We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In a time of unprecedented displacement, hostility toward refugees is widespread. Two common strategies refugee advocates pursue to counter hostility and promote inclusion are perspective-getting exercises and providing information that corrects misperceptions. In this study, we evaluate whether these strategies are effective across four outcomes commonly used to measure outgroup inclusion: warmth toward refugees, policy preferences, behavior, and beliefs about a common misperception concerning refugees. Using three studies with nearly 15,000 Americans, we find that information and perspective-getting affect different outcomes. We show that combining both interventions produces an additive effect on all outcomes, that neither strategy enhances the other, but that bundling the strategies may prevent backfire effects. Our results underscore the promise and limits of both strategies for promoting inclusion.
Diversity's effect on violence is ambiguous. Some studies find that diverse areas experience more violence; others find the opposite. Yet conflict displaces and intimidates people, creating measurement challenges. We propose a novel indicator of diversity that circumvents these problems: the location of physical structures at disaggregated geographical levels. We introduce this solution in the context of the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Our data reveal a curvilinear relationship between diversity and conflict-related deaths, with the steepest increase at low diversity, driven by an increase in violence when our proxy for the Catholic proportion of the population rises from 0 to 20 percent. These patterns are consistent with a theory of group threat through exposure.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the CDC and the WHO have recommended face masks as key to reducing viral transmission. Yet, in the USA, as the first wave erupted in the Summer of 2020, one-fifth of individuals said they wore masks at most “some of the time”, and a majority said that people in their community wore masks at most “some of the time”. What strategies most effectively encourage compliance with this critical COVID-19 prevention measure? Relying on social identity theory, we experimentally assess two possible mechanisms of compliance, elite endorsement, and social norms, among a representative sample of white US-born Evangelicals, a group that has shown resistance to prevention measures. We find evidence for both mechanisms, but social norms play a remarkably important role – increasing support for mask-wearing by 6% with spillover effects on other prevention guidelines. Our findings confirm the role that appeals to norms and elite endorsements play in shaping individual behavior and offer lessons for public health messaging.
Migrants are often scapegoated during public health crises. Can such crises create opportunities for migrant inclusion instead? As the COVID-19 pandemic unfolds, many refugee organizations have stepped up their outreach with stories of refugees helping out in the crisis. We have partnered with the country’s leading refugee advocate organizations to test whether solidarity narratives increase public engagement with refugee advocates. We employ a Facebook experimental design to evaluate the effectiveness of refugee narratives. We test whether (1) migrant narratives framed in the context of COVID-19, (2) COVID-19 migrant narratives targeted to more or less local communities, and (3) COVID-19 migrant narratives labeled as refugee vs. immigrant efforts enhance public engagement with refugee organizations. Our results indicate that migrant narratives framed in the context of COVID-19 do not motivate greater engagement than those that make no mention of the pandemic. Our results provide suggestive evidence that locally targeted efforts motivate greater engagement. Finally, we find no difference between the “refugee” and “immigrant” label, but we show that both labels can motivate greater engagement than ads that include neither. Importantly, this is true even in the context of COVID-19, an uncertain environment where worries of backlash might be warranted. These results suggest promising strategies for migrant policy organizations to promote engagement during and possibly after the pandemic.
Immigration is a highly polarized issue in the United States, and negative attitudes toward immigrants are common. Yet, almost all Americans are descended from people who originated outside the country, a narrative often evoked by the media and taught in school curricula. Can this narrative increase inclusionary attitudes toward migrants? We draw from scholarship showing that perspective-taking decreases prejudice toward out-groups to investigate whether reminding Americans about their own immigration history increases support for immigrants and immigration. We propose that priming family experiences can indirectly stimulate perspective-taking and induce empathy toward the out-group, which we test with three separate survey experiments conducted over two years. Our findings show that priming family history generates small but consistent inclusionary effects. These effects occur even among partisan subgroups and Americans who approve of President Trump. We provide evidence that increased empathy for immigrants constitutes one mechanism driving these effects.
This article introduces, describes, and evaluates a program designed to broaden the PhD pipeline in political science to achieve greater equity and inclusion. In its fifth year, the program brings undergraduate students from two Historically Black Colleges and Universities to an R-1 political science PhD department for a seven-week summer program, in which they are paired with a faculty mentor to conduct research for, prepare, and present an original research project. Additionally, participants attend methods classes, GRE preparatory workshops, subfield presentations from graduate students and faculty in the host department, and social events. We describe key lessons drawn from our experience in piloting this program. We evaluate its success using data about the composition of the host institution’s PhD program and exit surveys conducted with all participants from 2016 to 2018.
