While corruption has become a common word it still carries different meanings for diverse people. It has been described in various ways and this poses problems for combating it effectively. We examine the various definitions and interpretations from the perspectives of law, political science and economics and argue that criminological viewpoints provide the best means to understand and deal with the crimes of corruption. The ‘rational choice’ perspective explains corruption as an economic rent but is limited, as it suggests prevention by enabling officials to function in desirable manner. Moreover, such conceptualizations also are ideologically biased towards free market economy and liberalism. These perspectives also limit the notion of corruption to public officials whereas, in the global integrated system corruption is also embedded in the private sector. This chapter argues that criminology presents a more nuanced explanation for the existence, nature and control of corruption. We reiterate the social-interaction perspective and suggest that people tend to emulate the prevailing norms and be part of the group rather than stand out alone. We argue that corruption as evil is perhaps the best manner to capture the damaging influence of this phenomenon. We also examine methods of measuring corruption and illustrate the techniques developed by Transparency International and the World Bank. Here we also describe the seriousness and nature of corruption in India presented by the National Crime Records Bureau.

The Concept of Corruption

Corruption is a heinous crime that unfortunately is also ubiquitous. The year 2011 will be remembered for the protest demonstrations that occurred across the world from India to Athens, from the ‘Arab Spring’ to ‘Occupy Wall Street’ phenomena. These public demonstrations were peculiar to each country but corruption was a common denominator everywhere. Indeed, corruption has become a global problem that affects almost all nations across the world. It is also true that corruption has seeped into every aspect of human life. Corruption exists in sports, development, education, health, finance, mineral exploration, security and humanitarian aid, and of course governance and politics, to name a few. While efforts such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption, Right to Information Act and Whistle Blower Protection Act are welcome measures to combat corruption, clearly these have failed to prevent or check corrupt practices. The basic fact is that, ‘corruption is universal.

April 2011 was the time when emotions were running high and the anti-corruption movement was in full swing in India. Hundreds of thousands of people from all age groups and backgrounds—young, old, male, female, educated and school dropouts—were out on the streets determined to end the scourge of corruption in the country. Led by Anna Hazare, who according to many, exhibited the same qualities of integrity, simplicity and steadfastness as Gandhiji, the movement for Lokpal had reached its zenith. Police raids, threats of arrests, questions about motives, foreign money and media manipulation all failed to stop the juggernaut from rolling on. The government was finally brought to its knees after months of obstinate refusal to accede to the demand of a Lokpal (an ombudsperson) to deal effectively with corruption.

Cabinet ministers came down from their high pedestal to negotiate with the leaders of the movement. The then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, even offered to meet Anna Hazare and his compatriots. Assurances were given to establish the Lokpal though it would still take years to take shape. The movement finally did lead to the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 that provides for the establishment of a body of Lokpal for the Government of India and Lokayuktas for the states. These institutions can inquire into allegations of corruption against public functionaries, however high and mighty, including the Prime Minister under certain dispensation.

Like every citizen of the country and every person interested in ending corruption in India, we, the authors of this book, too were following the evolving protest movement keenly and with passion. While we appreciated the mass mobilization and the determination with which Anna Hazare pursued the demand for Lokpal, we were debating amongst ourselves if such an institution could really combat corruption effectively in the country. Both of us have served many years in the Indian Police Service (IPS) and have considerable experience in criminal investigation. One of us even commanded the premier anti-corruption agency of a major Indian state and handled a large number and variety of high profile corruption-related cases. Based on our experience and knowledge of criminal justice system of India, we were certain that the mass protest movement might, alas, be in vain. The Lokpal will not be effective in handling corruption in the country because the roots of corrupt practices run deep.

An ombudsperson by the nomenclatures of ‘Lokpal’ at the central government level and ‘Lokayukta’ at the state level, to address the inadequacies of the current anti-corruption systems, have been major issues of agitation by Anna Hazare and many citizen groups in the past few years. These Indian ‘ombudsperson’ armed with the power and independence to investigate and prosecute cases of corruption are purported by these agitators to be the best mechanism for handling growing corruption in the country. The Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 (No. 1 of 2014) has come into existence. While it will take time to assess the operations, impact and the efficacy of Lokpal, its possible role in combating corruption can still be examined on the basis of its provisions, structure and from comparative perspectives. The current discourse questions the perspective that an independent Lokpal alone is capable of combating corruption in the country. We pay special attention to the composition, selection and powers of the Lokpal to judge its powers and functioning. Specific examples from different Lokayuktas, already operational in different states, further provide the context to make this assessment. A comparative evaluation of the powers and performance of several international systems of ombudsperson are also analyzed to determine how far this design of Lokpal will be successful in its mission of combating corruption effectively in the country. We argue that such ombudsperson needs to go beyond the limited objective of prosecuting the corrupt officials. Prevention of corruption must be an integral part of its functions and it must also serve to educate and engage the citizens to deal with corruption. We provide evidence that Lokayuktas that have been in operation for many years have failed to evolve as institutions that can reform the ‘rotten barrel’ which spoils the apples.

