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Traditionally, statutory provisions prohibiting direct discrimination have employed a test of less favourable treatment. This test is controversial since it requires the use of a comparator, which is widely regarded as giving rise to a range of serious problems. It is commonly assumed, both by academics and legislators, that reliance on a comparator, and the problems to which such reliance gives rise, can be avoided by employing a test of unfavourable treatment instead of a test of less favourable treatment. In this article, we subject this assumption to critical scrutiny. We acknowledge that, on what is probably the most common understanding of the test of unfavourable treatment, employing that test does avoid the need to rely on a comparator. However, we argue that this understanding renders the test of unfavourable treatment radically over-inclusive. We then consider alternative approaches to understanding the test of unfavourable treatment, and investigate whether these approaches avoid the need to rely on a comparator whilst also avoiding the over-inclusiveness problem. We argue that this depends, ultimately, on what the value is that underlies prohibitions on discrimination.
A central tenet of the High Court of Australia's account of statutory interpretation is that the aim when interpreting a statutory provision is to ascertain the meaning of the words contained in that provision. The goal of this article is to challenge that tenet, which I call “the meaning thesis”. I argue that the High Court's acceptance of the meaning thesis leaves it unable to account for important features of the practice of statutory interpretation. In particular, it struggles to account for the ways in which statutory provisions interact with other legal norms (including other statutory provisions), especially when those other norms are introduced into the law after the statutory provisions with which they interact. This, I argue, provides a powerful reason to abandon the meaning thesis. I conclude by briefly suggesting how we might begin to develop a more satisfactory account of statutory interpretation.
In Faces of Inequality, Sophia Moreau offers a pluralist theory of discrimination, according to which discriminatory conduct involves one or more of (at least) three types of wrong. She claims, further, that each of these wrongs represents a failure to treat some people as the equal of others. I argue that this further claim is mistaken. I also suggest that there may be no need for a pluralist theory of discrimination to identify a property that is shared by the different types of wrong recognised by the theory (beyond the fact that each is present in cases of wrongful discrimination).
The Ratio-Bias phenomenon, observed by psychologist Seymour Epstein and colleagues, is a systematic manifestation of irrationality. When offered a choice between two lotteries, individuals consistently choose the lottery with the greater number of potential successes, even when it offers a smaller probability of success. In the current study, we conduct experiments to confirm this phenomenon and test for the existence of Bias as distinct from general irrationality. Moreover, we examine the effect of introducing a monetary incentive of varying size (depending on the treatment) on the extent of irrational choices within this framework. We confirm the existence of the Bias. Moreover, the existence of an incentive significantly reduces the extent of irrationality exhibited, and that this effect is roughly linear in response to changes in the size of the incentive within the magnitudes investigated.
Considerable heterogeneity exists in treatment response to first-line posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) treatments, such as Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT). Relatively little is known about the timing of when during a course of care the treatment response becomes apparent. Novel machine learning methods, especially continuously updating prediction models, have the potential to address these gaps in our understanding of response and optimize PTSD treatment.
Methods
Using data from a 3-week (n = 362) CPT-based intensive PTSD treatment program (ITP), we explored three methods for generating continuously updating prediction models to predict endpoint PTSD severity. These included Mixed Effects Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (MixedBART), Mixed Effects Random Forest (MERF) machine learning models, and Linear Mixed Effects models (LMM). Models used baseline and self-reported PTSD symptom severity data collected every other day during treatment. We then validated our findings by examining model performances in a separate, equally established, 2-week CPT-based ITP (n = 108).
Results
Results across approaches were very similar and indicated modest prediction accuracy at baseline (R2 ~ 0.18), with increasing accuracy of predictions of final PTSD severity across program timepoints (e.g. mid-program R2 ~ 0.62). Similar findings were obtained when the models were applied to the 2-week ITP. Neither the MERF nor the MixedBART machine learning approach outperformed LMM prediction, though benefits of each may differ based on the application.
