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Page 1 of 4

  • 12 - Law Reporting and Law-Making

  • Edited by Michael Lobban, London School of Economics and Political Science, Ian Williams, University College London
  • Book:
    Networks and Connections in Legal History
    Published online:
    10 August 2020
    Print publication:
    03 September 2020, pp 285-306

  • Summary

    The defining characteristic of common law systems is the development of law through the resolution of disputes by the judges. This precept is anchored in the doctrine of judicial precedent, effected through a system of courts reflecting a hierarchical network of authority. Judicial precedent depends on an authoritative and accessible report of the courts’ decisions. In the long nineteenth century this connection was weak or non-existent in the law of tax. In the rare instances where appeals were permitted, few were reported in a form acceptable to the emerging doctrine of judicial precedent. This had a profound effect on the nascent substantive tax law. It inhibited the robust development of its principles and the interpretation of tax legislation, thereby undermining the quality of tax law and process. It also promoted the isolation of tax law from the norms and values of the legal system well into the twentieth century.

Tax, Medicines and the Law
  • From Quackery to Pharmacy
  • Chantal Stebbings
  • Published online:
    19 October 2017
    Print publication:
    26 October 2017
  • In 1783, a stamp duty was imposed on proprietary or 'quack' medicines. These largely useless but often dangerous remedies were immensely popular. The tax, which lasted until 1941, was imposed to raise revenue. It failed in its incidental regulatory purpose, had a negative effect in that the stamp was perceived as a guarantee of quality, and had a positive effect in encouraging disclosure of the formula. The book explains the considerable impact the tax had on chemists and druggists - how it led to an improvement in professional status, but undermined it by reinforcing their reputations as traders. The legislation imposing the tax was complex, ambiguous and never reformed. The tax authorities had to administer it, and executive practice came to dominate it. A minor, specialised, low-yield tax is shown to be of real significance in the pharmaceutical context, and of exceptional importance as a model revealing the wider impact of tax law and administration.

  • PROTECTING THE PROPERTY OF THE MENTALLY ILL: THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY LUNACY LAW

  • Chantal Stebbings
  • Journal:
    The Cambridge Law Journal / Volume 71 / Issue 2 / July 2012
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    15 June 2012, pp. 384-411
    Print publication:
    July 2012
    • Article
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  • The modern legal framework for the protection of the mentally ill was conceived and developed in the nineteenth century. A substantial growth in the numbers of the mentally ill revealed an absence of effective and accessible legal protection for the property of patients with small estates. This challenge was met through the retention and reform of the ancient jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor in the Lunacy Court as the sole instrument of protection. The judicial solution was adopted in preference to bureaucratic regulation, despite the strong forces of state intervention and the reform of the legal system and its processes.

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