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The making of mistakes by organisms and other living systems is a theoretically and empirically unifying feature of biological investigation. Mistake theory is a rigorous and experimentally productive way of understanding this widespread phenomenon. It does, however, run up against the long-standing ‘functions’ debate in philosophy of biology. Against the objection that mistakes are just a kind of malfunction, and that without a position on functions there can be no theory of mistakes, we reply that this is to misunderstand the theory. In this paper we set out the basic concepts of mistake theory and then argue that mistakes are a distinctive phenomenon in their own right, not just a kind of malfunction.
The aim of the study was to evaluate the trends in respiratory syncytial virus-related hospitalisations and associated outcomes in children with haemodynamically significant heart disease in the United States of America.
Study design
The Kids’ Inpatient Databases (1997–2012) were used to estimate the incidence of respiratory syncytial virus hospitalisation among children ⩽24 months with or without haemodynamically significant heart disease. Weighted multivariable logistic regression and chi-square tests were used to evaluate the trends over time and factors associated with hospitalisation, comparing eras before and after publication of the 2003 American Academy of Pediatrics palivizumab immunoprophylaxis guidelines. Secondary outcomes included in-hospital mortality, morbidity, length of stay, and cost.
Results
Overall, 549,265 respiratory syncytial virus-related hospitalisations were evaluated, including 2518 (0.5%) in children with haemodynamically significant heart disease. The incidence of respiratory syncytial virus hospitalisation in children with haemodynamically significant heart disease decreased by 36% when comparing pre- and post-palivizumab guideline eras versus an 8% decline in children without haemodynamically significant heart disease (p<0.001). Children with haemodynamically significant heart disease had higher rates of respiratory syncytial virus-associated mortality (4.9 versus 0.1%, p<0.001) and morbidity (31.5 versus 3.5%, p<0.001) and longer hospital length of stay (17.9 versus 3.9 days, p<0.001) compared with children without haemodynamically significant heart disease. The mean cost of respiratory syncytial virus hospitalisation in 2009 was $58,166 (95% CI:$46,017, $70,315).
Conclusions
These data provide stakeholders with a means to evaluate the cost–utility of various immunoprophylaxis strategies.
Recent regulatory initiatives in the United States of America and Europe have transformed the paediatric clinical trials landscape by significantly increasing capital investment and paediatric trial volume. The purpose of this manuscript was to review the impact of these initiatives on the paediatric cardiovascular trials landscape when compared with other paediatric sub-specialties. We also evaluate factors that may have contributed to the success or failure of recent major paediatric cardiovascular trials so as to inform the optimal design and conduct of future trials in the field.
The effects of vascular rarefaction (the loss of small arteries) on the circulation of blood are studied using a multiscale mathematical model that can predict blood flow and pressure in the systemic and pulmonary arteries. We augmented a model originally developed for the systemic arteries by Olufsen and coworkers and Ottesen et al. (2004) to (a) predict flow and pressure in the pulmonary arteries, and (b) predict pressure propagation along the small arteries in the vascular beds. The systemic and pulmonary arteries are modelled as separate bifurcating trees of compliant and tapering vessels. Each tree is divided into two parts representing the ‘large’ and ‘small’ arteries. Blood flow and pressure in the large arteries are predicted using a nonlinear cross-sectional-area-averaged model for a Newtonian fluid in an elastic tube with inflow obtained from magnetic resonance measurements. Each terminal vessel within the network of the large arteries is coupled to a vascular bed of small ‘resistance’ arteries, which are modelled as asymmetric structured trees with specified area and asymmetry ratios between the parent and daughter arteries. For the systemic circulation, each structured tree represents a specific vascular bed corresponding to major organs and limbs. For the pulmonary circulation, there are four vascular beds supplied by the interlobar arteries. This paper presents the first theoretical calculations of the propagation of the pressure and flow waves along systemic and pulmonary large and small arteries. Results for all networks are in agreement with published observations. Two studies were done with this model. First, we showed how rarefaction can be modelled by pruning the tree of arteries in the microvascular system. This was done by modulating parameters used for designing the structured trees. Results showed that rarefaction leads to increased mean and decreased pulse pressure in the large arteries. Second, we investigated the impact of decreasing vessel compliance in both large and small arteries. Results showed that the effects of decreased compliance in the large arteries far outweigh the effects observed when decreasing the compliance of the small arteries. We further showed that a decrease of compliance in the large arteries results in pressure increases consistent with observations of isolated systolic hypertension, as occurs in ageing.
This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theories (dualism, double aspect theory, eliminative materialism, functionalism), and explores a number of important issues: the forms and limits of introspective awareness of sensations, the semantic properties of sensory concepts, knowledge of other minds, and unity of consciousness. The book is a significant contribution to the philosophy of mind, and has much to say to psychologists and cognitive scientists.
This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience are lending new support to type identity theory and still others provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the theory's explanatory power.
This chapter compares and evaluates two theories of qualitative states that is, states that have a proprietary phenomenological dimension. The first theory is known as type materialism or the central state identity theory. The second theory is representationalism. The most compelling virtue of the central state theory is that it can do justice to the fact that qualitative phenomena appear to be perfectly correlated with cortical phenomena. According to the central state identity theory, all awareness of qualitative states takes the form of judgments and therefore necessarily involves conceptualization. The main virtue of representationalism is its account of qualitative awareness. This chapter focuses on the apparent virtues of the two theories with respect to each whether it in fact confers a decisive advantage on the theory that possesses it. It also focuses on paradigmatic qualitative state pain and considers additional examples on future occasions.