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7179 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute

Page 1 of 359

Localization of the United States-China Rivalry
  • Cases from the Philippines
  • Aries A. Arugay, Miguel Antonio V. Hermo, Edcel John A. Ibarra, Aletheia Kerygma B. Valenciano
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 April 2026
    Print publication:
    06 May 2025
  • The intensified rivalry between the United States and China has put small states like the Philippines in a precarious position, given its relative importance in the regional geo-strategy of both big powers.

    Since foreign and security policymaking tend to be formulated in a top-down manner, existing analyses have not paid sufficient attention to what extent this big-power competition has affected local political dynamics and local governance.

    The Philippine foreign policy pendulum has swung since 2016 between adopting a more cordial relationship with either the US or China. This opened opportunities for each big power to engage local governments in political, security, economic, and socio-cultural activities that potentially hold implications for national security.

    This study compares the engagement of the US and China with the local governments of Cagayan province in northern Luzon and Palawan province in southwestern Luzon. Both are geo-strategically important to the big powers for having coastal access to critical territorial and maritime zones (South China Sea and Taiwan).

    While China has fostered good economic and political relations with these two provinces, the presence of military sites and facilities identified by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the US and the Philippines have made it difficult for the local governments to veer away from the foreign and security policies adopted by the Marcos Jr. administration.

A Historical Note on Economic Reforms in Myanmar, 2006 to 2016
  • Lex Rieffel
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 April 2026
    Print publication:
    19 May 2025
  • This historical note seeks to provide some markers for economists and policymakers interested in Myanmar's woeful experience over seven decades when it fell from being one of the most prosperous and promising countries in East Asia at the end of World War II to one of the poorest now.

    For people interested in Myanmar's future, it is important to examine the foundations for the economic policy reforms that sparked Myanmar's joyful economic rise beginning in 2011, assess these reforms as they were carried out during the two administrations, and consider how they may have contributed to the coup in 2021.

    This note begins by focusing on the period from 2003 to 2011 when a 'Third Force' was active, mediating between the country's military rulers and the democratic opposition growing out of the 1988 uprising that gained international support through the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the NLD. In this period, the roles of 'Myanmar Egress' and the visit of Nobel-laureate economist Joseph Stiglitz are given special attention.

    The note goes on to describe the economic reforms implemented by the Thein Sein administration that arguably contributed crucially to the reforms subsequently implemented during the NLD administration. These reforms, in the five years leading up to the 2021 coup, have been thoroughly described by Sean Turnell, economic advisor to Aung San Suu Kyi in his monograph 'Best Laid Plans'. The note finishes with a short set of thoughts about lessons to be drawn and questions to be explored.

Striking While the Iron Is Hot
  • Sarawak and Federal-State Dynamics in Today's Malaysia
  • Francis E. Hutchinson, Lee Poh Onn
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    28 April 2026
    Print publication:
    27 April 2025
  • Malaysia's federal system is asymmetric, as the East Malaysian territories of Sarawak and Sabah have more autonomy and prerogatives than their West Malaysian counterparts. This reflects their incorporation into the Malaysian Federation in 1963 and distinct ethnic and religious composition. Despite this, many East Malaysians do not feel that their position within Malaysia has been beneficial. Due to their natural resource wealth, these states generate a substantial proportion of federal government revenue and yet suffer high rates of poverty and insufficient infrastructure investment. However, in Malaysia's current political context, East Malaysian parties are now kingmakers, as any national coalition must gain their support to be viable. Sarawak is particularly influential since its ruling coalition, Gabungan Parti Sarawak (GPS), is virtually invulnerable. Anwar Ibrahim's Madani administration is also dependent on GPS, and negotiations on pending East Malaysian and specifically Sarawakian issues are gathering steam. The state is pushing for greater control over natural resources, autonomy over the provision of public services, and more political representation. While further progress is likely, the prime minister faces constraints. There are considerable financial implications in yielding too much to Sarawak, and that could embolden state governments on the peninsula, some of whom are already pushing for more resources and autonomy, to seek more autonomy.

