This chapter compares the short-lived norm neglect regarding the 2011 no-fly zone over Libya with the longer-lasting, yet fragile, norm neglect of the Philippines and China regarding Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea (SCS). In these entrenched norm disputes, norm neglect was surprising. This chapter shows that social pressure from in-group members in the Libya case and from the arbitral tribunal and domestic compliance constituencies in the SCS case facilitated claim agreement. While these audience reactions continue to uphold norm neglect in the SCS case, key audiences’ perception that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led coalition’s implementation lacked output legitimacy led to a norm impasse on Syria.

Moreover, the missing shared normative basis for the claim agreements rendered them fragile. The blurring of responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) reduced the social strength or precision of R2P, as well as its breadth. The decrease in acceptance, and thus depth, of R2P due to the contested implementation of the no-fly zone further reduced the relative strength of R2P. In the SCS case, norm neglect is ongoing and thus the effect on norm strength remains to be seen. The increasing acceptance of the arbitral award and China’s frame rapprochement have slightly strengthened the applicability of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) norms.

The Introduction gives an overview of the book’s most important findings and contributions. Since international relations are anarchical and international legal norms are incomplete or in tension with other norms, there is potential for contestation whenever a general norm is applied to specific situations. The reactions of others to proposed norm interpretations can alter norms and their strength. The second section describes the book’s rhetorical approach, and the third section summarizes the main theoretical contributions. First, the "alternate endings" typology shows that it matters whether dispute parties (dis)agree on the norm frame or behavioral claim. Frame agreement is an internal source of stability. Moreover, the typology can guide assessment of how contestation affects norm strength. Second, I describe the focus on audience reactions, argumentation, and speakers (including delegation to agents) when analyzing extrinsic influences on the persistence of norm interpretations, and thus of alternate endings. The fourth section discusses the main contributions to the existing literature on norm strength, the dual quality of norms, legal argumentation and interpretive communities, and delegation to courts and other relevant agents. The Introduction then discusses the research design and methodology, before concluding with an overview of the remaining chapters.

This chapter compares the short-lived norm recognition in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq war with the persistent norm recognition in the 1267 sanctions regime. Delegation to agents – weapons inspectors (Iraq) and the Ombudsperson (1267 sanctions regime) – played a significant role due to its consensual and potentially ongoing nature. The chapter thus focuses on how delegation affects the relative stability of norm recognition. The different problem structures both agents faced made the Ombudsperson more effective in managing norm contestation than the United Nations (UN) weapons inspectors: Certainty over the output legitimacy of its work and compliance constituencies that exert social pressure on the UN Security Council (UNSC) to continue delegating have made it easier to build a reputation as credible and effective. While norm recognition persists, the indirect costs of delegation for the UNSC have led to tensions in the delegation relationship, rendering resolution of the claim disagreement between the UNSC and European Court of Justice (ECJ) unlikely. Moreover, the chapter shows that contestation over the 2003 Iraq war reduced the clarity, and thus the social strength, of chapter VII norms, but contestation increased the social strength of due process rights in targeted sanctions. The effect on relative norm strength is more difficult to determine due to the claim disagreement.

The Conclusion provides a brief overview of important findings of this book. It then suggests three areas for future research: First, to improve our understanding of reputational mechanisms, scholars could further study why states sometimes refrain from publicly criticizing opponents whose norm interpretations were clearly shown to be inapplicable. Second, scholars could study the interplay of domestic audience and in-group reactions to norm interpretations in greater detail. Third, further research could explore how the explicitness of (dis)agreement over norm frames and claims affects norm strength, in particular how silence should be interpreted and differs from clear endorsement or criticism of specific norm interpretations. The Conclusion also gives guidance on how my alternate endings typology could be applied to non-state actors such as transnational advocacy networks, for example to study whether they prioritize gaining support for their preferred norm frame, behavioral claim, or both, when trying to establish new norm understandings.

This chapter studies norm contestation that led to norm clarification (frame and claim agreement). It compares the United States’s (US) contestation of the right to self-defense with its contestation of the prohibition of torture in the context of international terrorism. These episodes of contestation weakened the contested norms while ongoing. However, they eventually led to norm clarification through widespread acceptance of the US’s broadening of the right to self-defense and through widespread rejection of a narrowing of the torture prohibition. This norm clarification respectively increased or affirmed social and relative strength of the contested norms. The variation in outcome indicates that the preferred norm interpretations of materially powerful states do not always prevail. In this chapter, I engage in a fine-grained discourse analysis. Among others, this illustrates that whether proponents of norm change seek generally applicable norm change or covert exceptionalism affects argumentation, and that in-group reactions to norm interpretations are consequential.

