The uprising that began in Algeria on 22 February 2019, demanding a change in leadership, democracy, and an end to corruption, was a watershed moment in the country's 57-year history since independence. It reflected, in part, the culmination of decades of struggle by two secular movements that have pushed against both the extremist Islamist tendencies in the country and a regime that tried both to contain and to use the Islamists to its own advantage. The near absence of an Islamist presence in the protests and the secular nature of the demands was notable, suggesting that the country has now entered what some call a post-Islamist era (Charef 2017). In Algeria, this has particular significance given the recent history of the country and its experiences during the Black Decade (1991–2002), when large numbers of civilians died at the hands of Islamist militia and even government soldiers. This happened after the country opened up to multipartyism, leading to the electoral successes of Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), which the government could not accept, resulting in the shutting down of FIS and a second round of elections, thus leading to a civil war.

This post-Islamist turn has particular significance for women, who were especially targeted by the jihadists during the Black Decade and were subsequently one of the key forces in pushing back against the Islamist extremist influence. Their role and importance in the post-Islamist trend has rarely been explored, yet in countries like Algeria women's rights activists were key opponents of religious extremism, which they regarded as diametrically opposed to their agenda. Islamism in Algeria, as elsewhere in the region, had become the primary opposition ideology after the 1980s. It replaced nationalism and leftist ideologies (Bayat 2017; Knudsen 2017). The civil and non-religious character of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings in the region marked a sharp break with the earlier mid-1980s and 1990s, when moral politics within an Islamist paradigm prevailed. The protests that started in 2019 in Algeria followed a similar pattern. These antigovernment movements were spurred on by structural changes within the region (as in Algeria), including globalisation, urbanisation, expansion of electronic media, and a new sense of citizenship.

In October 2000, Namibia, which held the presidency of the United Nations Security Council at the time, brought a seminal resolution to the floor of the Council. After considerable pushback from Security Council members, the resolution, UNSCR 1325, was finally passed. It was to redefine women's role in peacebuilding (Ileke and Imene-Chanduru 2020). It recognised the importance of women's participation and the inclusion of gender perspectives in peace negotiations, humanitarian activities, peacekeeping operations, and postconflict peacebuilding and governance. Twenty years after the passage of UNSCR 1325, there is widespread recognition that although some gains have been made, there is still a long way to go to fully implement this resolution and to do so in a way that more fully accounts for the many ways both men and women are treated in peacebuilding. This has particular bearing on Africa because some of the deadliest conflicts can be found on the continent, in the areas affected by Boko Haram, the Sahel, South Sudan, and Somalia.

Peacebuilding is commonly understood to involve measures aimed at reducing the risk of return to conflict by strengthening national capacity for conflict management and laying the foundation for durable peace and development. Traditionally, peacebuilding has included support for conflict prevention through the protection of civilians; peacemaking through the use of diplomacy, negotiations, and community strategies; peacekeeping through external interventions supported by the UN or regional peacekeepers; and disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes; along with security sector reform. And finally, peacebuilding has included transitional justice mechanisms that focus on inclusive dialogue, reconciliation and truth processes, and strengthening the rule of law.

Many of these liberal peacebuilding strategies have been seen as problematic because they have focused almost exclusively on formal statebuilding and technocratic solutions, the professionalisation of personnel, standardisation of operating procedures, and honing best practices focused on the state. These types of strategies have been carried out to the exclusion of grassroots activities (Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016). Critics of peacebuilding and statebuilding have argued that these strategies, as they have been implemented, have not always delivered results and that they are an extension of Western ideology, promoting a free market economy and creating countries dependent on Western aid (Bindi and Tufekci 2018).

This chapter shows how the adoption of constitutional and legislative women’s rights reforms have converged in the Maghreb region, but also how the Maghreb has diverged from the Middle East in this regard. I discuss the adoption of unified legal systems, which set the stage for future women’s rights reforms. I then examine constitutional reforms followed by a discussion of key areas of legislative reform since 2000, particularly areas showing variation within the region and where we have seen legislative reforms improving women’s status. This allows us to identify the key differences between the Maghreb countries and the Middle East, but also where variance cuts across the entire region.