Not that long ago, any thought of transferring body parts, or fluids like blood, among individuals was expressed in terms of a nightmare. Consider the problem of involuntary blood transfusions to Count Dracula! Or recall the infamous brain transplant to the brutish body under Dr. Frankenstein's ministrations. The very thought of bodily transference stimulated writers to create monsters. The stuff of evil seemed to surround any attempt. Hubris was considered the evil that exceeded the normal limits of scientific research and development. Transplantation seemed to make humans into gods who defied death but who, like Icarus and his wax wings, flew too close to the sun.

Ethics consults at a university medical center share many qualitites with those in other settings. What makes them different, if at all, is a difference of degree, not kind. All consult services share the tasks of exploring cases for possible recommendation, contributing to the development of institutional and public policy, and educating colleagues and patients about medical ethics dimensions. Nonetheless, the university setting, devoted as it is to teaching, research, and public service, brings a slightly different focus to these tasks and adds other, peripheral ones.

“Ethical dilemmas…are rarely simple and stark but are, instead, multifaceted, complex, and gut wrenching for parents and care givers alike.” This is never more the case than when one must treat vulnerable babies who are not, nor ever can be competent to offer us some guidance about that treatment. The ethical problems are heightened when the parents, or the single mother, are incompetent to make decisions themselves, for example, because of drug addiction. In such cases, when the baby is premature and suffering the effects of the drugs the mother has taken, and the mother herself is either no longer available for consultation or so damaged by her own addiction that she is not a reliable decisionmaker, the usual trend In the United States is to initiate treatment and continue until it is virtually certain that the infant will die.

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others.

From time to time medical ethicists bemoan the loss of a religious perspective in medical ethics. The discipline had its origins in the thinking of explicitly religious thinkers such as Paul Ramsey and Joseph Fletcher. Furthermore, many of those who contributed to the early development of the discipline had training in theology. One thinks of Daniel Callahan, Richard McCormick, Albert Jonsen, Sam. Banks. As the discipline becomes more and more self-reflective, with attention being paid to methodological and conditional concerns, it is only natural that the roots are due for a reexamination. The time has therefore come for some reassessment. The first steps here are taken in the form of a dialogue between the coauthors to clarify authentic contributions and weed out unauthentic ones.

During 1992, academic bioethicists celebrated the 30th anniversary of bioethics. Some like to date the origin of modern secular bioethics to the advent of transplant technology that began with kidney transplantation in the early 1960s in the Seattle, Washington, area. This is certainly a good candidate for a starting point. Another might be the work of Joseph Fletcher in the New York area with the Euthanasia Society of America and with clergy training. Still another candidate for the origins of secular bioethics would be the trial of physicians at the University of Virginia for transplanting a kidney at which the same Joseph Fletcher testified. At that trial, the alteration occurred in American law from a definition of death that focused on the cessation of heartbeat to one that focused on the cessation of brain function.

At the end of the most violent century in human history, it is good to take stock of our commitments to human and other life forms, as well as to examine the rights and the duties that might flow from their biological makeup. Professor Thomasma and Professor Loewy have held a long-standing dialogue on whether there are moral differences between animals and humans. This dialogue was occasioned by a presentation Thomasma made some years ago at Loewy's invitation at the University of Illinois, Peoria, Medical Center. During that presentation, Thomasma argued that human beings are sufficiently distinct from other animals genetically and otherwise to justify a moral difference in rights and obligations. In effect, he argued that there are species-specific rights. This essay will pick up the threads of that dialogue.

You wrote an editorial in JAMA giving a 30-year retrospective on bioethics. If you look ahead to the next 30 years, what are the issues you see facing bioethics in the future?

In this essay I will examine why the truth is so important to human communication in general, the types of truth, and why truth is only a relative value. After those introductory points, I will sketch the ways in which the truth is overridden or trumped by other concerns in the clinical setting. I will then discuss cases that fall into five distinct categories. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of truth telling and its primacy among secondary goods in the healthcare professional-patient relationship.

Populations around the world are aging at a very fast rate, so much so that care for the elderly will soon rupture even the most carefully planned, enlightened care provisions societies can offer. The demographics in advanced countries demonstrate this dilemma, even without projections based on antiaging medications that may be possible in the near future, and a healthier lifestyle that has preoccupied the yuppies for about 10 years.

The combination of genuine ethical concerns and fear of learning to use germ-line therapy for human disease must now be confronted. Until now, no established techniques were available to perform this treatment on a human. Through an integration of several fields of science and medicine, we have developed a nine step protocol at the germ-line level for the curative treatment of a genetic disease. Our purpose in this paper is to provide the first method to apply germ-line therapy to treat those not yet born, who are destined to have a life threatening, or a severely debilitating genetic disease. We hope this proposal will initiate the process of a thorough analysis from both the scientific and ethical communities. As such, this proposal can be useful for official groups studying the advantages and disadvantages of germ-line therapy.

Models of the doctor-patient relationship determine which value will predominate in the interaction of the parties. That value then significantly colors and even sometimers alters the nature of the ethical discussion. For example, if an institution predominately prides it-self on its competitive posture, ethical issues arising therein will necessarily be colored by entrepreurial rather than deontological ethics. By contrast, a physician who underlines patient decision making will tend to place autonomy first above all other principles, casting that relationship in a libertarian tone.

Past ages of medical care are condemned in modern philosophical and medical literature as being too paternalistic. The normal account of good medicine in the past was, indeed, paternalistic in an offensive way to modern persons. Imagine a Jean Paul Sartre going to the doctor and being treated without his consent or even his knowledge of what will transpire during treatment! From Hippocratic times until shortly after World War II, medicine operated in a closed, clubby manner. The knowledge learned in medicine was not shared with the patients, who were in general poorly educated and for the most part completely ignorant of the craft of medicine and the physicians (but not, perhaps, of folk medicine). Physicians were cautioned against telling patients too much about their Illness and/or their recovery, perhaps because physicians themselves did not have an enormous armamentarium to confront disease.

The exportation of Western biomedicine throughout the world has not resulted in a systematic homogenization of scientific ideology but rather in the proliferation of many forms and practices of biomedicine. Similarly, in the last decade, bioethics has become increasingly an international enterprise. Although there may be consensus regarding the inherent value of ethical discourse as it relates to health and medical care, there are disagreements about the nature and parameters of medical morality. This lack of consensus exists because our beliefs about morality are culturally constituted, embedded in social, religious, and political ideologies that influence particular individuals and communities at specific historical moments.

Let us look at autonomy in a new way. Autonomy has a richly deserved place of honor in bioethlcs. It has led the set of principles that formed the basis of the discipline since the beginning. It is the leading principle In what is now regularly called “the Georgetown Mantra,” a phrase suggested by one of the first philosophers ever to be hired In a medical school, K. Danner Clouser. The phrase applies to the principled approach of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. This kind of bioethics was developed by scholars like Beauchamp and Childress, Veatch, and Engelhardt, during their association with Georgetown University.

In advanced technological societies there is growing concern about the prospect of protracted deaths marked by incapacitation, intolerable pain and indignity, and invasion by machines and tubing. Life prolongation for critically ill cancer patients in the United States, for example, literally costs a fortune for very little benefit, typically from $82,845 to $189,339 for an additional year of life. Those who return home after major interventions live on average only 3 more months; the others live out their days in a hospital intensive care unit.