The High Court's tentative moves toward adopting structured proportionality as a method of constitutional review have been hampered by concerns about the separation of powers. This article argues that the manner in which a court undertakes proportionality analysis is crucial to the question of whether it is acting within the domain of judicial power. In this regard, the concept of judicial deference plays a vital but thus far under-theorised role. Deference refers not to judicial submission or surrender to the legislature, which would abdicate judicial power to a non-judicial body. Rather, it refers to a court giving weight to the judgment or opinion of government in circumstances of normative or empirical uncertainty. Courts afford deference in this way for two reasons: the desirability of respecting decisions made by democratically legitimate decision-makers, and the practical advantages that inhere in relying on the institutional competence and expertise of the other branches of government. An increased understanding of these rationales for deference in the context of constitutional review would diminish concerns about the High Court straying outside the domain of judicial power. Proportionality and deference exist in a symbiotic relationship and should be addressed together by a coherent judicial theory; many of the concerns raised by the High Court about the former would diminish were it also to embrace the latter.

Much of the core work of government is now done pursuant to contract with private sector bodies, primarily for efficiency reasons. While the phenomenon of contracting out of governmental functions has attracted increasing scholarly attention in terms of public law accountability, the use of commercial arbitration for the resolution of contractual disputes involving governments has until recently attracted scant attention. The law regulating commercial arbitration does not distinguish between arbitrations between private actors and arbitrations involving governments, treating all commercial disputes as wholly private in nature. By controlling government action, arbitrators contribute to governance but without the hallmarks of the judicial process such as impartiality, transparency, the possibility for third-party participation and judicial oversight. As such, the law does not take into account the public dimension of disputes under government contracts or the role of arbitrators as adjudicators of public law disputes. Nor do there appear to be any constitutional constraints on the use of arbitration in government contracts.

This article examines the High Court of Australia’s treatment of the concept of dignity as both a value animating the implied freedom of political communication and as a legitimate reason to limit the exercise of that freedom. It does so through the lens of Clubb v Edwards, Preston v Avery, where the Court found that laws establishing safe access zones around abortion clinics were compatible with the implied freedom. The use of dignity as a prism through which to view the interests at stake in both abortion and speech cases is a familiar feature of developments abroad, and the Court has laid the foundations for recognition of dignity as one of the axiological bases of the implied freedom in a manner that generally emphasises individual autonomy over other conceptions of dignity that might be described as operating as a constraint on behaviour to protect other interests. Yet, while the Court has used dignity as the common measure with which to commensurate competing claims, it has yet to convincingly address concerns regarding incommensurability that attend the balancing stage of proportionality review, not to mention the potential objection that its reliance on dignity is not properly grounded in the text and structure of the Constitution. In light of these issues, the role of dignity ought to be tethered to its central role in facilitating political participation so as to more clearly link the concept to the text and structure of the Constitution, and to identify what is at stake when women’s ability to access reproductive health care is impaired or denied.

International investment tribunals often use the language of ‘rights’ to characterize foreign investors’ claims against host states, evoking the language of human rights and, in some cases, appearing to conflate the two concepts. We investigate the cognitive framing of the relationship between investor rights and human rights in investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), as characterized by investment tribunals. We first establish that arbitrators (and scholars and counsel) tend to characterize investor claims as rights claims in general and property rights claims in particular, even if this normative basis is far from precise. Second, building on behavioural economics and cognitive psychology, we argue that this characterization places human rights considerations at a structural disadvantage in ISDS. Investor rights are perceived by arbitrators as endowments that are possessed and that risk being lost, while the human rights of host state populations are viewed as aspirational demands that might only be fully realized in the future. Thus, governmental actions interfering with investments are perceived by arbitrators as actual losses, while competing human rights claims are perceived as potential gains or demands. Following prospect theory, the former (certain losses) will usually be weighed more heavily in a decision-making calculus than the latter (possible gains). This loss–gain frame provides a cognitive explanation for the prevalence of arbitral decisions that prefer investor claims over human rights, a phenomenon that is highly problematic in times in which the legitimacy of the ISDS system rests on its ability to consider the rights of non-investors.

The dyadic rule–exception structure common to many legal systems has posed particular interpretive difficulties in international trade and investment law. Adjudicators have interpreted general and security exceptions in GATT, GATS and cognate provisions of investment treaties in divergent ways, and the analytic character of these provisions is under-theorised in the literature. This article argues that we should understand exceptions from a deontological perspective as permissions that affirm governmental regulatory capacity and thus limit the scope of the commands set out in the treaty. This characterisation of exceptions has both symbolic and practical implications, of which this article discusses two: determining the exception's applicability as a preliminary matter rather than as a defence, which would in turn permit consideration of regulatory purpose at the point of obligation; and whether the applicability of an exception is properly a question of merits or jurisdiction.