When the information of many individuals is pooled, the resulting aggregate often is a good predictor of unknown quantities or facts. This aggregate predictor frequently outperforms the forecasts of experts or even the best individual forecast included in the aggregation process (“wisdom of crowds”). However, an appropriate aggregation mechanism is considered crucial to reaping the benefits of a “wise crowd”. Of the many possible ways to aggregate individual forecasts, we compare (uncensored and censored) arithmetic and geometric mean and median, continuous double auction market prices and sealed bid-offer call market prices in a controlled experiment. We use an asymmetric information structure, where participants know different sub-sets of the total information needed to exactly calculate the asset value to be estimated. We find that prices from continuous double auction markets clearly outperform all alternative approaches for aggregating dispersed information and that information lets only the best-informed participants generate excess returns.

Asymmetric distribution of information, while omnipresent in real markets, is rarely considered in experimental financial markets. We present results from experiments where subjects endogenously choose between five information levels (four of them costly). We find that (i) uninformed traders earn the highest net returns, while average informed traders always perform worst even when information costs are not considered; (ii) over time traders learn to pick the most advantageous information levels (full information or no information); and (iii) market efficiency decreases with higher information costs. These results are mostly in line with the theoretical predictions of Grossman and Stiglitz (Am. Econ. Rev. 70:393-408, 1980) and provide additional insights that studies with only two information levels cannot deliver.

There is a heated debate on whether markets erode social responsibility and moral behavior. However, it is a challenging task to identify and measure moral behavior in markets. Based on a theoretical model, we examine in an experiment the relation between trading volume, prices and moral behavior by setting up markets that either impose a negative externality on third parties or not. We find that moral behavior reveals itself in lower trading volume in markets with a negative externality, while prices mostly depend on the market structure. We further investigate individual characteristics that explain trading behavior in markets with negative externalities.

With a novel experimental design we investigate whether risk perception, return expectations, and investment propensity are influenced by the scale of the vertical axis in charts. We explore this for two presentation formats, namely return charts and price charts, where we depict low- and high-volatility assets with distinct trends. We find that varying the scale strongly affects people’s risk perception, as a narrower scale of the vertical axis leads to significantly higher perceived riskiness of an asset even if the underlying volatility is the same. Furthermore, past returns predict future return expectations almost perfectly. In our setting perceived profitability was considered more important than perceived riskiness when making investment choices. Overall we show that adapting the scale of a chart makes it easier to recognize yearly return variations within a single security, but at the same time makes it harder to identify differences between dissimilar securities. This is something regulators should be aware of and take into account in the rules they set.

In this methodological study we analyze price adjustment processes in multi-period laboratory asset markets with five distinct fundamental value (FV) regimes in a unified framework. Minimizing the effect of between-treatment variations we run markets with deterministically decreasing, constant, randomly fluctuating and—as main innovation—markets with deterministically increasing FVs. We find (i) efficient pricing in markets with constant FVs, (ii) overvaluation in markets with decreasing FVs, and (iii) undervaluation in markets with increasing FVs. (iv) Markets with randomly fluctuating fundamentals show overvaluation when FVs predominantly decline and undervaluation when FVs are mostly upward-sloping. Finally, we document that (v) bid-ask spreads and volatility of price changes are positively correlated with mispricing across regimes. The main contribution of the paper is to provide clean comparisons between distinct FV regimes, in particular between markets with increasing FVs and other regimes.

We review bubble measures which are commonly used in the experimental asset market literature. It seems sensible to require that measures of mispricing should (i) relate the fundamental value and price, (ii) be monotone in the difference between fundamental value and price, and (iii) be independent of the total number of periods and the absolute level of fundamental value. We show that none of the measures currently used fulfills all these criteria. To facilitate comparability across different experimental settings with different parameterizations we propose two alternative measures which fulfill all evaluation criteria. The measure for mispricing, RAD (relative absolute deviation), is calculated by averaging absolute differences between the (volume-weighted) mean price and the fundamental value across all periods and normalizing it with the absolute value of the average FV of the market. The measure for overvaluation, RD (relative deviation), is calculated analogously, but uses raw difference between (volume-weighted) mean prices and fundamental values. Hence, it provides information on whether the mispricing stems from over- or undervaluation of the asset.

In 1988 Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (henceforth SSW) introduced a very influential model to test the efficiency of experimental asset markets. They and many subsequent studies observe that bubbles are robust to many treatment changes. Instead, bubbles are avoided only when subjects are experienced in the same setting, when the dividend-process is experienced by subjects beforehand, or when the fundamental value-process (FV) is presented in a well understandable context to reduce subjects’ confusion. We extend this line of research and show that even marginal changes in the experimental instructions/procedure can eliminate bubbles in the SSW-model. In particular, we show that mispricing is significantly reduced and overvaluation is eliminated completely (i) when the fundamental value process is displayed in a graph instead of a table or (ii) when subjects are asked about the current fundamental value at the beginning of each period. From a questionnaire conducted at the end of the experiment we infer that these treatment changes help to improve subjects’ understanding of the FV-process. We conclude that all bubble reducing factors have one common feature: they allow subjects to understand the non-intuitive declining FV-process of the SSW-model better and thus reduce subjects’ confusion about the FV-process.

