Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-tj2md Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-24T22:00:08.468Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Abstract

The right to property was accorded the status of a human right as a result of its incorporation in international human rights instruments in the second part of the twentieth century. The right has acquired special importance as part of the freedom of the individual, his economic autonomy in modern democratic societies and generally as a significant element for the development of the individual's personality.1 Its recognition as a separate human right and its legal protection on an international level was the result of gradual efforts. It is still in the process of further legal elaboration, as regards both its scope and effect, by legal theory and jurisprudence.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2004

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Marcus-Helmons, ‘Le Droit de Propriété est-il un droit fundamental au sens de la Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme?’, in Les nouveaux Droits de L'Homme en Europe (BruxellesEuropean Lawyers' Union 1999) 193 paras 207–8; Meyer-Bisch 194 of the same article: ‘l' homme tire une partie de son identité de ce qu'il s'est approprié’.Google Scholar

2 Phillipson, CThe International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (LondonMacmillan 1911) II, 166384.Google Scholar

3 Keen, MHThe Laws of War in the Middle Ages (LondonRoutledge 1965).Google Scholar

4 Schwarzenberger, GInternational Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals II The Law of Armed Conflict (LondonStevens 1968) ch 39.Google Scholar

5 Green, LC ‘Human Rights and the Law of Armed Conflict’, in Essays on the Modern Law of War (2nd ednNew YorkTransnational 1999) 446.Google Scholar

6 Roberts, A and Guelff, RDocuments on the Laws of War (3rd ednOxfordOUP 2000) 3.Google Scholar

7 Green (n 5) 440.Google Scholar

8 Ibid 441; and Schindler, D and Toman, JThe Laws of Armed Conflicts (GenevaSijthoff-Leiden 1973) 27 Art 38.Google Scholar

9 Schindler, and Toman, (n 8) 44.Google Scholar

10 Daillier, P and Pellet, ADroit International Public (6th ednParisNguyen Quoc Dinh 1999) 481 para 314; the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg in 1946, and a report of the UN Secretary-General to the Security Council in May 1993 concerning the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, expressly recognized 1907 Hague Convention IV as declaratory of customary international law: Roberts and Guelff (n 5) 68, 178; it was on this premise that the Tribunal found that the rules in that Convention applied in respect of Czechoslovakia even though that country was not a party to the Convention;Google Scholarsee also Oppenheim's International Law II: Disputes, War and Neutrality (7th ednLauterpacht, (ed) LondonLongmans 1952) 234–5.Google Scholar

11 Whether there is occupation is a question of fact. Occupied territory means ‘any territory under the overall control of a party to the conflict’. Naletilic and Martinovic Case (Judgment) ICTY-98–34 (31 Mar 2003) para 211.Google Scholar

12 Starke, JGAn Introduction to International Law (11th ednShearer, (ed) LondonButterworths 1994) 500, 517–18.Google Scholar

13 Ibid, at 403, 619.

14 The Israeli High Court has approved acquisitions by private persons of privately owned land in the territories occupied by Israel for the settlements of Israeli civilians, with the explanation that such settlements increased the security of the occupying power and could therefore be justified on the basis of military interest (Beth El Case, Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 9 (1979)). As rightly observed by Dr Hans-Peter Gasser, Senior Legal Adviser to the International Committee of the Red Cross: ‘This extension of the concept of security as an exception to the guarantee of property should be rejected as excessive, since it nullifies the guarantee of property based in international law’: ‘Protection of the Civilian Population’ in Fleck, D (ed) The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (OxfordOUP 1995) 209, 262.Google Scholar

15 Oppenheim's International Law (n 10) 410.Google Scholar

16 This Convention reflects principles of international customary law: see Meron, THuman Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (OxfordClarendon Press 1991) 45–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Brownlie, IPrinciples of Public International Law (5th ednOxfordOUP 1998) 566.Google Scholar

18 See, eg, War Crimes Reports: the Flick trial 9 (1949) 48; the IG Farben trial 10 (1949) 1; the Krupp trial 10 (1949) 69 and more recently the ICTY trials of Blaskic Case (Judgment) ICTY-95–14 (3 Mar 2000), Naletilic and Martinovic Case (Judgment) ICTY-98–34 (31 Mar 2003), Milutinovic et al Case and Gotovina Case.Google Scholar

19 It has been held that ‘plunder’ within the meaning of the Statute encompasses ‘all forms of unlawful appropriation of property in armed conflicts for which individual criminal responsibility attaches under international law’ and extends to both cases of ‘organized’ and ‘systematic’ seizure of property from protected persons in occupied territories, as well as to ‘acts of looting committed by individual soldiers for their private gain’. Furthermore, the terms ‘pillage’, ‘plunder’, and ‘spoliation’ varyingly have been used to describe the unlawful appropriation of public and private property during armed conflicts. See the Simic et al Case (Judgment) ICTY-95–9 (17 Oct 2003) paras 98 and 99. It may also be pointed out here that in so far as any forced displacement of any person to another location may entail the loss of the use and enjoyment of that person's property, this may amount to an impermissible interference with the right to property contrary to the required protection according to the instruments under consideration:Google Scholar See ibid, paras 123 and 126 and Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI 2237–8.

