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Unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, and mindreading
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 April 2009
Abstract
Carruthers views unsymbolized thinking as “purely propositional” and, therefore, as a potential threat to his mindreading-is-prior position. I argue that unsymbolized thinking may involve (non-symbolic) sensory aspects; it is therefore not purely propositional, and therefore poses no threat to mindreading-is-prior. Furthermore, Descriptive Experience Sampling lends empirical support to the view that access to our own propositional attitudes is interpretative, not introspective.
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References
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