Disinformation and Election Propaganda
  • Impact on Voter Perceptions and Behaviours in Indonesia's 2024 Presidential Election
  • Maria Monica Wihardja, Burhanuddin Muhtadi, Sue-Ann Lee
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 April 2026
    Print publication:
    13 May 2025
  • This study analyses the impact of social media election campaigning, disinformation and election propaganda on voters' perceptions and behaviours in Indonesia's 2024 presidential election. It assesses the influence of social media platforms and chat messaging apps as sources of election-related information on voters and their level of trust in these mediums. The study also assesses how exposed and susceptible voters have been to various disinformation and election propaganda narratives.

    This study shows that merely being exposed to disinformation and election propaganda narratives does not necessarily sway committed loyalists and staunch supporters of a presidential candidate. The acceptance or rejection of specific disinformation and election propaganda narratives is contingent upon personality-based partisanship and allegiances to a particular candidate, corroborating the salience of confirmation bias, the phenomenon where individuals accept only information that is consistent with their political affiliation and pre-existing beliefs about their preferred candidate.

    Among 'swing voters' (those initially undecided or who are not staunch supporters of a presidential candidate), changes in exposure to disinformation or propaganda narratives are not enough to sway their votes. This study shows that for these voters, it is changes in beliefs in conspicuous election propaganda narratives that sway votes towards or away from a certain presidential candidate.

Online Campaign Narratives in Thailand's 2023 General Election
  • An Ecosystem Analysis
  • Surachanee Sriyai
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    08 April 2026
    Print publication:
    16 December 2024
  • This article explores the intricate dynamics of election-related narratives and ideological shifts that characterized Thailand's 2023 general election during a pivotal moment when the salient issue transcends the economy, encompassing a profound ideological shift that cuts across social cleavages.

    Leveraging an original dataset comprising over 2,500 posts disseminated by major parties on Facebook and X (formerly known as Twitter) one month prior to the election to two days afterwards, the findings show that while parties have different posting strategies and a predetermined platform of choice, their campaign narratives can be categorized in general terms.

    Although economic and populist policies are the most prevalent campaigning narratives for most parties, the victory of the Move Forward party, gained through highlighting social issues and structural reforms, suggests that promises to address deep-rooted societal issues might have been more appealing to the Thai voters in this election.

    Distinct engagement patterns for some types of posts are also observed, alluding that netizens' reactions can be different based on the types of content posted by parties. However, apart from the Move Forward Party's followers, discrediting narratives did not receive much reaction from other parties' followers.

Southeast Asian Affairs 2025
  • Edited by Terence Chong, Daljit Singh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    01 May 2025
  • Southeast Asian Affairs, produced since 1974, is an annual review of significant trends and developments in the region. The emphasis is on ASEAN countries but important developments in the broader Asia-Pacific region are not ignored. The publication seeks to provide readable and easily understood analyses of major political, strategic, economic and social developments within the region.

Putin's Russia and Southeast Asia
  • The Kremlin's Pivot to Asia and the Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War
  • Ian Storey
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    22 May 2025
  • In the first major study of Russia-Southeast Asia relations since the end of the Cold War, Ian Storey traces the dramatic shifts in Moscow's interests in the region under President Vladimir Putin. He skillfully assesses the long-lasting legacy of the Soviet Union, traces the evolution of Putin's foreign policy and identifies the driving forces behind the Kremlin's Pivot to Asia. With expert insights, Storey examines Russia's political, economic and military engagement with ASEAN and each of the eleven Southeast Asian countries over the past quarter of a century. He also delivers an in-depth analysis of how Southeast Asia responded to Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and what the Russia-Ukraine War means for Moscow's great power ambitions in the region and beyond.

Economic Governance of Non-State Authorities in Myanmar
  • Potentials and Pitfalls
  • Jared Bissinger
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    30 April 2025
  • Since Myanmar's 2021 military coup, the reach and influence of non-state authorities have spread considerably, providing them with greater scope to govern economic activity in parts of Myanmar.

