

112 ibid art 1(2); see also DRD, preambular para 7; Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (n 35) art 1.

113 DRD (n 22), art 2(3), preambular para 2; Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States, Ch II (n 36) art 7.

114 DRD (n 22) preambular para 16.

115 Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States (n 36) preambular para 10; see also among other provisions, preambular paras 1 and 2 and Ch 1 on ‘Fundamentals of International Economic Relations’.

116 Salomon, ME, ‘Legal Cosmopolitanism and the Normative Contribution of the Right to Development’ in Marks, SP (ed), Implementing the Right to Development: The Role of International Law (Harvard School of Public Health/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2008) 17Google Scholar.

117 For a detailed consideration, see Salomon (n 29) 114–21; see also Orford, A, ‘Globalization and the Right to Development’ in Alston, P (ed), Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press 2001) 137Google Scholar.

118 Bedjaoui, M, ‘The Right to Development’ in Bedjaoui, M (ed), International Law: Achievements and Prospects (Martinus Nijhoff 1991) 1180Google Scholar.

119 I Brownlie, ‘The Human Right to Development’ (Commonwealth Secretariat 1989) 8.

120 Salomon (n 29) 50–6.

121 Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development (Fourth Session, 9 December 1982), UN Doc E/CN4/1983/11 annex IV, Pt I, Section II, art 1.

122 A Kadri, Another Famine in the Horn of Africa: Putting Hunger in Context, Triple Crisis, 10 August 2011. <http://triplecrisis.com> on ‘landgrabs’, see among others, O de Schutter, Large-scale Land Acquisitions and Leases: A Set of Minimum Principles and Measures to Address the Human Rights Challenge, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, UN Doc A/HRC/13/33/Add.2, 28 December 2009; and ME Salomon, ‘The Ethics of Foreign Investment: Agricultural Land in Africa’, The Majalla, 5 August 2010 (English and Arabic) <http://www.majalla.com/en/ideas/article94948.ece > .

123 Saith, A, ‘From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation’ (2006) 37 Development and Change 1171CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 1196.

124 Klein, N, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism (Allen Lane 2007)Google Scholar; Sornarajah (n 52) 6.

125 L Wacquant, Bringing the State Back In, British Journal of Sociology Public Lecture, London School of Economics, 6 October 2009; L Wacquant, The Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age OpenDemocracy, 1 August 2011.

126 See generally Gewirth, A, ‘Duties to Fulfil the Human Rights of the Poor’ in Pogge, T (ed), Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? (Oxford University Press/UNESCO 2007)Google Scholar 228; T Pogge, ‘Introduction’ in T Pogge (ed), ibid 6; Marks, S, ‘Human Rights and the Bottom Billion’ (2009) 14 EHRLR 48Google Scholar.

127 See further Salomon, ME, ‘Poverty, Privilege and International Law: The Millennium Development Goals and the Guise of Humanitarianism’ (2008) 51 GYIL 39Google Scholar.

128 See M Sornarajah, ‘A Justice-Based Regime for Foreign Investment Protection and the Counsel of the Osgoode Hall Statement’, Special Section on International Law, Human Rights, and the Global Economy: Innovations and Expectations for the 21st Century (2012), Guest Editor ME Salomon, 4 Global Policy Journal 3.

129 Donnelly, J, ‘In Search of the Unicorn: The Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development’ (1985) 15 CalWIntlLJ 473Google Scholar.

130 Statement of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to the Third Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (n 18), para 2; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006, Inter-Am Ct HR (ser C), Report No 146, para 140 (The Inter-American Court of Human Rights holds that the enforcement of bilateral investment treaties should always be compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights).

131 The Public Statement on the International Investment Regime (n 64).

132 Chimni, BS, ‘The Past, Present and Future of International Law: A Critical Third World Approach’ (2007) 8 MelbJIntl L 499Google Scholar.

133 Sornarajah (n 128).