We run laboratory experiments to analyze the impact of prior investment experience on price efficiency in asset markets. Before subjects enter the asset market they gain either no, positive, or negative investment experience in an investment game. To get a comprehensive picture about the role of experience we implement two asset market designs. One is prone to inefficient pricing, exhibiting bubble and crash patterns, while the other exhibits efficient pricing. We find that (i) both, positive and negative, experience gained in the investment game lead to efficient pricing in both market settings. Further, we show that (ii) the experience effect dominates potential effects triggered by positive and negative sentiment generated by the investment game. We conjecture that experiencing changing price paths in the investment game can create a higher sensibility on changing fundamentals (through higher salience) among subjects in the subsequently run asset market.

How does risk aversion change in wealth? To answer this question, we implemented a field experiment in the form of a free-to-play mobile game. Players made lottery choices at various points in the game and at different levels of in-game wealth. Since the game was designed as a closed economic system, that is, wealth could not be transferred into or out of the game, only in-game wealth was relevant for players’ choices. Analyzing the choices of over 2000 players, we find evidence for decreasing absolute risk aversion and decreasing relative risk aversion. We also find evidence of an “always safe” heuristic in a subgroup of decisions and observe a tendency of players to act according to the “hot hand fallacy”. Our research design allows us to exclude inertia and lets us analyze lottery stakes of significant size relative to in-game wealth. Our results render implications for theoretical research, empirical studies, and for the optimal design of financial products.

Experimental asset markets with a constant fundamental value ($\mathrm{F}\mathrm{V}$) have grown in importance in recent years. A methodological examination of the robustness of experimental results in such a setting which has been shown to produce bubbles, however, is lacking. In a laboratory experiment with 280 subjects, we investigate whether specific design features are sufficient to influence experimental results. In detail, we (1) vary the visual representation of the price chart, and (2) provide subjects with full information about the FV process. We find overvaluation and bubble formation to be reduced when trading prices are displayed at the upper end of the price chart. Surprisingly, we do not find any effects when subjects have full information about the FV process.

The connection between populism and democracy is widely researched. Most of the literature focuses on populist actors (e.g., parties, leaders, and governments) as it examines the intricacies of this relationship. Some of the resulting takeaways have become embedded firmly in scholarship and are currently considered accepted knowledge across the discipline. Scholars have only recently started focusing on the individual-level relationship between populism and democracy. As a result, our knowledge remains limited and is often based on the assumption that what holds for populist actors also will hold for populist citizens. The first part of this article briefly reviews the state of the art on the individual-level relationship between populism and democracy. Drawing from this review, we identify several theoretical and empirical gaps and limitations in the literature that future research should address. We conclude that contemporary scholarship has made important contributions, but more nuanced and targeted research is necessary to comprehensively understand the intricacies between populism and democracy on the individual level.

Canadian entomology collections contain valuable biodiversity and ecological data. To be most accessible to those working outside of the collections, they need to be digitised. Multiple analyses of the digital database of the Odonata collection at the Royal British Columbia Museum (Victoria, British Columbia, Canada) were conducted. These analyses reveal that complete digital datasets can be used to explore questions of historical and current geographical distribution and species composition differences based on ecoprovince and elevation. The results of these analyses can be used directly in conservation and climate change impact mitigation decisions. These analyses are possible only because the Odonata collection has received concerted effort to digitise all specimen records. The full value of long-term historical insect biodiversity data can be accessed only once collections are digitised. Additional training and employment of collection management and curatorial staff is essential to optimise the use of abundant but underused Canadian biodiversity data.

The phoretic mite assemblage of the Douglas-fir beetle, Dendroctonus pseudotsugae Hopkins (Coleoptera: Curculionidae), has not been thoroughly documented. Phoretic mites can impact fitness and population dynamics of hosts; documenting a mite assemblage may provide information on their ecological roles. We caught Douglas-fir beetles in central British Columbia, Canada, and sorted associated mites into morphospecies. Representatives of the morphospecies were DNA barcoded (CO1 barcode region), indicating at least nine operational taxonomic units (OTUs). Representatives of all OTUs were slide-mounted and morphologically identified. There was a mean of 50.5 ± 4.7 mites per beetle, with both females and males carrying similar numbers of most mite species, except for OTU B1, which was found in higher numbers on females. OTU B1, Parawinterschmidtia furnissi (Woodring) (Astigmata: Winterschmidtiidae), was found in substantially higher numbers than all other OTUs and was always clustered in large aggregations in an anterior pocket on the beetles’ subelytral surface. When this OTU was removed from the calculation, the mean number dropped to 1.3 ± 0.2 mites per beetle. The consistent high numbers of OTU B1 in conjunction with its consistent anatomical aggregation suggests an important interaction between this particular mite species and the Douglas-fir beetle.