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Avenues of influence: on the political expenditures of corporations and their directors and executives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 February 2017

Adam Bonica
Adam Bonica*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Stanford University, Encina Hall West, 616 Serra Street, Room 307, Stanford, CA 94305-6044, USA
*
Corresponding author: Adam Bonica, e-mail: bonica@stanford.edu
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Abstract

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The literature on corporate political influence has primarily focused on expenditures made by corporations and their PACs but has largely ignored the political activities of the individuals who lead these firms. To better understand the role of corporate elites in political advocacy, I introduce a new database of campaign contributions made by corporate directors and executives of Fortune 500 firms. Donating to political campaigns is nearly universal among corporate elites. When compared to corporate PACs, corporate elites are more ideological, more willing to support non-incumbents, and less likely to target powerful legislators. The results also reveal substantial heterogeneity in the political preferences of directors both across and within firms. In addition to challenging widely held beliefs about the political leanings of corporate elites, the prevalence of bipartisan boardrooms has important implications for how the preferences of key decision-makers within a firm shape its political activities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Business and Politics , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 367 - 394
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston 

Footnotes

a Replication data is available for download at http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/6R1HAS.

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