The ‘constitutional reform’ planned by the government that assumed power in Israel in December 2022 is not an end in itself. Its aim is to provide the basis for planned policies and actions of the government that are incompatible with Israel's present constitutional order, and that are unlikely to stand up to judicial review before the present judges of the Supreme Court. This article discusses the connection between various parts of the reform and the plans to make a radical change in Israel's policies in the occupied West Bank. It examines the coalition agreement between PM Netanyahu's Likud party and the Religious Zionist Party, and exposes the connection between the commitment in that agreement to the policies regarding the occupation and the planned ‘reform’.

One of the unique features of Israel's legal, military, and political control over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) has been the review by the Supreme Court of Israel of the actions and decisions of the authorities in those territories. Sitting as a High Court of Justice that has the competence to review the actions of all persons exercising public functions under law, the Court has entertained thousands of petitions relating to the legality of such varied actions as house demolitions, deportations, land requisition, entry permits, and establishment of settlements. There can be little doubt that the very existence of judicial review has had a restraining effect on the authorities. While the Court has not ruled against the government that often, and has provided legitimization for acts of dubious legality, such as punitive house demolitions and deportations, it has handed down some important rulings on questions of principle. Furthermore, in the shadow of the Court, many petitions have been settled without a court ruling, allowing for a full or partial remedy for the Palestinian petitioner.

It would be impossible in a short lecture to give a comprehensive survey of all the changes that have occurred in the last forty years in that branch of law known as “Israel common law”. I will not, therefore, try to do so. Instead, I wish to single out the most distinctive phenomenon in this area of law. I refer to the conceptual/intellectual revolution in the outlook of the court regarding the nature of its judicial function. The original view, according to which the sole function of the court in the area of public law is to decide disputes between citizens and public authorities, has been abandoned and replaced by an outlook that views the court as an institution responsible for the legality of public administration, or, as the court itself is accustomed to defining the matter, for the rule of law.

I shall divide my discussion into two parts. In the first part I will briefly discuss the prominent changes that have occurred in the judicial decisions regarding public law in recent years, and the judicial philosophy underlying these changes.

Political agreements are an integral part of the political system in Israel. For various reasons — mainly the proportional representation electoral system and the existence of a “third bloc” of religious parties that do no fit into the centre-right and centre-left political alliances — no political party has ever enjoyed an absolute majority in the Knesset. The dominant parties have therefore always had to rely on coalition agreements with smaller parties in order to obtain, and subsequently maintain, the parliamentary majority required for a government to rule under Israel's parliamentary system. A similar situation exists in many municipal councils and in other elected bodies, such as the Bar Council.

The right of citizens to demonstrate has been in the news of late. Recent events have led many citizens in Israel to take to the streets as a means of expressing their opposition to, and in some cases support of, government policies, actions or leaders. Following a pattern which is not unusual in Israel, some aspects of this issue have found their way into the courts and on to the table of the Attorney General. Thus, the refusal of the Jerusalem police to grant a permit for a demonstration through the main streets of the city, exactly one month after the tragic murder of Emil Grunzweig during a Peace Now demonstration, led the disappointed applicants, with the active support of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), to petition the Supreme Court. The Court overruled the police decision and ordered the police to grant the licence. On the 1st April, 1983, following repeated requests by the ACRI, the Attorney General issued directives reaffirming the right of citizens to demonstrate and clarifying the powers of the police to disallow or interfere with demonstrations. That one of the two dailies with the largest circulations in Israel saw fit to publish the full text of these directives in its holiday edition is an indication of the interest which the public has in the issue.

When an industrial concern pollutes the environment thereby interfering with neighbouring homeowners' use and enjoyment of their property, may the homeowners enjoin the pollution even where compliance with an injunction could force the polluting industry to stop production?

Faced with this kind of question the initial reaction of people concerned with protecting the environment against pollution is almost certain to be in favour of granting the injunction. However, the problem has received considerable attention in contemporary legal literature and much of what has been written tends to show that this reaction is both simplistic and somewhat unrealistic. It is simplistic because an economic analysis of the facts of any given situation—which for want of a better term may be called a “nuisance-situation”—may well reveal that the defendant should be allowed to continue his polluting activity (though other measures should be taken to protect its victims from its effects); it is unrealistic because even if an injunction is granted by the court, means will probably be found to enable the polluting activity to carry on if it is economically or socially desirable for it to do so.

The assumption of this article is that when a state is involved in an international armed conflict it may employ lethal force against combatants of the enemy unless they are hors de combat. Hence, even when it would be feasible to do so, it has no duty to apprehend enemy combatants rather than use force against them. Does this same norm apply in non-international armed conflicts occurring in the territory of a single state (internal conflicts)? The writers argue that the answer is in the negative. Despite the attempt in recent years to narrow the differences between the norms that apply in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) and international armed conflicts (IACs), there are still significant differences between the two types of armed conflict, which justify the application of different norms in this context. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions refers only to humanitarian norms and does not imply that the norms relating to the conduct of hostilities in IACs apply also in NIACs. While customary international law may allow states to use lethal force in a NIAC in the actual conduct of hostilities, there is no basis for assuming that the norm that ostensibly applies in IACs relating to use of such force outside the context of hostilities applies in NIACs too. The jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which is the main source for the arguments on closing the gap between IACs and NIACs, relates only to humanitarian norms and has never addressed extending the permissive IAC norms of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to NIACs. Finally, in an internal armed conflict the state has a dual capacity: it must respect and ensure the human rights of all persons subject to its jurisdiction, and it is a party in an armed conflict with some of those persons. In such a situation, the only context in which the state may deviate from regular norms of law enforcement is the actual context of hostilities, in which application of such norms is not feasible. In other contexts, its human rights obligations prevail.

The first step in application by treaty of IHL norms to non-international armed conflicts, adoption of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 1949, was taken before the dramatic development of international human rights law (IHRL). The assumption was that unless international humanitarian law (IHL) norms were applied to such conflicts, the way States acted would be unrestrained by international law. With the development of IHRL this assumption is no longer valid. Application of IHL in such conflicts should therefore be re-examined. The Article argues that moving away from IHL in non-international armed conflicts should be based on the following principles: 1. In cases other than international armed conflicts, the presumption should be that the prevailing international legal regime is the human rights regime, based as it is on a law-enforcement model of law, rather than an armed conflict model. 2. The only justification for departure from that regime and for action under the armed conflict model, should be that the level and scope of organized armed violence are such that the State cannot reasonably be expected to act in accordance with the law-enforcement model. The rule of thumb in deciding whether this test has been met could be the definition of non-international armed conflicts adopted in APII. 3. There should be a return to the notion of minimum humanitarian standards or fundamental standards of humanity, which apply to all Parties in all situations, whether armed conflict, internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergencies. 4. A State should not be allowed to employ the armed conflict model, without at least some of the norms of protection that this model affords Parties in international armed conflicts. The ideal solution would be to demand that a State, which employs the armed conflict model has to draw the legal consequences and recognize as combatants those members of dissident forces who meet the substantive conditions of combatants under Article 4, paragraph 2 of Third Geneva Convention.