In this chapter I argue that self-defense is permissible against an unjust attack, but that any lethal harm must be, in Aquinas’s phrase, praeter intentionem, outside the intention of the defender. I argue that public authorities must also not intend death, but that because of the nature of the political task, public officials are capacitated to use force to a greater extent and in greater measure than are private individuals.

In this chapter I consider the moral status of radically impaired persons, such as those in a persistent vegetative state. Drawing on earlier arguments in the book, I show that human beings in such states retain their personal nature and entitlement to immunity from intentional killing.

In this chapter I respond to the claim that medical assistance in dying (physician-assisted suicide, euthanasia) is justified if refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining care is. I conclude with a reflection on the importance of a norm against intentional killing to the medical profession

In this chapter I argue that God’s love and goodness make it impossible for him either to intend the evil of human death or to delegate the authority to take a human life. This concludes my argument for the absolute norm against intending death.

In this chapter I respond to two claims about unborn human beings: first that they have no rights because they have no interests; second that they have no rights because they are not persons.

In this chapter I extend the analysis of the previous chapter to defense against innocent threats. Once again, the norm against intending death applies, but the standards for permissible killing as a side effect are stricter than in the case of unjust threats.

In this chapter I argue that the norm against intentional killing is a moral absolute, identifying an action never to be done. On this ground, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and other allied bombings in World War II, are shown to have been morally unjustified.

In this chapter I give a preliminary argument against suicide, based on the core argument of the book. Suicide is distinguished from permisible acceptance of death as a side effect of some other permissible action.

In this chapter I trace the problem of killing in Christian thought. I then raise the question of whether any intentional killing can be justified; in the remainder of the book I argue that the answer to this question is “no”.

I turn now to questions concerning killing in war. I first rehearse Thomas Aquinas’s treatment of the conditions that must be met for a just war. Aquinas clearly differs from me in his belief that those with public authority are morally entitled to intend death as part of what is required for them to carry out their responsibilities. I argue, however, that even St Thomas is more restrictive with regard to intentional killing than are some contemporary Thomists.

In this chapter I address the problem of human suffering. After giving an account of the nature of suffering, I argue that suffering does not justify intending death. However, suffering needs to be understood within the larger story of Christ’s redemptive work.