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Establishing economic property rights is a ubiquitous human activity that is key to the creation of wealth. Why the Rush? combines economic and historical analysis to argue that the institution of homesteading, as established in the US through the Homestead Act of 1862, was a method to establish meaningful, economic property rights on the American frontier. It explains how homesteading rushed millions of people into specific areas, established a meaningful sovereignty without the use of military force and became the means by which the US Thwarted military and legal challenges. Using fine-grained data, along with a detailed theoretical analysis and exhaustive institutional content, this book makes a serious contribution to the study of economic property rights and institutions providing the definitive analysis of the economics of homesteading and its role in American economic history.
Researchers generally do an excellent job tracking the scientific impacts of their scholarship in ways that are relevant for academia (e.g., publications, grants) but too often neglect to focus on broader impacts on population health and equity. The National Cancer Institute’s Implementation Science Centers in Cancer Control (ISC3) includes 7 P50 Centers that are interested in broad measures of impact. We provide an overview of the approach underway within the ISC3 consortium to identify health and social impacts.
Methods:
ISC3 adapted and applied the Translational Science Benefits Model (TSBM) to identify the impact on the discipline of D&I science and to consider dissemination and implementation (D&I) impacts in the four original TSBM domains: (1) clinical; (2) community; (3) economic; and (4) policy. To collect data from all Centers, we: (1) co-developed a set of detailed impact indicators with examples; (2) created a data collection template; and (3) summarized the impact data from each center.
Results:
Based on data from 48 ISC3 pilot studies, cores, or consortium activities, we identified 84 distinct benefits. The most common impacts were shown for implementation science (43%), community (28%), and clinical (18%). Frequent audiences included primary care providers, public health practitioners, and community partners. ISC3 members highlighted the need for product feedback, and storytelling assistance to advance impact.
Conclusions:
The ISC3 consortium is using a participatory approach to successfully apply the TSBM, thus seeking to maximize the real-world impacts of D&I science. The D&I field needs to prioritize ways to more fully document and communicate societal impacts.
Psychiatric services are under increasing pressure to provide effective patient care with diminishing resources. In NHS Lothian, there is a sector-based model and chronic issues with lack of inpatient beds.
We aim to examine the admission to discharge process at the Royal Edinburgh Hospital (REH) for patients within the North-West sector of Edinburgh (NW) to identify areas for improvement.
Methods
We collected data for NW admissions and discharges from the five General Adult Psychiatry wards in REH in 2023, two of which are allocated NW wards.
Admissions to the Intensive Psychiatric Care Unit were excluded as they indicated differing severity, and discharges via the ‘long-stay’ ward were excluded due to other factors delaying discharge.
Data was collected from NHS Lothian Analytical Services and anonymised in line with NHS Information Governance Policy.
Qualitative data was collected anonymously from staff within NHS Lothian in the form of an online questionnaire to identify strengths and weaknesses of the current processes.
Results
In 2023 there were 133 discharges of NW patients in REH. The average age was 39 years old and most common diagnosis was a psychotic illness (36%).
Qualitative data identified that admitting patients to hospital is increasingly challenging due to capacity issues and the lack of a community transfer plan.
53% of NW patients were admitted to NW wards. 27% of patients were moved between wards during their admission.
Length of stay (LOS) and readmission rates were used as proxy measures to examine patient outcomes. Patients who remained on the same ward during their admission had an average LOS of 28 days. 22% were re-admitted within the calendar year. Outcomes were no better when patients remained on their sector ward.
Patients who moved ward during their admission to hospital had an average LOS of 47 days. 45% were re-admitted.
Conclusion
A lack of bed capacity is having a negative impact on patient care in NHS Lothian. Staff expressed concerns about the admission process and patients are moving wards during acute episodes of care to accommodate a sector-based model and chronic lack of capacity. Lack of continuity during admissions may be contributing to longer admissions and more re-admissions, further impacting on capacity.
A review of the strategic planning of NHS Lothian Psychiatric care is required, including capacity planning, admission protocols and policies on boarding patients. We will disseminate these results to support this process and any future work into this topic.
U.S. homesteading has been linked to establishing federal sovereignty over western lands threatened by the Confederacy, foreign powers, and the Indian Wars in the last half of the nineteenth century. However, the bulk of homesteading actually took place in the early twentieth century, long after these threats to federal ownership ceased. We argue that this “late homesteading” was also an effort to enforce federal rights, but in response to a different threat—a legal one. Questionable federal land policies in the late nineteenth century dispossessed massive amounts of Indigenous lands, and exposed the federal government to legal, rather than violent, conflict. Late homesteading was used to make the dispossession permanent, even in cases where a legal defeat eventually occurred. Examining the qualitative evidence, and using data on the universe of individual homesteads and federal land cessions across the 16 western states, we find evidence consistent with this hypothesis.
Yoram Barzel was a Chicago trained price theorist who became a foundational contributor to the literature on property rights and transaction costs. In this commemoration I outline the academic path he took, but then concentrate on the set of transformative ideas he had that led to ‘the theory of economic property rights’. It was Yoram's belief that such a theory is the ground floor for the study of the organization of economic activity, and therefore, should be used to understand the structure and form of law, institutions, firms, and all other forms of organization.
When many individuals combine their inputs in production, common property problems arise. Often the use of low incentive wage contracts are necessary to mitigate overuse. However, such contracts mean that workers need direction from others. This is the seed of an organization. The central person in an organization must be able to bare the risks of their decisions, and so the owner of the organization is often the holder of the equity capital, which is used to convince others that they will not bear negative residuals.
Transaction costs are the costs of strengthening a given distribution of economic property rights. When these costs are positive, economic property rights are never perfect and the Coase Theorem does not hold. Furthermore, different distributions of these property rights lead to different levels of joint wealth.
Institutions are the system of legal rules and social norms that enhance individual economic property rights. Individuals take them as exogenous, but they are endogenous to the entire system. Institutions are complicated distributions of economic property rights and are therefore the result of attempts to maximize wealth net of the transaction costs involved. This chapter defines institutions, relates them to property rights, reviews the literature, and provides numerous examples of institutions and their evolution.
Throughout history, individual laborers have often not had freedoms of movement, effort, or work choice. Workers have worked under master/servant relations, indentured servitude, and even slavery. Within marriage, the doctrine of coverture made wives assume the legal identity of their husband. Such restrictions on individual freedoms affect the choices these indivduals make, and lead to various transaction costs. These costs help explain the organization and institutions surrounding nonfree labor.
Output is higher when individuals cooperate and combine their inputs in some type of production. This exposes the attributes of their inputs to other people. Since contracts and agreements cannot prevent overuse of someone elses attributes, transaction costs arise in every form of human production interaction. Specific contracts are designed to mitigate this problem.
One of the greatest placements of wealth into the public domain was the US federal governments decision to issue large land grants to railroads and many small land grants to homesteaders in the nineteenth century. These lands were enormous in size, and putting them in the public domain induced a massive rush to get them. This chapter argues that the government wanted the lands to be taken and occupied, and that this was the benefit of placing them in the public domain, even though the racing was costly and they could have sold the lands.
The traditional economic model implies that ownership is irrelevant for resource allocation. This result is known as the Coase Theorem. The Coase Theorem is just an idea, not a reality. Its importance comes from understanding its logic. It relies on the assumption of zero transaction costs. When this assumption is violated, then the way ownership is organized matters. Hence, a theory of ownership, or a theory of the allocation of property rights, must be based on models of positive transaction costs.