Systematic reviews are essential for evidence-based health care, but conducting them is time- and resource-consuming. To date, efforts have been made to accelerate and (semi-)automate various steps of systematic reviews through the use of artificial intelligence (AI) and the emergence of large language models (LLMs) promises further opportunities. One crucial but complex task within systematic review conduct is assessing the risk of bias (RoB) of included studies. Therefore, the aim of this study was to test the LLM Claude 2 for RoB assessment of 100 randomized controlled trials, published in English language from 2013 onwards, using the revised Cochrane risk of bias tool (‘RoB 2’; involving judgements for five specific domains and an overall judgement). We assessed the agreement of RoB judgements by Claude with human judgements published in Cochrane reviews. The observed agreement between Claude and Cochrane authors ranged from 41% for the overall judgement to 71% for domain 4 (‘outcome measurement’). Cohen’s κ was lowest for domain 5 (‘selective reporting’; 0.10 (95% confidence interval (CI): −0.10–0.31)) and highest for domain 3 (‘missing data’; 0.31 (95% CI: 0.10–0.52)), indicating slight to fair agreement. Fair agreement was found for the overall judgement (Cohen’s κ: 0.22 (95% CI: 0.06–0.38)). Sensitivity analyses using alternative prompting techniques or the more recent version Claude 3 did not result in substantial changes. Currently, Claude’s RoB 2 judgements cannot replace human RoB assessment. However, the potential of LLMs to support RoB assessment should be further explored.

As the Second World War was drawing to a close in 1944, two great works of political economy were published. One of them was Friedrich August von Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom,1 inspiring the defenders of free market movements ever since and up to the present. The other was Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation.2 This essay will focus on Polanyi but also pay tribute to Hayek. Contrasting the two helps to understand both of them better. Of the two, Hayek, the Nobel prize winner, is of course more widely known and by far more influential. But Polanyi’s work, too, has achieved and has been attracting as of recently such attention that one of the Directors of the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne proclaimed that ‘we are all Polanyian now’,3 not only in economic sociology, but also in related disciplines, including, of course, political economy and political theory. A plethora of aspects of The Great Transformation are very widely discussed. This essay will be concerned with the not-so-well explored importance of Polanyi’s work for European Law and legal scholarship in general, including his theorems on the ‘embedded economy’, his conceptualisation of labour as a ‘fictitious commodity’ as well as the notion of counter-movements. It will then juxtapose Polanyi’s expectation of a new international order with the development of the European integration project and sketch out the contours of the democracy-enhancing conflicts law and its affinities with Polanyian core normative principles.

Michael Wilkinson’s Authoritarian Liberalism is an important, and, in many respects, praiseworthy contribution to the debates on the present state of the European Union (EU) and its highly problematical future. Its recourse to political economy in the re-construction of the integration project contrasts innovatively and instructively with the usual, if subtle, stories told about the history of Europe’s “integration through law” and its promotion of an “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The spectre of “authoritarian liberalism” is a counter-narrative which exhibits the socio-economic dimensions and forces us to consider the political quality of European rule, in which Europe’s “material constitution” is a key concept of these analyses. “Authoritarian liberalism” is more than just a catchy characterisation of Europe’s constitutional constellation. The resort to this notion ties in with a conceptual history that definitely deserves to be remembered and continued.

The motivation and agenda of the German contributors to the “German-American Debate on Critical Legal Thought”, were not, and certainly could not, be uniform, neither within the American nor the German group of participants, let alone between Americans and Germans. It seemed nevertheless obvious at the time that we shared a number of concerns. Four seemed obvious and particularly important: Uneasiness, albeit for different reasons, with our respective mainstream traditions; a concern for social justice, albeit in different societies and with different priorities; the critique of our educational systems though they differed so markedly; an awareness of the discrepancies between the law on the books and the law in action which generated contextual studies and all sorts of “law and…” endeavors. Neither during the laborious preparations of the 1986 conference nor during the equally demanding publication process and not even with hindsight is it conceivable to identify comprehensively and exactly our communalities and differences. This is why we have decided to write separate introductions. Mine will proceed in three steps. The first is a reconstruction of German, more precisely: my own, motivation and agenda (A). The second step reproduces in the form of an essay the proposal submitted to the Volkswagen Foundation in 1985, the funding organization for the conference (B). The third summarizes much more briefly what I see as accomplishments and failures - and ensuing challenges (C).

