Introduction: Jos – paradise lost?

The violent politicization of religion has intermittently marked Jos, the capital of Plateau State, from 2001 to 2015. How this came to be, and how it is now gradually being overcome, is a lesson for many communities in northern Nigeria. Jos represented one of the most volatile ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. Since September 2001, there have been a series of destructive episodes of collective violence in Jos. While the rioting has not been continuous, it has divided much of the religiously plural city into Muslim and Christian areas and created a climate of fear and uncertainty (Danfulani & Fwatshak 2002; Bagudu 2004, 2008; Higazi 2007, 2011; Ostien 2009). Jos is a city in central Nigeria with approximately 1 million inhabitants, situated on the high Plateau in an area of great ethnic and linguistic diversity, with a large number of ‘minority’ ethnic groups and also a century or more long presence of Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and others. There is also a large presence of people with origins in southern Nigeria in Jos, especially the Yoruba and Igbo. While previously known as a peaceful part of Nigeria, Jos has since 2001 gained notoriety as a communal violence flashpoint. Thousands of people have been killed in the violent conflicts in Plateau State (not just in Jos city) between 2001 and 2015. In addition to the heavy loss of life caused by a series of riots, there was extensive population displacement and damage to property and the city's infrastructure. The riots also led to a collapse of trust between Muslims and Christians in Jos. While interaction continues in markets and can be cordial, mutual suspicion is pervasive. Contrasting with the image of Jos as a picturesque peace-loving destination, the cycle of repeated violence came as a surprise to many Nigerians. The city was regarded as cosmopolitan in both outlook and composition. Muslims and Christians co-existed peacefully for decades, even when – from the 1980s – religious violence escalated in other parts of northern Nigeria (Ibrahim 1989; Kukah 1993; Falola 1998; Gofwen 2004; Last 2007). Many Nigerians remember Jos as a ‘home away from home’ and, even today, write with nostalgia about ‘growing up in a city where your religion or ethnicity never mattered’ (Agboro 2012).

Introduction

The protracted conflicts in Plateau State between 2001 and 2015 inevitably led to a series of efforts to achieve peace and, since 2015, some semblance of peace seems to have returned to Jos, albeit tentatively. The general situation is no longer as tense and alarming as it was during the crisis years. Still, this peace cannot be taken for granted, given the recursive nature of the violence from 2001. Furthermore, it is important to learn any lessons from this peace process. This chapter examines the Jos peace processes. Specifically, it compares the efficacy of top-down and bottom-up approaches to peace building in Jos. We examine how individuals and neighbourhoods cope with insecurity at the bottom of society, and how state institutions – the Plateau State governments, and successive federal governments – have responded to the cycle of violence in Jos. At the community level, we show how the violence has re-shaped individuals’ social networks and accelerated the process of neighbourhood segregation. We examine how individuals and neighbourhoods seek safety through strategies of communal segregation and vigilantism, which have only started to be relaxed after 2015. At the state level, we examine the serial establishment of commissions of inquiry, both judicial and administrative, and the repeated inability to implement the recommendations of any. At the federal level, we examine the responses of the executive and legislature branches, and highlight the damaging tension between federal and state authorities in the management of the crises in Jos. Finally, we argue that Nigerian society has tended to approach the conflict in Jos through two opposed normative principles: (i) supporting inclusive civic citizenship which privileges the rights of individuals; or (ii) respecting the cultural and territorial rights of indigenous minority groups who are seen to be threatened by bigger and better-endowed ethnic groups. We argue that this binary approach – variously justified under the banner of individual rights or group rights – has played into the hands of intransigent and opportunistic politicians who have made it difficult to find a mutually agreeable route to peace. We emphasize local-level confidence-building measures, which address every-day fears and insecurities of the warring groups as a first step toward peace. Afterwards, the give and take of mutual recognition can set the basis for broaching the more substantive issues of individual and group constitutional rights.