This short report exploits a unique opportunity to investigate the implications of response bias in survey questions about voter turnout and vote choice in new democracies. We analyze data from a field experiment in Benin, where we gathered official election results and panel survey data representative at the village level, allowing us to directly compare average outcomes across both measurement instruments in a large number of units. We show that survey respondents consistently overreport turning out to vote and voting for the incumbent, and that the bias is large and worse in contexts where question sensitivity is higher. This has important implications for the inferences we draw about an experimental treatment, indicating that the response bias we identify is correlated with treatment. Although the results using the survey data suggest that the treatment had the hypothesized impact, they are also consistent with social desirability bias. By contrast, the administrative data lead to the conclusion that the treatment had no effect.
Can African politicians play the ethnic card? Ethnicity matters for a host of outcomes in Africa, but debate remains about the extent to which it motivates the African voter. In experimental settings, we know that ethnicity shapes political support for hypothetical candidates. This paper offers an experimental test of the extent to which ethnicity shapes political support for actual, real-world politicians. Relying on Benin’s mixed-ethnicity President, this paper proposes a survey experiment that measures the independent effect of coethnic cues in boosting support across both coethnic groups. The results reveal that coethnic cues work: the same political actor can draw support from two different ethnic groups based solely on subtle ethnic cues.
This book explores the diverse immigrant experiences in urban West Africa, where some groups integrate seamlessly while others face exclusion and violence. It shows, counterintuitively, that cultural similarities between immigrants and their hosts do not help immigrant integration and may, in fact, disrupt it. This book is one of the first to describe and explain in a systematic way immigrant integration in the developing world, where half of all international migrants go. It relies on intensive fieldwork tracking two immigrant groups in three host cities, and draws from in-depth interviews and survey data to paint a picture of the immigrant experience from both immigrant and host perspectives.
Karim is a Nigerian Hausa who traveled from his hometown in Kano (Nigeria) to Accra (Ghana) eight years ago to seek, among other things, a better livelihood. He arrived without a job or resources and had to rely on the kindness of a fellow Nigerian Hausa he met arriving in Accra, who housed and supported him financially for a week. He found his first job through a walkin interview at a health service company that had advertised the opening on a billboard. He found his second job through a connection hemade with his first employer.His wife and children live with him in a suburb of Accra. He is fluent in his native Hausa, in English, and in Twi, the most widely spoken Ghanaian language. He is currently learning Ga, the indigenous language of Accra. On weekends, he joins other Hausas to study the Koran. When he first arrived in Ghana, he did not seek the help or assistance of the Hausa community organization: he did not even know it existed. He eventually found out that it did through a friend but, he claims, “compared to the Yorubas and the Igbos, they don't do as much.”
Michael is a Nigerian Yoruba who traveled from his hometown in Ogbomosho (Nigeria) to Accra (Ghana) in 1989. He arrived as a trader transporting and selling goods between Nigeria and Ghana. His sister and uncle, who were already settled and working in Accra, loaned him money and offered him a place to stay to assist him upon arrival. Because of financial difficulties and a stroke of bad luck, he is currently unemployed. He spends his time at the Mark Hayford Memorial Baptist Church in downtown Accra, a large and lively church whose membership is largely Yoruba. He finds support from family and friends in the church. His wife, a Yoruba who was born in Ghana and whom he met through the church in Accra, is back in Nigeria with their three children. He speaks Yoruba and English fluently. He speaks only a little bit of Twi. He is an active member of the Yoruba Community and of his hometown association, the Ogbomosho Parapo, where Yorubas “help each other out, especially if people get in trouble”.
I studied two immigrant communities in threeWest African cities to learn why groups that appear to be most likely to assimilate end up facing greater exclusion than groups that are more easily labeled as foreigners. I learned that the immigrant integration process in urban West Africa pits the incentives of individual immigrants trying to assimilate against those of immigrant leaders protecting their groups as well as their own positions of power. Leaders resist immigrant assimilation because they benefit both socially and materially from their leadership position over a distinct immigrant community. They counter the threat of assimilation by striking bargains with local police to become monopoly providers of social and civil protection for their immigrants, thus gaining the leverage they need to lock in immigrant loyalty and membership through formal organizations and institutions. Furthermore, hosts who compete economically with immigrant traders adopt exclusionary attitudes toward immigrant groups whose capacity to assimilate poses a socioeconomic threat. As a result, religious or ethnic similarities between immigrants and hosts are neither necessary nor sufficient for immigrant integration. In fact, cultural similarity can disrupt integration: the highoverlap immigrants studied in this book are more excluding and more excluded. In times of political instability, they are alsomore insecure.
Economic and cultural factors are thus deeply intertwined in explaining the immigrant integration process in urban West Africa. This holds when we aim to understand broader patterns of anti-immigrant violence in the region: a systematic analysis of new data on mass immigrant expulsions in Africa shows that leaders facing an ethnically fractionalized landscape turn to mass immigrant expulsions after a couple years of economic decline.