    Taxation is among non-state authorities' most widespread aspects of economic governance. Numerous groups rely on checkpoints and road tolls, with other common taxes covering natural resource extraction, agricultural production, and business activity. At least one non-state authority collects monthly household taxes, with higher rates for wealthier households.

    Other forms of economic governance implemented by non-state authorities include land titling and regulation, business licensing, business registration, and infrastructure repair/development. Numerous groups have authority over aspects of trade, and some have either stated policies or informal engagement with foreign investors.

    Economic governance varies due to historical experience and group capacity, among other factors, but there are numerous promising practices that show policy experimentation and responsiveness to local needs and concerns. The Karen National Union's governance of land shows that sophisticated governance at scale by non-state authorities is possible. However, there are examples of policies and practices that distort economic activity, negatively affect livelihoods, and raise revenue in regressive ways.

    Collaboration to develop and implement joint quasi-federal governance for national-level economic powers, such as trade, has been limited. This raises questions about whether Myanmar's non-state authorities can offer a viable national-level alternative to the State Administration Council (SAC), or whether they constitute an alternative only for some subnational areas and powers.

Malaysia Chairs ASEAN at a Strategic Crossroads
  • Priorities, Opportunities and Challenges
  • Joanne Lin, Kristina Fong, Melinda Martinus
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    20 May 2025
  • Malaysia's ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, under the theme 'Inclusivity and Sustainability', draws from the Madani concept and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim's long-standing vision of an Asian renaissance. It reflects Malaysia's aspiration to promote a forward-looking, values-based leadership grounded in sustainability, inclusivity and regional solidarity.

    Malaysia's chairmanship takes place amid heightened geopolitical volatility, including intensifying major power rivalry, ongoing tensions in the South China Sea, and the deepening political and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar. Malaysia is expected to lead with a more pragmatic and action-oriented approach to the South China Sea and more structured engagement with Myanmar's opposition groups and humanitarian actors, while managing ASEAN's internal divisions and external pressures.

    The chairmanship coincides with key milestones, including the tenth anniversary of the ASEAN Community and the adoption of the ASEAN Community Vision 2045. Malaysia is expected to guide ASEAN in reviewing the region's progress and finalizing the vision's strategic plans.

    On economic integration, Malaysia is expected to steer the conclusion of key deliverables such as the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), the ASEAN Green Deal 2030, and upgraded agreements, including ATIGA and ACFTA, while promoting inclusive growth, sustainable finance, and digital transformation.

    Malaysia will also lead efforts to enhance ASEAN's external relations by strengthening cooperation with traditional dialogue partners and promoting South-South engagement, including through the proposed ASEAN-GCC-China Summit. These initiatives will be pursued alongside efforts to reinforce ASEAN's commitment to multilateralism, strategic autonomy, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

Reviving UMNO
  • Party Institutionalization and Coalition Management in Selangor and Malacca
  • Tricia Yeoh
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    12 June 2025
  • Since Malaysia's independence in 1957 until 2018, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was the single dominant party in control of an authoritarian regime, having been the main party within the long-ruling National Front (Barisan Nasional, or BN). Since its fall from power in 2018, key events have reshaped its party structure, leadership and overall support. Today, it sits in a large-tent coalition at the federal level, is part of the state government in seven states, and of these, controls the position of chief minister in three.

    Using the states of Malacca and Selangor as case studies, this paper examines UMNO's current state of leadership, how the PH-BN coalition is being managed and how this relationship is being communicated to the grassroots, and how these key elements contribute to the deinstitutionalization of the party.

    While grappling with party factionalism and leadership gaps at the national level, UMNO in both Selangor and Malacca has also undergone significant leadership changes. Serious efforts are being made to strengthen state-level leadership, but these remain overshadowed by the gaps in the party's central leadership.