Introduction

The need to have an institution independent of the government that can examine the complaints against public servants, including ministers serving the government, was felt as early as the eighteenth century when parliaments in Europe asserted their independence from the monarch ruling the country. Sweden was the first country that established the office of ombudsperson, an officer appointed by the legislative body to receive and investigate complaints against unjust administrative action. Since the king appointed the ministers and public servants, the objective clearly was to give the Parliament a means of balancing the wide powers exercised by the King.

This chapter describes the existing anti-corruption machinery in India, both at the central and state levels, and examines in detail their functions and limitations in the country. We describe the nature, structure and role played by the CBI and the CVC. Their charters are evaluated in terms of a large number of case studies to illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of these two organizations in handling corruption in the country at the federal level. The major argument we make is that the efficacy of investigative agencies is affected due to their lack of autonomy. The political leaders and bureaucrats tightly control the funds as well as personnel in terms of their transfer, posting, promotion and disciplinary matters. These are often misused to ‘tame’ recalcitrant officers and make them fall in line to ensure that political considerations are not affected by these investigation agencies. We present strong evidence about the misuse of power of the politicians to grant approval for inquiring into or registering cases against senior bureaucrats. A number of cases are presented to illustrate how corrupt officials have thwarted attempts of investigators to inquire into their questionable activities. On the other hand, we also examine why immunity granted to the senior levels of bureaucracy, drawn from the All India Services, including the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), Indian Police Services (IPS) and Indian Foreign Service (IFS), under Article 311 of the Constitution has failed to shield them to work independent of political, bureaucratic and other pressures. We also argue that the Anti-Corruption Bureaus (ACBs) in this country are mainly concerned with the detection and prosecution of corruption and economic crimes and there is little by way of prevention in their functions. These agencies step in only when the damage is done.

Structure of Anti-Corruption Machinery

The jurisdiction and set up of the anti-corruption machinery in India is based on the mandate that ‘police’ is a state subject, being in List II Entry 2 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India and hence police agencies are distributed between the union and state governments. At the level of the union government, there are specific agencies to deal with cases of corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against officers and employees of the central government. There are different anti-corruption units functioning under each state government to deal with state officers and employees.

The common belief in combating corruption is that the independence of investigation agencies must be ensured and guaranteed either by a constitutional or a statutory body. Additionally, the entire Criminal Justice System, including the police, prosecution and the judiciary be reformed and strengthened in terms of personnel, training, technical and financial resources. However, we believe that these measures are inadequate to combat corruption effectively in a country like India, given its size, complexity and historical experience. These agencies are only triggered into motion after the corrupt deed has occurred. The emphasis must equally be upon prevention of corruption. Here we examine some alternate solutions focused on prevention and outside the realm of policing. An innovative ‘doctrine of housekeeping’, is propounded so that the responsibility and accountability for monitoring and disbursal of funds must essentially devolve on the head of the department/ministry concerned. We describe how the adoption of this principle will go a long way in the prevention of corruption and economic crimes. Significantly, we argue that corruption can be reduced realistically only by empowering the citizens to hold public officials directly accountable. A vigilant and informed citizenry is needed to safeguard abuse of authority. For this it is necessary that the citizens engage with the functions of administration and have the means to hold officials accountable for performance. We outline some innovations that have evolved by expanding use of ICT platforms, social media, citizen initiatives and rise of informed and concerned citizen groups. We also propose developing a variety of means to bring in the private sector, volunteers, non- governmental bodies and transparency in the functions of public institutions. We argue that open, knowledge-based, publicly-funded institutions best serve the community and help maintain the integrity of public officials.

Introduction

We started this research after witnessing the anger and frustration with the elected officials for their indifference to corruption. The Anna movement is past many years and Lokpal is still to come into action. Yet we believe that we should not be despondent with the politicians and ruling establishment. India is a democracy and the people are supreme who elect their government regularly and astutely. The frequent changes in the government and the undisputed ‘incumbency’ factor in elections are a testimony to the maturity of Indian voters. The politicians have to listen to the people and take steps to address their concerns and grievances.

Case Study of EOW Madhya Pradesh

We conduct an important empirical case study about a major anti-corruption and anti-economic offences unit and its functions from one of the largest states of India. Our objective is to present statistical evidence that even when an anti-corruption agency is run professionally and efficiently, it is not able to curb corruption to any significant extent. The Madhya Pradesh (MP) government, over successive decades, took a number of innovative and promising steps to strengthen the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), empowering it with progressive legislations, administrative measures and providing resources of personnel, technical support and requisite infrastructural facilities. We examine the structure, powers and enabling legislations and assess the ability of such an empowered unit to combat corruption in the state. A major part of this examination is done through specific case studies to illustrate its success and limitations. Furthermore, a detailed empirical examination of the assiduously collected unique official data for 13 years (2000–12) has been carried out to assess the nature and problems of investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. Such a detailed examination of real and comprehensive data provides an in-depth understanding of what one can term the functioning of a representative anti-corruption agency and the extent of its ability in tackling and curbing corruption effectively.