Conclusions
Utilizing continuously updating models in PTSD treatments may be beneficial for clinicians in determining whether an individual is responding, and when this determination can be made.
Knowledge of the spatial distribution of bed lubrication regimes, i.e. frozen vs wet conditions, is crucial for understanding ice-sheet flow. Radar sounding can probe differing reflectivities between wet and frozen beds, but is limited by uncertainty in attenuation within the ice of bed echoes. Here we present two methods to estimate attenuation: (1) wide-angle radar sounding, in which source and receiver locations are varied so as to vary propagation path length, and thus echo amplitude; and (2) profiling, inwhich similar variations are obtained by sounding through varying ice thicknesses (assuming constant bed reflectivity). Siple Dome, West Antarctica, provides unusually favorable circumstances for application of these methods: the bed beneath Siple Dome is flat and uniform in its radar reflectivity, while ice thickness varies by several hundred meters. Wide-angle data 4 km from the summit yield an estimate for characteristic attenuation length of 124 m (35 dB km–1 loss), whereas profiling yields an estimate of 168 m.The difference between estimates is modest compared to the range of attenuation lengths reported in the literature. It may nonetheless prove informative by bounding effects of two ice properties to which the methods respond differently: (1) wide-angle sounding sampled relatively warm (lossy) ice beneath the summit, whereas the profiling method sampled relatively cold ice beneath the flanks as well; and (2) strain-induced crystal orientation fabrics and resulting dielectric anisotropy in the ice would vary from summit to flank, and may influence wide-angle sounding more strongly than profiling.
A suspected glyphosate-resistant Italian ryegrass biotype was collected from a filbert orchard near Portland, OR, where glyphosate was applied multiple times per year for about 15 yr. Greenhouse studies were conducted to determine if this biotype was glyphosate resistant. The plants were sprayed with glyphosate (0.01 to 3.37 kg ae ha−1) 14 d after planting and shoot biomass was determined 3 wk after herbicide treatment. Based on the dose–response experiments conducted in the greenhouse, the suspected Italian ryegrass biotype was approximately fivefold more resistant to glyphosate than the susceptible biotype. Plants from both susceptible and resistant biotypes were treated with glyphosate (0.42 and 0.84 kg ha−1) and shikimic acid was extracted 12, 24, 48, and 96 h after treatment. The susceptible biotype accumulated between three and five times more shikimic acid than did the resistant biotype. Leaf segments from both susceptible and resistant biotypes were incubated with different glyphosate concentrations (0.5 to 3000 μM) for 14 h under continuous light. Shikimic acid was extracted from each leaf segment and quantified. At a concentration up to 100 μM, leaf segments from the susceptible biotype accumulated more shikimic acid than leaf segments from the resistant biotype. The epsps gene was amplified and sequenced in both susceptible and resistant biotypes; however, no amino acid change was found in the resistant biotype. The level of resistance in this biotype is similar to that reported for a glyphosate-resistant Italian ryegrass biotype from Chile.
Ronald Dworkin has repeatedly claimed that the debate between moral objectivists and anti-objectivists (which I shall call “the meta-ethical debate”) has no implications for legal practice or theory. He has offered two main arguments to support this claim. The first is that while assertions about the truth or falsity of moral objectivism may be intelligible, they are irrelevant to legal practice and theory. The second is more radical, namely, that no assertion can be given an intelligible meta-ethical reading. In this article, I contend that neither argument is sound. The first argument overlooks the variety of ways in which the meta-ethical debate could impact upon legal practice or theory. It also rests upon an uncharitable interpretation of that debate. As for the second argument, Dworkin is correct in claiming that statements seemingly about the truth or falsity of moral objectivism can instead be interpreted as moral statements, but he is wrong to claim that this is the only intelligible reading they can be given.
