This paper provides quantitative evidence on interbank transmission of financial distress in the Panic of 1907 and ensuing recession. Originating in New York City, the panic led to payment suspensions and emergency currency issuance in many cities. Data on the universe of interbank connections show that (1) suspension was more likely in cities whose banks had closer ties to banks at the center of the panic, (2) banks with such links were more likely to close in the panic and recession, and (3) banks responded to the panic by rearranging their correspondent relationships, with implications for network structure.

Financial network structure is an important determinant of systemic risk. This article examines how the U.S. interbank network evolved over a long and important period that included two key events: the founding of the Federal Reserve and the Great Depression. Banks established connections to correspondents that joined the Federal Reserve in cities with Fed offices, initially reducing overall network concentration. The network became even more focused on Fed cities during the Depression, as survival rates were higher for banks with more existing connections to Fed cities, and as survivors established new connections to those cities over time.

This note investigates the sources of variation in the growth of per capita personal incomes across U.S. states during the Great Depression. States entering the economic contraction with relatively low per capita incomes tended to suffer larger percentage declines in per capita income than did high income states. By contrast, low-income states tended to experience larger percentage gains during the recovery. Hence, state per capita incomes diverged during the contraction phase and converged during the recovery phase.

This article investigates interstate differences in banking market structure during the 1920s. It finds that the number of banks per capita and the ratio of state-chartered to federally chartered banks were highest in states with deposit insurance systems, low minimum capital requirements, and branching restrictions. In the 1920s banking consolidation was greatest where falling incomes caused high failure rates, in states with deposit insurance, and where branching increased. After 1920, the high failure rate of insured state banks caused the ratio of state–chartered to federally chartered banks to decline relatively more in states with insurance systems.

This article examines the contribution of government policies to the high number of bank failures in the United States during the 1920s. In the state of Kansas, which had a system of voluntary deposit insurance and where branch banking was strictly prohibited, bank failure rates were highest in counties suffering the greatest agricultural distress and where deposit insurance system membership was highest. The evidence for Kansas illustrates how prohibitions on branch banking caused unit banks to be especially vulnerable to local economic shocks and suggests that deposit insurance caused more bank failures than would have occurred otherwise.