Chapter 7 explores political virtue. The central feature of Montesquieu’s reflections on the Ancients was his claim that the Greeks and the Romans had been motivated by a form of civic patriotism that Europeans of his day appeared incapable of achieving. The size of most modern nations and the progress of modern commerce conspire to foreclose a return to communities moved by passionate commitment to the common good. The aim of this chapter is to consider the relationship between the obsolescence of political virtue and Montesquieu’s project of political liberty and political moderation. The chapter will consider his critical appraisal of both classical virtue and its leading modern replacement, Machiavellian virtù. It will also consider the ways in which ambiguities in Montesquieu’s presentation of virtuous republics led to polemical and often distorted uses of his views on civic virtue during both the American and French revolutions.

In his Notes on England (1729–1731) and his Reflections on the Inhabitants of Rome (1732) Montesquieu displays the keen interest in national character that was evident in Persian Letters (1721), where he had juxtaposed the mores and politics of Christian France with the customs and government of Muslim Persia. Montesquieu finds much to admire about English politics and culture, including strong support for freedom of the press. The people of England, he remarks, are allowed to write what in other countries one can only think. His Notes reveal, however, that at the same time he was composing the idealized portrait of the English constitution that became Book XI, chapter 6 of The Spirit of Law he was aware that there was widespread political corruption in England. Money, rather than honor and virtue, is what the English most prize, he noted. In his Reflections on the Inhabitants of Rome (1732) Montesquieu explores several causes, some physical and others moral, for the striking contrasts between ancient and modern Romans.

Few philosophes of the Enlightenment received such accolades as Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu et de la Brède (1689–1755) following publication of his Spirit of Law (1748), the product, he said, of twenty years’ study. Charles de Brosses, noted author and magistrate in Dijon, was moved to say, “What a fine work! How many ideas, what fire, what precision […], what new and luminous thoughts.” Across the Channel David Hume proclaimed Montesquieu an “author of great genius, as well as extensive learning” and concluded he had produced “the best system of political knowledge that, perhaps, has ever been communicated to the world.” Montesquieu’s work, he predicted, would be regarded as “the wonder of all centuries.” Edmund Burke was similarly awed and called Montesquieu “a genius not born in every country, or every time […] with an herculean robustness of mind.”

In Memorandum on the Debts of State (1715) Montesquieu explains how to curb France’s debt crisis stemming principally from Louis XIV’s war-mongering. Rather than recommending declaration of bankruptcy, he proposes a gradual reduction of the debt by means of a partial repudiation. The greater the proportion of an individual’s overall wealth invested in the crown’s debt, the less the reduction would be, since such individuals would have fewer other investments. Montesquieu was confident his debt reduction plan would succeed and predicted the king would be able to reduce taxes. In his Considerations on the Wealth of Spain (1727–1728) he explains that the main reason for the collapse of Spain as a powerhouse in modern Europe was that the Spanish became the victims of inflation. The more bullion brought to Spain’s shores, the less valuable it became since more and more specie chased roughly the same amount of goods.

Montesquieu assesses Roman politics, philosophy, and religion. He explains in his Dissertation on Roman Politics in Religion (1716) that the Roman republic was designed by Romulus and the early kings of Rome as a theocracy. The goal of Roman paganism was “to inspire fear of the gods in a people who feared nothing, and to make use of that fear to lead them in any way they wished.” In his Discourse on Cicero (1717) Montesquieu expresses unstinting admiration for Cicero both as a statesman and a philosopher, asserting that Cicero’s De Officiis teaches us “what is honorable and beneficial, what we owe to society, what we owe to ourselves, and what we should do as heads of families or as citizens.” In his Dialogue between Sulla and Eucrates (1724) he assesses the conduct of the Roman general and dictator Lucius Cornelius Sulla, observing that he had shown how deadly heroism can be, even when based on sound principle, such as Sulla’s desire to restore the powers of the Roman senate. “For one man to be above humanity,” Montesquieu concludes, all the others pay too dear a price.” Sulla marked out a path toward tyranny that Caesar would surely follow.

Although The Spirit of Law (1748) was greeted very favorably in many quarters, a Jansenist writer in the Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques charged Montesquieu with lack of respect for Christianity and with being a follower of natural religion. Montesquieu’s response was that his critic had failed to understand that he was writing, not as a theologian, but as a “jurisconsult” (legal scholar) exploring what laws are most suitable for a given people considering their character and situation. Montesquieu acknowledges that although he had discussed many non-Christian customs, he was “not justifying the customs but giving the reasons for them.” He also stressed that he had rebutted the views of both Bayle and Spinoza. He notes that he had called out Bayle for his error in believing that “a society of true Christians could not survive” and had refuted Spinoza’s fatalism by asserting that “those who have said that a blind fate has produced all the effects that we see in the world have uttered a great absurdity.”

On the Motives that Should Encourage Us Towards the Sciences (1725) represents Montesquieu’s advocacy of accelerating the pace of scientific inquiry to build on the progress made in astronomy, physics, and physiology. In addition to stressing the lasting intellectual pleasures of pursuing science and its practical benefits to mankind, he emphasizes the important role of scientific learning in combating superstition. His Essay on the Causes that Can Affect Minds and Characters (1736–1738/1739) reveals his deep interest in physiology and brain functions and explains his view that both physical and moral causes affect human behavior, with moral causes predominating. Their cumulative effect produces a people’s general character, or spirit. The Essay dispels any notion that Montesquieu was a climatological determinist, a conclusion some have wrongly reached after a superficial reading of Book XIV of The Spirit of Law.

In Letters from Xenocrates to Pheres (1724) Montesquieu explores the politics of Regency France ( 1715-1723) during the minority of Louis XV. In On Politics (1725) he implores princes to employ straightforward and moral strategies rather than resorting to the ruthless tactics recommended by Machiavelli in The Prince. In Reflections on Universal Monarchy in Europe (1732–1733) he stresses the need to inject morality into international relations and teaches that warfare no longer bestows the same benefits as in Roman times. In his Reflections on the Character of Certain Princes and Certain Events in Their Lives (1731–1733) Montesquieu emphasizes the need for moral values in politics and shows that immoral acts by princes result in harm, not benefit. In his Memorandum on the Silence to Impose on the “Constitution” (1754), he offers Louis XV advice on how to deal with the presence of the Jansenist, predestinarian strain of Catholicism in France. He concludes that toleration is a practical necessity and says priests should be forbidden to inquire of parishioners whether they are Jansenists, who in turn should not identify themselves as such.

The texts in Part Three of the volume reveal Montesquieu’s moral idealism and life-long concern with ethics. He was clearly a moral theorist as well as a political philosopher. In his In Praise of Sincerity (1717) he stresses the importance of providing moral guidance to one’s friends by speaking to them honestly regarding their shortcomings. In his Treatise on Duties (1725) Montesquieu stresses the need, recognized by the Stoics and by Cicero, to observe human duties and attacks Thomas Hobbes by asserting contra Hobbes that there are absolutes of justice traceable to nature and attacks Baruch Spinoza by proclaiming that the world was created by design, not “blind fate.” In his Consideration and Reputation (1725) he observes that we crave the esteem of our friends even more than we desire birth, wealth, positions, and honors, and yet we neglect “probity, good faith, and modesty,” because these traits are undervalued by our friends. In his Discourse on the Equity that Must Determine Judgments and the Execution of Laws (1725) Montesquieu asserts that the “essential virtue” for a judicial magistrate is “justice, a quality without which he is but a monster in society.”