This chapter argues that we exist. It first examines whether we can perceive the self. It is concluded that we may be able to perceive the self, but it seems doubtful that we can perceive the self in a way which could establish, on the basis of perception, that the self exists. The chapter then turns to examine whether we can infer that the self exists. This chapter then endorses the following argument. Either something is thinking my thoughts, or some things are thinking my thoughts. If something is thinking my thoughts, then I am that thing, and so I exist. If some things are thinking my thoughts, then I am among those things, and so I exist. An analogous argument could be used to establish that you exist.

This chapter argues that the main arguments for substance dualism can be parodied and transformed either into arguments against substance dualism, or into arguments for the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to support substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: modal arguments; an epistemic argument; the argument from the alleged fact that facts regarding personal identity outstrip the physical facts; the argument from phenomenology and intentionality; the argument from the unity of consciousness; Lowe’s argument from unity; and the argument from the problem of the many.

This chapter argues that the main arguments which lead many philosophers to reject substance dualism can be parodied and transformed into arguments against substance dualism’s main competitor, the thesis that we are composite physical objects. The upshot of the chapter is that those considerations commonly thought to undermine substance dualism are indecisive at best, since they can be parodied. The arguments discussed include: parsimony-based arguments; the argument from causal closure/exclusion; the argument from conservation laws; the argument from the correlation between mental states and brain states; arguments to the effect that souls require an implausible cutoff point, in either evolutionary history or in fetal development, before which there is no soul and after which there is a soul; and arguments to the effect that substance dualism leads to an implausible skepticism regarding our ability to reidentify people over time.

This chapter examines some prominent arguments for the thesis that we do not exist. It is concluded that these arguments are not compelling. The arguments discussed include: the argument from impermanence; the argument from lack of control; the neither one nor many argument; and the argument from simplicity or parsimony. Most of these arguments are associated with the Buddhist philosophical tradition, and the argument from impermanence and the argument from lack of control are attributed to the Buddha himself in some of the earliest recorded teachings of the Buddha. The chapter therefore contains a discussion of whether these arguments are, within the context of the Buddhist intellectual tradition, really meant to undermine belief in our own existence, or whether they are rather merely intended to undermine belief in a certain sort of strong metaphysical postulate (i.e., the sort of unchanging and transcendent self postulated by the Upanishads).

This chapter discusses a particularly important objection to substance dualism, that there is something problematic about the idea that immaterial souls can causally interact with physical bodies. This objection is best put in terms of the pairing problem for substance dualism, which claims that substance dualism is objectionable because it would result in souls and bodies being causally paired in an objectionably brute manner. I argue that those who think that we are composite physical objects face an analogous problem: the mereological pairing problem. According to the mereological pairing problem, the thesis that we are composite physical objects is objectionable because composite physical persons and their parts would be paired in an objectionably brute manner. The upshot of the chapter is that one of the most prominent objections to substance dualism is indecisive at best, since it can be parodied.

This chapter introduces the subjects which will be discussed over the course of the book. The question of personal ontology – “what are we?” – is distinguished from the more commonly discussed question of personal identity over time – “under what conditions is someone at one time identical with something at some other time?” This chapter introduces the main thesis which will animate much of the book, namely that we are unable to choose between substance dualism and the thesis that we are composite physical objects, as the arguments on each side of the issue can be parodied. This chapter also introduces the concept of composition, as well as the thesis of composition as identity, and argues that composition as identity should be rejected. The chapter ends with brief summaries of the remaining chapters.

This chapter examines whether agnosticism with respect to personal ontology should lead us toward agnosticism with respect to the possibility of life after death. Two afterlife scenarios are considered: resurrection and reincarnation. It is argued that all the major accounts of personal ontology are compatible with both resurrection and reincarnation, except for the non-self thesis, which is incompatible with resurrection. Various arguments for the conclusion that resurrection or reincarnation are impossible are considered and rejected. But it is argued that reincarnation faces a difficulty: the standard evidence cited for reincarnation, namely the presence of mental states apparently from a previous life, would, even if corroborated, not show that one is identical with someone from a previous life. What’s more, it would not provide any evidence for substance dualism.

This chapter examines mind uploading, in which one allegedly thwarts death by “uploading” oneself to a computer. This chapter examines various possible ontologies which might be associated with “uploaded” persons: the non-self view; the view that they would be immaterial souls; the view that they would be computers, or particular physical parts of computers; the view that they would be patterns; the view that they would be simulated objects. Various problems with each proposal are identified. An additional problem is discussed: regardless of which personal ontology is true with respect to us now (pre-upload), it seems doubtful that one could be moved into a computer by way of the processes which would be involved in mind uploading (e.g., copying one’s mental states to a computer). Finally, practical matters are considered, chief among them being the question of whether one should attempt to “upload” oneself if given the opportunity.

The previous three chapters identify numerous surprising similarities between substance dualism and the thesis that we are composite physical objects of some sort. This chapter reinforces this point, and argues that these two theses are more similar than is commonly recognized. While the chapter concedes that some substantive differences between the two theses remain, it is doubtful that these differences are of the right sort to allow us to decide between one thesis and the other.