Childhood obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) stems from a bunch of restricted and repetitive behaviors, which are part of normal behavioral repertoire up to the age of 7. The persistence of compulsive-like behaviors after that age is often associated with unique comorbidity patterns, which are age-at-onset dependent and reflect different developmental stages. In particular, OCD synchronically co-occurs with a broad constellation of neurodevelopmental disorders, whereas diachronically it is related to an increased risk of major adult psychoses. Moreover, OCD is associated with trait-like sensory phenomena, suggesting a common disrupted sensorimotor grounding.

The present study is aimed at exploring the hypothesis that this specific temporal and comorbidity OCD profile may be due to a developmental heterochronic mechanism of delay in attenuation of ontogenetically early behavioral patterns. The developmental shift of highly evolutionarily conserved behavioral phenotypes might be regulated by epigenetic changes induced by different conditions of sensory unbalance. This evolutionary and developmental model allows capturing childhood OCD in light of the ultimate causes of ritual behavior throughout phylogeny, namely its “homeostatic” function over conditions of unpredictability. Moreover, it may have important clinical implications, as OCD symptoms could represent putative biomarkers of early divergent developmental trajectories, with a pathoplastic effect on course and outcome.

The construct of sense of agency (SoA) has proven useful for understanding mechanisms underlying obsessive–compulsive disorder (OCD) phenomenology, especially in explaining the apparent dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one’s actions. Paradoxically, people with OCD appear to experience both diminished SoA (feeling unable to control their actions) and inflated SoA (having “magical” control over events). The present review investigated the extent to which the SoA is distorted in OCD, in terms of both implicit (ie, inferred from correlates and outcomes of voluntary actions) and explicit (ie, subjective judgment of one’s control over an outcome) measures of SoA. Our search resulted in 15 studies that met the criteria for inclusion in a meta-analysis, where we also examined the potential moderating effects of the type of measure (explicit versus implicit) and of the actual control participants had over the outcome. We found that participants with OCD or with high levels of OCD symptoms show lower implicit measures of SoA and at the same time tend to overestimate their control in situations where they do not actually have it. Together, these findings support the hypothesized dissociation in OCD between actual and perceived control over one’s actions.