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Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2026

Florian Weiler  and
Matthias Brändli
Florian Weiler*
Affiliation:
University of Bamberg, Germany
Matthias Brändli
Affiliation:
University of Zurich, Switzerland
*
Address for correspondence: Florian Weiler, University of Bamberg, Feldkirchenstrasse 21, 96045 Bamberg, Germany. Tel.: +49 (0) 951 863 2805; E‐mail: florian.weiler@uni-bamberg.de
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Abstract

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.

Keywords

interest group strategiesinside lobbyingoutside lobbyingelectoral institutionsdirect democracy

Information

Type
Original Articles
Information
European Journal of Political Research , Volume 54 , Issue 4 , November 2015 , pp. 745 - 766
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 European Consortium for Political Research

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