    UMNO is in a unique position of being positionally stable but institutionally weak, and the cases of Selangor and Malacca offer some insight into how its internal dynamics play out on the ground.

    While the party may never fully reclaim its past strength, it can, however, leverage its existing resources and use this period to reorganize and strengthen its institutional foundations.

Obstacles to Reform in Myanmar
  • Lessons from the Past, for a Better Future
  • Winston Set Aung
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    19 March 2026
    Print publication:
    25 June 2025
  • Myanmar experienced a decade of reforms from 2011 to 2021 under the administrations of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the National League for Democracy (NLD). But policymakers in both administrations were often ill-prepared to push the economy to its potential, and they were hindered by a lack of resources and beset by obstacles at every turn. Challenges have persisted into the efforts of the current State Administration Council (SAC) military regime to administer the country after the 2021 coup.

    Obstacles include bureaucratic inertia resisting reforms; lack of experience, exposure and technical knowledge; deep-rooted corruption; hasty decision-making to show strong leadership; and overconfident bureaucrats with narrow perspectives.

    Past and present experiences of obstacles must transform into valuable lessons for the future. This requires acknowledging issues and obstacles, carefully analysing them to understand their origins, and implementing thoughtful reforms that address both symptoms and underlying causes.

    Any future administration must possess the wisdom and determination to confront such challenges head-on, drawing upon past experiences to forge a path towards a more prosperous and hopeful future for Myanmar.

    Myanmar's current moment of significant hardship presents an opportunity to prepare for a better future and to treat that possibility as more imminent than impossible. It is thus crucial to take proactive steps now to ensure preparedness for any opportunity and potential for change when the time comes.

The Democratic Action Party at Sixty
  • Struggles over Seniority, Structure, and Strategy
  • Francis E. Hutchinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    22 July 2025
  • Traditionally an opposition outfit, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has evolved to become a mainstream operation. A consequential player in Malaysian politics, it now has forty members of parliament and ninety state assembly representatives.

    Because of its cadre-based structure, the DAP usually has orderly party elections. Nonetheless, foundational issues have caused some disagreements to bubble to the sur-face - most recently at the 2025 National Party Congress.

    Now approaching its sixtieth year, the party is grappling with three key challenges.

    The first is the managing of generational change and the fostering of greater inclusiveness. Senior leaders are retiring, not always willingly; and while the party is multiracial in outlook, it has struggled to diversify its leadership.

    The second stems from it evolving from having a small group structure into a larger and more complex organization. No longer a uniquely nationally focused party, the DAP's leaders are increasingly nourishing support bases at the state level - shifting power within the party structure outwards and downwards.

    The third is the managing of diverse expectations. While much of its support base sees the DAP as the opposition, it is now in government. Navigating within the boundaries of what is politically feasible now calls for a different set of skills.

Retelling the Tale of Two Democracies
  • How Shifting Urban-Rural Dynamics Shaped Thailand's 2023 General Election
  • Napon Jatusripitak
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    14 January 2025
  • Thailand's 2023 general election reveals a political landscape undergoing significant transformation, where the traditional Bangkok-versus-countryside political dichotomy has given way to more nuanced urban-rural electoral dynamics unfolding within individual provinces and constituencies.

    As urbanization spreads across Thailand, political candidates adapt their campaign strategies to appeal to voters across the urban-rural divide in their constituencies, leveraging the resources and competitive advantages that come with their party affiliation.

    Parties with strong ideological stances and popular prime ministerial candidates who took clear positions on political reform performed better in urban constituencies than rural ones. Conversely, parties that specialized in candidate-centred, locally driven campaigns - including vote-canvassing networks - saw greater success in rural constituencies.

    A visible trend of ballot splitting emerged in rural constituencies, where voters frequently supported nationally appealing parties like the Move Forward Party (MFP) in the party-list vote but chose local candidates from other parties for constituency seats.

    A more urbanized electorate nationwide, combined with rural voters' strategic distinction between national and local preferences, enabled the MFP to win constituency seats outside major cities and secure strong party-list support across the urban-rural spectrum.