Evolution of EOW MP

Long before the anti-graft movement came into focus in India and at a time when there were still plenty of admirable, honest and committed political leaders and bureaucrats around in the 1970s, Madhya Pradesh was a pioneer state in visualizing and conceiving a single specialized agency to combat corruption and economic offences simultaneously. The police leadership proposed for a single agency on grounds that a majority of the economic offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), 1988, other relevant sections of the IPC and other minor Acts involved similar modus operandi and set of offenders. Accordingly, it was prudent to combine the various roles performed by a single agency. BM Shukla, a former IPS officer and then advisor to the Government of MP, had earlier conceptualized a ‘Special Wing’ of the police under the Home Department with the avowed objective of collecting intelligence and investigating serious type of such offences against society.

In this section, we look into the history of bribery and other corrupt practices in India. In particular, we present some criminological perspectives that identify the facilitators of corrupt practices in public and political establishments. We suggest that the bureaucratic system with roots in colonial governance bears no local responsibility and functions in secrecy. Moreover, the extensive discretion exercised by public officials is another factor that promotes corruption and misuse of authority. We illustrate this by examining the nature of corrupt practices in the police department and civil administration. We further assert that political shenanigans and criminality is perhaps the biggest cause of corruption in the country. We highlight several cases of political corruption and also examine the role of illegal financing of elections that catalyzes corruption in the country. We argue that the control of the state over natural resources and the lack of transparency in distributing for private exploitation is a major path to corruption. We add that the electronic revolution has also helped build long distance associations that further assist in coordinating actions to siphon public funds. Online banking has opened new avenues wherein financial institutions have become the playground of corruption. This chapter also presents some criminological perspectives to explain the means by which corruption occurs and hides its traces.

Introduction

In independent India, corruption made its presence felt during the period of the Nehru government itself. Starting from the Mundra affairs of 1957 that involved a sum of 1.24 Crores (about USD 3.2 million at the time) the current corruption scandals have reached staggering sums of ‘$40 billion in revenues lost from the crooked sale of 2G telecoms licenses and over $40 billion stolen in Uttar Pradesh alone from schemes subsidizing food and fuel for the poor’ (Economist, 2011). Independent India started with a socialist stance and the founding fathers led by Nehru saw no problem with the state controlling the commanding heights of economy. Many ministers in Nehru's cabinet were corrupt but the government went out of its way to shield its ministers (Report on Public Administration, Planning Commission, Government of India 1951).

In this chapter, we will examine various proposals to augment the existing anti-corruption measures in the country. There are a variety of recommendations made by different committees and internal study groups to strengthen and professionalize the investigative agencies. The CBI Study Group Report provides many attractive suggestions that can assist the agency to be more effective and efficient. The same is true of state police agencies that handle the bulk of corruption cases. Evaluation of their training, resource mobilization and applications of technology suggest practical ways of enhancing the performance of these anti-corruption mechanisms. Additionally, many new legislative measures are needed to address the obstacles in effectively dealing with corruption.

Finally, participation of people at large as stakeholders need to be an essential factor in all functions of the officials. Furthermore, universal directives as per the UN Convention against Corruption, systems operational in Singapore, Hong Kong, Scandinavian countries and the RICCO provision in United States are also considered to develop a strong blue print of an anti-corruption strategy in the country.

Introduction

In 1962, the Santhanam Committee identified administrative delay, overburdened government, exercise of discretion in administrative judgments and cumbersome procedures as the four major causes of corruption in the country. The recommendations of the Committee led to the establishment of the CVC as an apex and independent body for prevention of corruption in central government units. In the Vineet Narain and others versus Union of India, the Supreme Court directed that statutory status be conferred upon the CVC. Following this judicial directive, the CVC Act of 2003 was promulgated for the constitution of a CVC to inquire into offenses alleged to have been committed under the PC Act, 1988. The Act also empowered the CVC to exercise superintendence over the CBI and to review the process of grant of sanction for prosecution against the guilty officers pending with competent authorities. An important process known as the Whistle Blowers Resolution was also adopted by the Commission to provide protection to whistle blowers from victimization and power to take action against complainants making vexatious complaints. A bill titled The Whistleblowers’ Protection Bill 2011 has been signed into law by the President on May 2014. The legislation aims to protect a person who exposes alleged wrongdoing in public offices, projects and functions.