The EC-Seal Products case raises a number of interesting issues for scholars researching in the broad area of risk regulation. This symposium addresses a selection of them through innovative, analytical contributions whose goals are to test central assumptions and question the logic of the findings and to bring fresh solutions to problems faced by the Appellate Body and the panel. In keeping with this analytical focus, this introduction to the symposium will not just present a summary of the key legal findings. Instead, it attempts to draw some further conclusions from the different contributions, to place the contributions in their broader legal context and to make connections between aspects (not) decided in Seals and scholarship on risk regulation, more generally.

International investment agreements (IIAs) emerged in the 1960's as an instrument to lower political risk for foreign investors and to facilitate political risk insurance when investing in developing countries with weak governance structures. Political risk is constituted by interferences to the investment by host states once the investor has entered the market and which would render the execution of the investment unduly burdensome, deprive the investor of the control or enjoyment of the investment or discriminate or treat the foreign investor arbitrarily. The legal provisions in IIAs include non–discrimination provisions, fair and equitable treatment, full protection and security, rights to compensation in case of expropriations, including indirect regulatory ones with the effect of depriving the investor of the control and benefits of the investment, provisions on free transfer of capital and, occasionally, non–precluded measures clauses as well as stabilization clauses in which the host state promises not to change the regulatory environment affecting the investment.

The section on WTO law highlights the interface between international trade law and national risk regulation. It is meant to cover cases and other legal developments regarding the SPS, TBT and TRIPS Agreements and the general exceptions in both GATT 1994 and GATS as well as to inform about pertinent developments in recognized international standardization bodies and international law. Of recurrent interest in this area are questions of whether precautionary policies can be justified under WTO law, the standard of review with which panels and the Appellate Body assess scientific evidence and the extent to which policy can and should influence risk regulation.

The leaked TTIP documents reveal that the EU and US are discussing the introduction of a detailed set of procedural requirements for the adoption of regulatory measures. Default provisions are set forth in the chapter on regulatory cooperation, applicable to goods and services. More specific provisions are being negotiated in the chapters on technical barriers to trade and on sanitary and phytosanitary measures. If they conflict with the regulatory cooperation chapter, they prevail.

This article analyses the regulatory cooperation chapter insofar as it pertains to trade in goods but to the exclusion of SPS matters and anything provided in the TBT chapter itself. The questions this article examines are to what extent the TTIP proposals expand upon the obligations the two parties have already taken on under WTO law and to what extent the resulting regulatory coordination is consistent withWTO law. It will be shown that the US proposals on procedure may constrain substantive regulatory discretion beyond what applies under the GATT and TBT Agreement of the WTO. It will alsobe shown that the needs to conduct trade impact assessments and a detailed explanation of the necessity of measures anticipate a legal challenge to necessity and will provide information of much use to complainants in meeting their burden of proof.

My analysis focuses on a limited aspect of the Appellate Body’s (AB) EC—Seal Products decision under the chapeau of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). It is revelatory for the kind of discrimination at issue under the chapeau in surprising ways.

The general exceptions in Article XX serve to justify measures infringing other GATT provisions that have a close nexus to a list of types of public policies. The list of public policies is exhaustive. The chapeau prohibits application of those measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between countries where the same conditions prevail or that constitute a disguised restriction on international trade.

Under Section II of the Rules of Conduct for the DSU, the institutional affiliation of experts may be considered as an element that casts doubts on their impartiality and independence. Under Articles 5.1 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, the level of protection that a particular country is ready to tolerate may inform risk assessment and have an impact on the determination of insufficiency of scientific evidence. In a situation in which there is sufficient scientific evidence for performance of risk assessment in one of the international standard setting-organizations, one may still find insufficiency as provided by Article 5.7 if new data puts into question the relationship between the relevant scientific evidence and the conclusions in relation to risk, thereby not permitting the performance of a sufficiently objective assessment of risk (authors’ headnote).

GATT Article III:4 aims at equal treatment in respect of competitive opportunities of imports and competing domestic products by preventing protectionism. A key question is whether regulations with heavier burdens on imported products than on domestic products and a valid regulatory purpose are consistent with Article III:4. Inquiry into regulatory purpose under Article III:4 would allow by-passing Article XX whose list of regulatory objectives is a closed one and which puts the burden of proof on the defending WTO member. In EC-Seal Products, the Appellate Body has rejected any role for the regulatory purpose inquiry under Article III:4. This article shows why a purely empirical definition of likeness and less favourable treatment as disparate impact cannot logically lead to a finding of a violation of Article III:4. It then argues that regulatory purpose continues to play a role under Article III:4 because of the centrality of the notion of competition. It proposes to frame that competition as perfect competition. It shows that the adoption of perfect competition as the evaluative benchmark for all of Article III:4 makes better legal sense than starting from imperfect competition for the likeness analysis and perfect competition for the less favourable treatment standard, as is proposed in the literature. It also shows that even in case where imperfect competition is used as the sole benchmark for both parts of Article III:4, an assessment of how regulation interacts with competition continues to play some role.

The Seals Regime at issue in EC–Seals pursued conflicting policy objectives of animal welfare, protection of public morals, Inuit, and the marine environment through regulation of product composition and hunting. The panel's TBT findings are problematic. The panel uses the term ‘related’ PPMs in the definition of technical regulations of content and does not distinguish and sequence the legal tests of TBT Articles 2.1 and 2.2 clearly enough. It fails to analyze properly how the necessity analysis should be performed for a multipurpose policy and reduces the ability of WTO members to defend them. The panel also adopts an unduly empiricist definition of public morals and legitimate objectives. This article argues that the content of public morals and legitimate objectives in Article 2.2 should be informed by moral philosophy. Its analysis suggests that collectively binding regulation of ethical standards can generally not be considered to be about public morals.

Is the World Trade Organization (WTO) in a legitimacy crisis and might the protracted Doha negotiations be evidence of it? This article understands the notion of ‘legitimacy crisis’ as a severe threat to an institution’s viability due to fundamental shifts in the legitimising ideas underlying the institution, an external threat to its values or its ability to fulfil its functions. It contends that the WTO is not yet definitely in a legitimacy crisis because the Doha negotiations still reveal the commitment of the WTO members to the values and legitimising ideas of the WTO. Perception of a legitimacy crisis fuels the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs) amongst key WTO members, which could be used to advance the Doha negotiations, force developing countries into agreement and shape the outcome of the negotiations in favour of developed countries. Such an outcome, this chapter cautions, could be the real onset of a legitimacy crisis if developing countries gain very little from a Doha agreement. To prevent a crisis and move the negotiations forward this chapter suggests that the different trade-related development needs of developing countries need to be assessed more seriously and developing countries need to be enabled to address serious adverse consequences linked to any trade liberalisation they undertake.

This article understands risk dialectically as a decision-making resource stressing probability but as also giving rise to further uncertainties. It shows that the panel report in EC – Biotech reflects an understanding of risk as decision-making that is deterministic and leaves little room for the application of precautionary approaches and non-scientific factors. It submits that such an approach is unsuitable for novel technologies with limited background knowledge and reduces the accountability of risk regulators. A different approach is put forth, which allows members greater scope for precautionary action while preventing trade protectionism. The article concludes that law can enhance its authority and epistemic validity through scientific evidence but only if it recognizes science's epistemic and its own limitations. Law has to approach science as contested knowledge and risk regulation as political decision-making, leading – inevitably – to more indeterminate solutions to legal conflicts.