This chapter focuses on the "alternate endings" typology. Building on theories of political rhetoric, we can break norms down into norm frames (norm-based justifications) and behavioral claims (conclusions for actions) and identify four alternate endings of norm contestation: norm impasse, norm neglect, norm recognition and norm clarification. Whether states (dis)agree on frames, claims, or both affects the stability of these alternate endings and norm strength. As identifying frames and claims in actors’ interpretations of international law is the cornerstone of this book, this chapter first provides detailed guidance on different kinds of norm frame and claim disagreements. It then analyzes the relative stability of each "alternate ending" and shows that frame agreement is an internal source of stability. Norm strength is conceptualized as the extent of collective expectations related to applying a norm of international law in a certain way. Norms are stronger when these collective expectations are clearer (social norm strength), and are held by more (critical) actors and/or cover more situations (relative norm strength). The chapter shows that the "alternate endings" typology can anchor the assessment of how contestation affects collective expectations. This approach provides a more actor-centric assessment of norm strength, compared to other prominent approaches.

This chapter analyzes the norm impasses over the status of Kosovo after its declaration of independence in February 2008 and over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 August war. Both cases happened within quick succession, revolved around the same well-established norms in the United Nations (UN) Charter – the rights to territorial integrity vs. self-determination – and showed an interesting reversal of sides: While the United States (US) and European states recognized Kosovo’s statehood and rejected Russia’s emphasis on Serbian territorial integrity, the US and European states rejected Russia’s support of South Ossetia’s statehood and emphasized Georgian territorial integrity. These norm impasses became protracted because each side received social support from key audiences, or at least only muted criticism, for their interpretations, lowering the cost of disagreement. These disputes show both the power and limits of international law: The US’s sui generis frame and Russia’s quasi-legal argumentation indicate that there is a strong collective expectation regarding using international law to justify claims. Yet these cases also indicate that protracted norm impasses weaken individual norms: Unclear norm meaning gives leeway for interpretation, which can be used to craft interpretations that appeal to important audiences and thereby reduce pressure to abandon contested norm interpretations.

This chapter identifies factors that are extrinsic to norms and affect the stability of the alternate endings. Three classical elements of rhetoric guide the analysis: speakers, audiences, and arguments. The chapter first discusses my focus on critical states with decision-making authority. Speakers need the support of important audiences to avoid or reduce social and material costs of proposing "inappropriate" norm interpretations. Some audiences are more important than others: Speakers are likely to prioritize gaining approval for their norm interpretations from their in-groups and domestic audiences. The chapter gives guidance on identifying in-groups. Speakers try to gain support for their norm interpretations through their argumentation: We would expect the use of legal language and output legitimation when norm interpretations are openly proposed, and identity-based legitimation when actors try to hide exceptionalist norm interpretations. Lastly, I draw attention to a particular kind of speaker – agents to whom norm interpretation was delegated. When agents are involved, perceptions of agent competence also affect what interpretations can be upheld. The chapter concludes that audience reactions, argumentation, and delegation to agents affect the extent of collective expectations surrounding norm application, and thus norm strength.

In international affairs, legal arguments and political actions shape each other. Unlike in domestic affairs, there is no enforcement authority, and hence there is much debate over how international law affects politics. Many existing approaches do not help us to assess what implementation efforts tell us about a state’s commitment to international law. Some study the effect of law on state behaviour but have a too static understanding of law and state preferences. Others focus on the justificatory discourse that accompanies norm implementation but do not assess individual states’ commitment to contested norms. This chapter studies what a state’s effort to implement a norm tells us about its sense of obligation towards that norm. I propose there are three signposts of obligation in the words and actions that accompany a state’s norm implementation: consistency, publicity, and engagement with the international community. I show that depending on whether the behaviour and discourse of a state displays a strong or weak sense of obligation, we can characterise a state’s norm implementation as exposing weak or strong normative influence or discursive or behavioral norm avoidance. I illustrate these different degrees with cases that involve a variety of different norms and states.