The European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC requires all European Economic Area (EEA) jurisdictions to provide an equivalent regime protecting the privacy and other fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to personal data processing, whilst also shielding media expression from the default substantive requirements as necessary to ensure a balance between fundamental rights. Through a comprehensive coding of the derogations set out in each jurisdiction's data protection laws, this article provides the first systematic analysis of whether this has in fact been achieved. It is demonstrated that there is a total lack of even minimal harmonization in this area, with many laws providing for patently unbalanced results especially as regards the publication of sensitive information, which includes criminal convictions and political opinion, and the collection of information without notice direct from the data subject. This reality radically undermines European data protection's twin purposes of ensuring the free flow of personal data and protecting fundamental rights, an outcome which remains largely unaddressed by the proposed new Data Protection Regulation. Practical suggestions are put forward to ameliorate these troubling inconsistencies within the current process of reform.

Defamation law has historically occupied a position of overwhelming dominance in the vindication of the traditional right to reputation. Nevertheless, liberalisation of this legal framework including through the Defamation Act 2013 has led to a concern that, when analysed from a fundamental rights perspective, “gaps” in the protection provided for natural persons may have emerged. In this new context, there has been a renewed focus on whether data protection may fill the potential lacunae. Data protection law contains a number of important limitations and exceptions and its jurisprudence has been both limited and sometimes confused. Nevertheless, this article argues that its broad purpose and complex structure ensure it will play a significantly augmented role in the future, especially in actions against website operators facilitating the dissemination of information posted by a third party, the publication of opinion, or where either injunctive relief or the correction of inaccurate information is sought (in particular in cases of continuing online disclosure).

This article argues that three factors have framed elite political debate and outcomes on a Bill of Rights in Britain – the degree of commitment to an ideology of social liberalism, the executive/non-executive power orientation of key actors and the phenomenon of policy drag. These factors explain not only the overall historical contours of political debate but also (1) Labour's ‘aversive’ conversion to the Bill of Rights agenda and passage of the Human Rights Act (1998); and (2) the Conservatives’ more positive recent attitude to the Bill of Rights agenda.

This article argues that the cultural self‐understandings of the judiciary can exert a profound effect on legal outcomes under a bill of rights. Utilizing the case of New Zealand, it demonstrates that confinement of expansive case law under the New Zealand Bill of Rights (NZBOR) to the criminal law and freedom of expression arenas is most significantly explained by a British‐descended judicial culture that prioritizes, first, those civil liberty values already cognizable by the common law and, second, rights connected with the policing of parliamentary and legal processes. Nevertheless, judicial culture does not operate in a vacuum. Rather, the opportunity structure facing potential public interest litigants under NZBOR depends also on their politicolegal resource set including the attitude of the political branches (legislature and executive) to the claim being forwarded.

In a nuclear processing plant, four departments were compared using a 60-item questionnaire measuring safety attitudes and beliefs including the perception of managers' attitudes and behaviour, communication and risk-taking, and attitudes to taking personal responsibility for safety. Results suggest some differences at the conceptual level in addition to departmental differences and large grade differences. It is proposed that there are certainly two and possibly more differing safety cultures within this organization. The implications of this are discussed in terms of policy.