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REASONS TO BELIEVE AND REASONS TO ACT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2016

Stewart Cohen
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Abstract

I consider the structural differences between reasons to believe and reasons to act. I argue that Mark Schroeder's project of providing a unified account of reasons to believe and reasons to act faces serious difficulties. I also investigate the difference between rational requirement and rational permission. While the difference between these notions in the case of action is a matter of the strength of one's reasons, I argue that in the case of belief, the difference depends on what one is attending to.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 13 , Special Issue 4: 2015 Episteme Conference , December 2016 , pp. 427 - 438
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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References

REFERENCES

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