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in the question of whether Ronald Dworkin was correct to allege that legal positivists are unable to account for theoretical disagreement about law. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the related question of who can best account for agreement about law. An important exception is Brian Leiter’s argument that there is massive and pervasive agreement in legal judgments and that positivism can account for this agreement but Dworkin cannot. In this article, I argue that Dworkin can account for such agreement, and that his explanation is no less straightforward than the positivist’s. I further contend that Leiter’s strategy for explaining theoretical disagreement is weakened once we recognise that Dworkin has a plausible explanation of agreement in legal judgments. I conclude by exploring how we might choose between the positivist’s and Dworkin’s competing explanations of agreement in legal judgments.
In 2008, avian bornaviruses (ABV) were identified as the cause of proventricular dilatation disease (PDD). PDD is a significant condition of captive parrots first identified in the late 1970s. ABV infection has subsequently been shown to be widespread in wild waterfowl across the United States and Canada where the virus infects 10–20% of some populations of ducks, geese and swans. In most cases birds appear to be healthy and unaffected by the presence of the virus; however, infection can also result in severe non-suppurative encephalitis and lesions similar to those seen in parrots with PDD. ABVs are genetically diverse with seven identified genotypes in parrots and one in canaries. A unique goose genotype (ABV-CG) predominates in waterfowl in Canada and the northern United States. ABV appears to be endemic in North American waterfowl, in comparison to what appears to be an emerging disease in parrots. It is not known whether ABV can spread between waterfowl and parrots. The discovery of ABV infection in North American waterfowl suggests that European waterfowl should be evaluated for the presence of ABV, and also as a possible reservoir species for Borna disease virus (BDV), a related neurotropic virus affecting horses and sheep in central Europe. Although investigations have suggested that BDV is likely derived from a wildlife reservoir, for which the shrew and water vole are currently prime candidates, we suggest that the existence of other mammalian and avian reservoirs should not be discounted.
Joseph Raz famously argues that given that the law necessarily claims authority and given the account of authority he provides, exclusive legal positivism is the only tenable theory of law. In this article, I contend that even if one accepts that the law necessarily claims authority and that Raz's account of authority is correct, it does not follow that exclusive legal positivism is the only tenable theory of law. This is because even if the law necessarily claims authority, it need not be capable of satisfying the requirements for possessing authority laid down by the correct account of authority. Thus, even if exclusive legal positivism is the only theory of law according to which the law can satisfy those requirements, this does not show that exclusive legal positivism is correct.
We present photometry and spectroscopy of the peculiar Type II supernova SN 2010jp, also named PTF10aaxi. The light curve exhibits a linear decline with a relatively low peak absolute magnitude of only −15.9 (unfiltered), and a low radioactive decay luminosity at late times that suggests a low synthesized nickel mass of about 0.003 M⊙ or less. Spectra of SN 2010jp display an unprecedented triple-peaked Hα line profile, showing: (1) a narrow central component that suggests shock interaction with a dense circumstellar medium (CSM); (2) high-velocity blue and red emission features centered at −12,600 and +15,400 km s−1; and (3) very broad wings extending from −22,000 to +25,000 km s−1. We propose that this line profile indicates a bipolar jet-driven explosion, with the central component produced by normal SN ejecta and CSM interaction at mid and low latitudes, while the high-velocity bumps and broad line wings arise in a nonrelativistic bipolar jet. Jet-driven SNe II are predicted for collapsars resulting from a wide range of initial masses above 25 M⊙, especially at the sub-solar metallicity consistent with the SN host environment. It also seems consistent with the apparently low 56Ni mass that may accompany black hole formation. We speculate that the jet survives to produce observable signatures because the star's H envelope was very low mass, having been mostly stripped away by the previous eruptive mass loss.
Edited by
Alex S. Evers, Washington University School of Medicine, St Louis,Mervyn Maze, University of California, San Francisco,Evan D. Kharasch, Washington University School of Medicine, St Louis