20 Arts 5, 77.Google Scholar

21 See Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v the Netherlands, Series A No 306-B (1995), where the Court also observed that ‘possession’ is not limited to ownership of physical goods: other rights and interests constituting assets can also be regarded as property rights.Google Scholar

22 See Rook, DProperty Law and Human Rights (LondonBlackstone 2001) 60–1 where it is also stated that the guarantee does protect the ‘peaceful enjoyment of possessions which embraces the right to own, possess, use, lend or dispose of the property as one so desires without interference by the state’.Google Scholar

23 Art 8 of the Convention.Google Scholar

24 Art 15 of the Convention.Google Scholar

25 No derogation concerning a state of war has yet been in issue.Google Scholar

26 Cf Harris, DJ, O'Boyle, M, and Warbrick, CLaw of the European Convention on Human Rights (LondonButterworths 1995) 502. See also Art 53 of the Convention: ‘Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party.’Google Scholar

27 Art 53 of the Convention.Google Scholar

28 This requires that any taking of property must conform with international law, and it is submitted that the better view is that this requirement applies to nationals as well as to aliens: Russo, C ‘L'application aux nationaux des principes généraux du droit international vise l'article 1er du Protocol N° 1’ in Mélanges Wiarda (CologneCarl Heymann Verlag 1988) 547 et seq, and the references appearing at 522 n 5;Google ScholarCondorelli, L ‘Article 1 of the Additional Protocol’ in Pettiti, , Decaux, and Imbert, (eds) La Convention européenne des Droits de I'Homme (ParisEconomica 1995) 986–8. See to the contrary Lithgow v UK ECHR Series A No 102 (1986) and James and Others v UK ECHR Series A No 98 (1986).Google Scholar

29 Res 2675 (XXV) ‘Noting that in the present century the international community has accepted an increased role and new responsibilities for the alleviation of human suffering in any form and, in particular, during armed conflicts … Convinced that civilian populations are in special need of increased protection in time of armed conflicts … Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their future elaboration within the framework of progressive development of the international law of armed conflict: 1. Fundamental human rights, as accepted by international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply fully in situations of armed conflict …’.Google Scholar

30 Applications 6780/74, 6950/75, 8007/77, and 25781/94 respectively.Google Scholar

31 Application 15318/89.Google Scholar

32 Application 16219/90.Google Scholar

33 Application 16163/90.Google Scholar

34 See the Commission's Report in Cyprus v Turkey applications 6780/74 and 6950/75, 151 and 166, ‘there has been deprivation of possessions of Greek Cypriots on a large scale, the exact extent of which could not be determined’ and Report in application 8007/77, 42–3, 47. The reference to possible justification ‘by any of the aims mentioned in Article 1 of Protocol No 1’ was made without any consideration of the question of whether such justification can in law apply to any interference with property rights by an occupant country contrary to the Hague Regulations. Such question was not raised in the relevant proceedings and it is submitted that the answer should be in the negative (see 5–6 in the present Article). It may be added that in any event no justification in terms of Art 1 of Protocol No 1 was invoked by the respondent government. Therefore the reference to possible justification under the Article in question was obiter as well as wrong.Google Scholar

35 ResDH(79)l and ResDH(92)12.Google Scholar

36 Loizidou v Turkey (Preliminary Objections) ECHR Series A No 310 (1995) 24 para 63, and Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) (n 19), 2223, 2234.Google Scholar

37 Ibid, at 2231–2.

38 Ibid, at 2237.

39 Ibid, at 2237–8.

40 Ibid, at 2238.

41 See the Commission's Report in respect of applications 6780/74 and 6950/75, 141 et seq; and in respect of application 8007/77, 38–43; and the judgment of the Court in Cyprus v Turkey application 25781/94 ECHR 2001-IV 49–52.Google Scholar

42 Loizidou v Turkey (just satisfaction) Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 –IV.Google Scholar

43 See Blaskic (n 18) para 233. According to Art 5(h) of the Statute of the Tribunal, persecution on political, racial and religious grounds amounts to a crime against humanity punishable under the same Statute.Google Scholar

44 See at 12 of the opinion entitled ‘Legal Issues arising from Certain Population Transfers and Displacements on the Territory of the Republic of Cyprus in the Period since 20 July 1974’ <http://www.attorney-general.gov.cy>..>Google Scholar

45 Loucaides, LGEssays on the Developing Law of Human Rights (DordrechtNijhoff 1995) 133.Google Scholar

46 Oppenheim's International Law (n 10) 411.Google Scholar

47 Ibid.

48 Robinson, Transfer of Property in Enemy Occupied TerritoryAJIL 39, 221 et seq.Google Scholar

49 Oppenheim's International Law (n 10) 410–11, and Robinson, (n 48) 228–9.Google Scholar

50 Robinson, (n 48) 223.Google Scholar

51 Ibid, at 219.

52 Ibid, n 10.

53 Ibid, at 220.

54 Weidlich and Others v Germany applications 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92, 19549/92, and 18890/91.Google Scholar

55 See also Prince Hans Adam II of Liechtenstein v Germany application 42527/98 ECHR 2001-VIII.Google Scholar

56 Applications 71916/01, 71917/01, and 10260/02.Google Scholar

57 Eg A/RES/41/63[D] (3 Dec 1986). The UN Commission on Human Rights followed the same approach in a series of Resolutions entitled ‘Question of the violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories, including Palestine’, see, eg, Resolutions 1985/1 A and B (19 Feb 1985) and Resolution 1986/1 A and B (20 Feb 1986).Google Scholar

58 Roberts, and Guelff, (n 6) 300. Turkey for example, although it occupies the northern part of Cyprus since the invasion of the island in 1974, resists the terms ‘invasion’ and ‘occupation’ and uses instead the terms ‘peaceful action’ and ‘peaceful operation’; more specifically, as regards the status of the occupied area, this has been described by Turkey as the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ and later as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’); see the Commission's Report in applications 6780/74 and 6980/75 (n 34) 6–7 and at 10 of the admissibility decision attached as an appendix to the same Reports, the admissibility decision in application 8007/77 at 150 and the judgment of the Court in Cyprus v Turkey (n 41) 22–3.Google Scholar