Revolutionary Regimes
  • Emerging Forms of Governance in Post-Coup Myanmar
  • Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung, Ashley South
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    13 March 2025
  • A variety of governance forms have emerged in Myanmar's post-coup landscape, bringing together established Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) with dynamic new actors from a broad spectrum of elected lawmakers, youth, women and civil society in Myanmar's 'Spring Revolution' against the 2021 coup and military rule.

    Experiments with new forms of governance have had varying degrees of success, with wide swathes of territory across the country coming under the control of groups opposed to the State Administration Council (SAC). Governance in non-SAC areas ranges from union-level claims, through regional, township and village tract arrangements. We identify five main types of governance in non-SAC areas: (1) Direct EAO governance - generally an (often benign) one-party state, in the name of a specific ethnic group; (2) Emergent (post-coup) state or area-based governance with more inclusion of civilians and local minorities, in a specific area; (3) Transitional governance arrangements, moving from model 1 to model 2; (4) Local resistance administrations in non-EAO areas - often aligned with the National Unity Government; (5) Indigenous local governance - at organic village/community-level, but also radical initiatives such as the Salween Peace Park in northern Karen State.

    These developments have significant implications for democratic practices, national reconciliation and intercommunal relationships in Myanmar, serving as 'bottom-up building blocks' for a new federalism aspired to by many ethnic minority groups.

    However, they remain vulnerable to junta attacks and are potentially subject to conflict due to overlapping territorial claims and the unsettled nature of territorial control by competing armed groups.

Indonesia's Political Volunteer Organizations
  • Tools of Mobilization and of Patronage
  • Made Supriatma
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    06 March 2025
  • The concept of political volunteerism in Indonesia differs markedly from that in established democracies. In Indonesia, it is less about civic engagement or strengthening democracy and more about serving as a tool for candidates to mobilize voters and win elections.

    The relationship between candidates and their volunteers is reciprocal but often imbalanced, fostering opportunities for patronage within electoral politics.

    Volunteers emerge from an electoral system requiring candidates to meet high thresholds to participate. In Indonesia's multiparty system, where most parties fail to meet these thresholds, coalition-building becomes essential as support for the singular candidate.

    As a result, candidates often lack strong ties to a party or coalition. Volunteer groups, operating independently from party structures and directly under candidates' control, provide an alternative mechanism for voter mobilization.

    The importance of volunteer groups may decline if political parties become more institutionalized, and candidates consolidate support through single well-established parties with significant voter backing.

Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents
  • A'an Suryana
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    01 August 2025
  • Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country's largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.

    Candidates actively develop ties with the organization's leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.

    Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.

    This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia's presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU's political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia's history.

Current Perspectives on Geopolitics among Southeast Asian Youths
  • Sharon Seah, Eugene R. L. Tan
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 January 2026
    Print publication:
    01 April 2025
  • Youths are becoming an increasingly significant political force in Southeast Asian countries. As a collective, young Southeast Asians aged 18-35 have the potential to exert greater sway over their respective national foreign policymaking landscapes. They will also occupy key positions in their respective countries and societies in the future, thus understanding young Southeast Asian opinion leaders' views on geopolitics can provide valuable insight into the future of foreign policymaking in the region.

    Using mixed purposive and open sampling methods, this series of Focus Group Discussions engaged thirty-three youths from the ASEAN-6 countries - Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam - between September and October 2024. Semi-structured interview questions and polling methods were used, and the results were aggregated and comparisons made for all age groups found in The State of Southeast Asia 2024 survey.

    The study's findings are fourfold. (1) Mainstream news sources remained the most referred source of information for youth elites. (2) Young Southeast Asian elites had a stronger preference for China over the US when compared to respondents across all age groups in the survey. (3) Japan and India emerged as the top preferred hedging partners for Southeast Asian youth. This stood in contrast to the results of the general survey where the EU emerged as the most preferred choice. (4) Youth elites in the region were deeply concerned about ASEAN becoming an arena for major power competition, the ineffectiveness of the organization, the disunity, and the growing disconnect with the average Southeast Asian citizen.

