This paper analyses the institutional incentives and constraints of the Black Mouth Society – the traditional police of the pre-colonial Mandan and Hidatsa tribes – to understand how it successfully maintained social order without abusing power. The Black Mouth Society was a fraternal organization of middle-aged men that monitored and enforced rules created by the village council and chiefs. Two categories of institutions ensured reliable policing. First, on the front end, a long probationary period and system of unanimous consent facilitated the selection of reputable men who would wield policing power responsibly, reducing the chance of predation. However, individual Black Mouths occasionally abused their power. Therefore, on the back end, public communication created common knowledge, leading to social sanctions in the form of shame and restitution that punished abuses and limited further abuse. Thus, well-functioning self-governance, including reliable policing, is possible without a centralized state, as these tribes have demonstrated.

Investigations of a society's competitiveness aim to trace the causal mechanisms behind patterns in wealth and poverty across societies. This paper argues that to be productive such investigations must be comparative, historical, and political economic in nature. Comparative historical political economy is how social scientists generate useful knowledge about the wealth and poverty of nations. Our contribution is a methodology – or rather a collection of methodologies – for understanding national competitiveness and attempts to improve it: one focuses on political-economic analysis, another on historical analysis, and a third on comparative analysis.

Hurricane Katrina was a “disaster” both “natural” and “social.” The storm destroyed a major American city that, like most American cities, was already the site of great inequality and vulnerability. It also dramatically put to the test both the logistical capabilities and the political responsibilities of national, state, and local governmental institutions. The Neoliberal Deluge: Hurricane Katrina, Late Capitalism, and the Remaking of New Orleans is an important collection of essays on the dynamics of “remaking New Orleans” and the limits of that effort. We have thus asked a diverse group of political scientists to review the book, and at the same time to treat it as an opportunity to reflect on two related questions: 1) What are the most important economic, cultural, and political dimensions of the crisis precipitated by Katrina, both for New Orleans and for US cities more generally? 2) What resources does political science as a discipline possess to help us understand these issues, and can political science as a discipline do a better job on this score?—Jeffrey C. Issac, Editor

I would like to thank Graciana del Castillo for her remarks regarding After War. I will focus my response on what del Castillo finds to be the major shortcoming of my book—the main policy implication. In After War, I conclude that current approaches to reconstruction, which typically rely on military occupation, are more likely to fail than to succeed. This outcome is not due to a lack of planning, effort, or political will, but is instead is the result of the array of incentives and constraints limiting what occupiers and policymakers can rationally design and implement in foreign societies. In considering alternative strategies for exporting the ideas, values, and beliefs underpinning liberal democracy, I argue that the U.S. should assume a default position of military non-intervention and free trade (unilateral if necessary). Del Castillo is sympathetic to this position as a “preventive measure,” but does not seem convinced of its suitability as a primary strategy. For example, she points out that offering trade preferences to the Taliban following 9/11 would hardly have brought liberalism to Afghanistan. I agree. However, I do not think this point undercuts my argument for a default position of free trade and non-intervention. Let me clarify why I believe this to be the case.

In this book, Graciana Del Castillo draws on theory, her own experiences as senior economist in the Cabinet of the United Nations secretary-general and as an International Monetary Fund staffer, and qualitative case studies to critically reconsider the challenges of postconflict economic reconstruction. The core argument is as follows. Countries making the shift from war to peace face a multipronged transition in the economic, legal, political, social, and security sectors. Given this multifaceted transition, economic reconstruction is fundamentally different from the “development as usual” approach taken by the international community to address typical socioeconomic challenges faced by peaceful developing countries. Instead, economic reconstruction in postconflict countries is a “development plus” challenge, meaning that these countries face the same challenges as other developing countries plus the added challenge of achieving reconciliation and peace. Del Castillo concludes that many post–Cold War reconstruction efforts have failed because of the development as usual approach to reconstruction, a lack of comprehensive planning, insufficient aid and assistance, and the inadequacies of international organizations (e.g., the United Nations and international financial institutions) in dealing with the challenges of reconstruction.

Reconstruction involves military occupation with the aim of rebuilding and reforming both formal and informal institutions along liberal democratic lines. We contend that successful reconstructions require mechanisms that make reforms credible over the long run. In the absence of a signal of sustained credible commitment, institutional reforms will not be trusted by the populace resulting in the failure of the broader reconstruction. The incentive and epistemic aspects of the credible commitment problem are analyzed. We also consider potential solutions to the problem of credible commitment. Absent such solutions, attempts to ‘export’ institutions via military occupation will fail or produce dysfunctional outcomes. An analysis of the numerous aspects of the credibility problem in the current reconstruction of Iraq is provided to illuminate the central arguments.