Chapter 1 introduces our idea that group-based inequality is in large part the result of anger constraints placed on disadvantaged groups. We use research in social psychology to understand how public expressions of anger are reserved for the powerful. We develop a theory of how group-based social hierarchies in society are maintained by instituting rules of who can express anger and who cannot. We provide several examples of how United States race relations between Black Americans and whites exemplify this “anger rule.”

Chapter 2 develops our theoretical argument of how an “anger rule” has been applied to Black Americans. Throughout American history, we make clear that Black political anger has been depicted as menacing. Special rules, laws, and devices have been instituted to keep what American society considers a dangerous form of emotional expression from being unleashed. Society has neutralized this anger by applying an angry feeling rule to Black Americans. If they break this rule by voicing anger, they will be penalized. This punishment takes different forms throughout American history, such as the brutality inflicted upon enslaved Black Americans, the lynching of Black Americans, the mass incarceration of Black men and women, and denying federal assistance to Black families. In this chapter, we focus on another penalty – electoral defeat. We theorize that whites invested in this anger rule will punish Black politicians for expressing anger. We also contend that Black Americans navigate this anger rule by strategically rallying behind Black politicians who constrain their anger in political spaces dominated by whites. However, in Black spaces, we argue that this anger has a home among Black Americans.

Chapter 5 determines whether the Black public shares Black politicians’ awareness of the anger rule. We accomplish this task by examining if Black Americans express less political and racial anger in the presence of whites relative to Black Americans. Analyzing data from 2004 to 2012 American National Election Studies (ANES) along with the ANES cumulative file, we find that Black survey respondents report significantly less political anger than white respondents. This difference magnifies when Black Americans are in the presence of a white interviewer. These findings indicate that Black Americans recognize that their group must limit their anger in the presence of whites. It is this knowledge that, we believe, motivates Black Americans to be more willing to give Black politicians an emotional pass when they fail to express anger about politics.

Chapter 3 explores the emotional rhetoric of elected public officials. We examine the presidential speeches of two Democratic presidents – Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. We find that Obama’s speeches are more positive than Clinton’s and less negative as well. The use of anger depends on the target (i.e., issue). Consistent with our theoretical argument, Obama expressed significantly less anger about race relations compared to Bill Clinton. We look even further at the differences between Black and white politicians by examining floor speeches of members of the United States House of Representatives. Most Black Members of Congress are elected in majority (or plurality) minority districts. Therefore, we would not expect for them to be as constrained by anger, particularly about race, as Obama. We find that to be the case. Black Democratic members of Congress convey more anger about race relations than white Democratic members of Congress. These findings suggest that Black politicians limit their anger when whites are a substantial number of the voting population, but Black elected officials and candidates abandon this rule when the electorate has a substantial number of Black voters.

Chapter 6 delves deeper into how the anger rule affects Black political decision-making by extending our analysis to three adult national samples of Black Americans. We investigate how Black Americans evaluate a Black and white male politician’s expression of anger. We expect Black Americans to abide by the anger rule in spaces controlled by whites. In our first experimental study, Black Americans evaluate a Black or white Democratic politician running for United States Senate. The results show some evidence that Black Americans are more supportive of a non-angry Black politician relative to an angry Black politician and an angry white politician. In the second study, we provide a clearer signal of the racial makeup of the voting population – majority Black or white Congressional district. We find that Black Americans only reward a non-angry Black politician relative to an angry Black politician when running in a majority white congressional district. Black Americans do not prefer this type of Black politician running in a majority Black congressional district. In the third study, we show that when Black Americans are encouraged to express anger, they gravitate toward politics challenging their group’s status.

Our final chapter puts all of the results together and explores their implications. We revisit our argument in relation to our findings of how the “anger rule” sustains group-based inequality between Black and white Americans. We take up how the anger rule can apply to other groups in American society and hampers their ability to fight against injustice. We also evaluate spaces (e.g., counter-public) these groups have had to operate in to express themselves emotionally and challenge their group’s status.

Chapter 4 investigates if whites apply an “anger penalty” to a Black politician relative to a white politician. We examine if an angry Black Democrat politician is racially handicapped among racially prejudiced whites. We test our predictions using several survey experiments on adult national samples of whites. We uncover evidence of an anger penalty in that racially prejudiced whites evaluate an angry Black Democrat politician more unfavorably than a non-angry Black Democrat politician and an angry white Democrat politician. Additionally, we find a similar effect among whites oriented to supporting group-based social hierarchies (i.e., having a social dominance orientation). In another study, we examine if this anger penalty depends on the issue. We expect an anger penalty is greater when the issue implicates Black Americans than if it is unrelated to the group. The findings show that racially prejudiced whites penalize a Black politician only when the anger is related to a racialized issue and not when the issue is unrelated to race. In our final experimental study, we examine whether a Black female politician’s anger is treated differently than a Black male’s; the anger penalty does not appear to be conditioned on gender.