Myanmar's Uncharted Territories
  • Pitfalls and Prospects in Emergent Forms of Governance
  • Ardeth Thawnghmung, Gwen Robinson
  • Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    29 January 2026
    Print publication:
    06 July 2025
  • An escalation of violence in Myanmar has led to a significant loss of territories by the Myanmar junta and reconfigured the country's political terrain. The territories can presently be characterized broadly into Junta-controlled areas with low resistance, junta-controlled areas with high resistance, active armed conflict areas, areas controlled by highly vulnerable non-state armed groups, areas controlled by non-state armed groups that are not as vulnerable, and border areas sheltering internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees.

    Negative concerns originated from the proliferation of armed actors and a growing conflict among non-state armed actors and inter- and intra-communal hostilities, while positive responses are drawn from emerging bottom-up local governing practices.

    The SAC has various options. It can intensify repression, it can divide and rule, or it can negotiate settlements on the terms set by the National Unity Government (NUG) and its coalition partners. Any of these could perpetuate the status quo or lead to negotiations that may either revert to civil war or result in further negotiations for 'federal democracy'.

    The nature of Myanmar's future territorial and governing landscapes will be determined by the relationships between union-level actors and regional actors, as well as those among regional actors.

    Given the many fault lines in Myanmar, domestic and international peace-building efforts will need to focus on fostering a broad coalition for federal democracy and mediating differences among anti-SAC forces, while encouraging local power holders to be more accountable to and sensitive about the needs of populations under their administrations.

  • Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents

  • A'an Suryana, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
  • Book:
    Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    01 August 2025, pp 1-26

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia, with a reported membership of between 40 and 162 million, has played an immense role in Indonesian presidential elections. It can be described as a loosely structured organization comprising Islamic boarding schools and autonomous agencies. However, given its vast resources and branches across the archipelago, including a massive budget, NU-affiliated schools, and its representatives in the influential umbrella organization, Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), NU has effectively played both the roles of power broker and community mobilizer. Many senior kiais who serve as NU leaders can influence their followers and sympathizers through sermons and speeches. Given such a context, initiating and maintaining political engagement with NU have been crucial for Indonesia’s presidents if they are to execute their social, political and developmental agendas and guarantee their re-election for a second term or their longevity in power.

    Because of their immense number, NU voters have played a crucial role in contributing to a presidential candidate’s victory since 2004. In the 2024 presidential election that secured Prabowo Subianto’s win, they made up at least 40 million, or one-fifth of the 204.8 million registered voters. Among them, more than half (55.8 per cent) voted for Prabowo, while 21.8 per cent and 12.8 per cent voted for Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo, respectively. A similar percentage of NU voters (56 per cent) voted for Joko Widodo in the 2019 presidential election, securing his win.

  • Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents

  • A'an Suryana, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
  • Book:
    Nahdlatul Ulama and its Political Engagement with Indonesian Presidents
    Published by:
    ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
    Published online:
    07 February 2026
    Print publication:
    01 August 2025, pp vii-viii

  • Summary

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

    • Since Indonesia adopted a direct presidential election in 2004, which applies a one-man, one-vote system, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, has played an increasingly significant role in elections.

    • Candidates actively develop ties with the organization’s leaders and vast voter base to improve their chances of winning elections.

    • Factors driving the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU are arguably contingent on the dynamics of the existing political situation. Whereas material or transactional factors defined the political engagement between NU and presidents Soeharto, Megawati Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto, the relationships were driven mainly by ideological factors under the administrations of Soekarno and Joko Widodo.

    • This article seeks to trace, albeit briefly, the political engagement between Indonesia’s presidents and NU throughout the presidencies of Soekarno to Prabowo Subianto. This longitudinal research seeks to give readers a more comprehensive understanding of NU’s political engagement with different presidents throughout Indonesia’s history.

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