Where do American and German critiques of their respective “mainstream” legal traditions converge, and where do they diverge? When can the convergences be interpreted as common learning experiences with modern law, as insights into the futility of critical efforts, as indications for their correction? Which divergences are due to differences between the legal cultures and philosophical traditions? Where are they reactions to more specific socio-political constellations and particular structurings of the respective academic systems? From which projects can the “other side” gain new insights, or perhaps entirely new perspectives? Such questions inevitably arise from a volume devoted to German and American critical and socio-theoretical contributions to the discussion of legal theoretical fundamentals. Yet they demand too much from an individual author (at least this one), and their enumeration is intended to make clear the sort of difficulties they occasion and suggest how they might be fruitfully dealt with.

The European Union rides through troubled waters. Its original reliance on law as the object and agent of the integration project and on the “economic constitution,” which the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)—as accomplished by the Treaty of Maastricht— expected to complete, have proven unsustainable. Following the financial and sovereign debt crises, individuals perceive the EMU, with its commitments to price stability and monetary politics, as a failed construction precisely because of its reliance on inflexible rules. The European crisis management seeks to compensate for these failures by means of regulatory machinery which disregards the European order of competences, takes power from national institutions, and burdens—in particular—Southern Europe with austerity measures; it establishes pan-European commitments to budgetary discipline and macroeconomic balancing. This abolishes the ideal of a legal ordering of the European economy, while the economic and social prospects of these efforts appear gloomy and the Union's political legitimacy becomes precarious. A fictitious debate between Carl Schmitt and Jürgen Habermas addresses the present critical constellation, where a number of Schmittian notions seem alarmingly realistic. This essay pleads for a more modest Europe committing itself to “unity in diversity,” the motto of the ill-fated Constitutional Treaty of 2003.

The contributions to this Special Issue of the German Law Journal originate from a meeting in July 2004 at the European University Institute, which was convened following a disappointing experience. The participants – lawyers, historians, political scientists – had co-operated intensively in the preparation of a project on “The Shadows of the Past(s) over the Construction of Europe” which they had submitted to the Volkswagen Stiftung. Although the foundation acknowledged the core aspirations and importance of its individual components, our application was, however, criticized for its overly broad scope and alleged lack of coherence. Should we, however, retain our loose multi-disciplinary, multi-issue and multi-national exploratory approach? Or, should we instead seek to tighten up the whole enterprise and explain what form of common result we would like to deliver? What was planned as a debate on these alternatives developed into enormously interesting, sometimes breath-taking discussions. At the end, we felt that we were able to articulate what we had more intuitively sought for, namely, a formula that would link our concern about European past(s) with our concern for Europe's present and future.

“Sozialstaatlichkeit” is a collection of essays dedicated to the author of Negative Freiheitsrechte und gesellschaftliche Selbstorganisation? Reflections on the survival of welfarism in the postnational constellations after his analyses of globalisation and Europeanisation? Affirmative references to the Discourse Theory of Law and Habermasian notions of Proceduralisation at all levels of governance against “Proceduralisation and its use in a post-modern legal policy?” “Are you trying to deliver something like an Anti-Ladeur.” No, neither Sisyphus nor Hercules, let alone Friedrich Engels, has inspired this essay. Its argument should rather be observed in the spirit of conflict-of-laws, i.e. of a discipline which accepts as a normative fact that different academic projects may be worthwhile despite of, or even because of, the differences of their premises and of the logics of their development, which may be inspired by complementary perceptions of a common problématque.

This essay is continuing the path between the disciplines of law and political science that I have been following for a couple of years now. This is a somewhat delicate exercise. In addressing my own discipline, law, I argue that it should renew its perceptions of reality and open up its normative and dogmatic conceptual structure. To political scientists engaged in integration research, I suggest that they ought to take the law’s normative structure seriously and open up their analytical and empirical models to this peculiar reality. ‘Two goals?! No wonder he never gets anywhere!’ By no means, I would object, we are only looking at the two sides of the same coin. And there are good reasons to undertake such efforts: Europe’s constitution is too important to be left up to the lawyers; but it is also something that cannot be grasped by empirical and analytical approaches which are unable to address the normative dimension of the ‘real’ world.