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1 results

  • Chapter 9 - The Lottery, the Preface, and Epistemic Rule Consequentialism

  • Edited by Igor Douven
  • Book:
    Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief
    Published online:
    29 January 2021
    Print publication:
    04 February 2021, pp 171-184

  • Summary

    In this chapter, we will revisit a recent solution to the lottery paradox by Igor Douven (2008b) that we believe, has been underappreciated. More specifically, we aim to show the following: First, Douven’s solution is best seen as epistemic rule consequentialist at heart and, once thus seen, it is more attractive than it might seem at first glance and indeed more than Douven himself would have us think. Second, Douven’s specific way of implementing epistemic rule consequentialism does not offer a fully satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox. Fortunately, however, a better alternative is available. Finally, third, we will work towards an epistemic rule consequentialist solution to the related preface paradox. Interestingly enough, while the lottery paradox does support the alternative form of rule consequentialism over Douven’s, in case of the preface paradox, it does not matter which version of the view one adopts. Both lead to the same result.