Adult intellectual development is known to produce a pattern of average age-related changes differing by whether the ability in question is dominated by acquired knowledge (crystallized intelligence) or by processes involved in reasoning and memory, especially working memory (fluid intelligence). Other differentiable abilities, like spatial visualization, also show average age-related decline. Both classes of abilities have shown substantial generational differences, with more recently born individuals showing better performance on tests of intellectual abilities. Genetic influences play a role in determining age-related change, but other factors are also at play. There is substantial stability of individual differences in intellectual abilities, showing that aging does not radically alter profiles of abilities seen in early adulthood. There are individual differences in magnitudes of age-related changes that are exacerbated by nonnormative age-related diseases (e.g., cardiovascular disease, Type 2 diabetes), life events, health-degrading behaviors (e.g., tobacco use), and late-life terminal decline. Individual differences in rates of age-related change are partly general (manifested for all abilities) but also ability specific (different persons showing decline on some abilities but not others), perhaps indicating multiple influences on age-related changes. At present it is unknown how much of the observed age-related decline could be mitigated by lifestyle and behavioral interventions prior to the period of late-life disablement. Age-related changes in fluid intelligence do not necessarily translate into functional impairment in demanding everyday activities, given the critical role that knowledge and experience play in self-regulation.

Lifespan approaches to intelligence must consider several issues. How many types of intelligence should be considered? Do different types of intelligence develop in different ways? What can developmental perspectives suggest about individual differences in intelligence? What are the causes of intellectual development at different points of the lifespan? In this chapter, we’ll look at each of these important questions in turn. But first we need to consider the underlying worldviews or metatheories about development that play a role in how people think about intelligence and how it changes over the life course.

Abstract

We articulate a lifespan developmental perspective on gains and losses in cognitive functioning during adulthood. This perspective argues that older adults function effectively in ways that preserve goal attainment in cognitively demanding situations despite age-related cognitive decline. Moreover, because individuals grow and age in self-selected contexts, they can successfully use expertise and knowledge, practiced routines of behavior, and reliance on sources of support in their environment to maximize their functional capacity. Metacognitive self-regulation and an active lifestyle can be important means for older adults to preserve cognitive capacity and to effectively compensate for declines in cognitive mechanisms as they occur.

Introduction

A chapter on cognitive resilience should probably start with a definition about it. Is it to think as fast as one did in younger years? Does it involve being as bright and sharp as possible, despite advancing age? Is it about recovering from strokes or other age-related insults to the brain? Is it manifested by showing no signs of decline in all or most cognitive abilities? Or is it about maintaining an active mind until old age? Does it concern keeping one's functional autonomy through preserving the ability to manage one's own affairs in everyday life? Proposing such a definition is not a trivial task, and it requires some insight into theoretical background and ongoing discussions. We begin by treating some core theoretical issues before coming back to propose a definition of cognitive resilience, framed within an important theoretical perspective on development and growth from lifespan developmental psychology.

Metacognition is a construct that has received considerable attention in developmental psychology, including psychological gerontology – the science of aging. As I treat it here, metacognition is a broad umbrella term that covers several related constructs: knowledge about cognition, beliefs (both about oneself and about cognition in general), and monitoring (Hertzog and Hultsch, 2000). Much of the emphasis in studies of aging and metacognition has been placed on the role of beliefs about memory and aging, both in oneself and others, and how those beliefs may influence beliefs about one's own cognitive functioning. Traditionally, beliefs have played less of a role in research by experimental psychologists interested in metacognition. This line of theory and research has typically focused on processes of awareness and judgment concerning the status of the cognitive system, concentrating on the constructs of monitoring and control achieved via utilization of monitoring (e.g. Nelson, 1996). This state of affairs seems to be changing, as scientists interested in metacognition have begun to consider the potential importance of constructs such as causal attributions in explaining the accuracy or inaccuracy of measures of monitoring (e.g. Koriat, Goldsmith, and Pansky, 2000).

The construct of metacognition has appeared in a wide variety of theoretical treatments of cognition, including theories of intelligence and problem solving (e.g. Davidson and Sternberg, 1998). For the purposes of this chapter, I focus more narrowly on the domains of learning and memory.