Australia will, I believe, ratify the convention and afterwards this Parliament will pass the necessary legislation to show other countries that we join in universal condemnation of the horror [of genocide].

On November 9, 2023, Prime Minister Albanese of Australia and then Prime Minister Natano of Tuvalu signed the Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union Treaty in Rarotonga (Falepili Union Treaty or the Treaty). The preamble explains that “the concept of Falepili . . . connotes the traditional values of good neighbourliness, duty of care and mutual respect.” It sets a groundbreaking precedent for Small Island States threatened by rising sea-levels, addressing both State continuity and climate resettlement. Nonetheless, and despite its subsequent entry into force on August 28, 2024, it has not been without controversy in Tuvalu and, to a lesser extent, Australia due to provisions seen by some as substantially infringing Tuvalu's independence in foreign relations or even its sovereignty.

This article examines reactions to the South China Sea and Chagos Marine Protection Area arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in particular concerns about the potential widening of Part XV jurisdiction and its impact on the dispute resolution system's consent basis. It argues that assessing the impact of such cases involves a characterization of both the function of Part XV and of international judges. Ultimately, it suggests that the best test of whether UNCLOS case law has gone too far is the reaction of States in designing dispute settlement under the new Agreement under UNCLOS on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction.

Cyberspace is now acknowledged not only as the newest domain of warfare, but also as a space vital to economic, educational and cultural development for all States. This thin consensus ignores the fundamental fact that the backbone of cyber infrastructure—submarine telecommunication cables—is not (for the large part) located within sovereign territorial jurisdiction. The radically increased reliance of States upon submarine data cables emphasises their vulnerability to damage by malicious acts, accidents, or natural phenomena. Faced with these problems, legal analysis has tended to identify gaps or deficiencies in the law, and propose the creation of new legal instruments. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it expands the frame of analysis to include deliberate damage to cables not only in peacetime but under the law of armed conflict. Second, rather than treating the legal framework as inherently deficient, it considers the extent to which existing rules and principles can be progressively developed, interpreted, or creatively applied to close perceived gaps. This article surveys the existing law specific to the protection of submarine cables and assesses how general principles of the law of the sea, State responsibility, the law on the use of force, and the law of armed conflict apply to this problem. It thus considers in turn the applicable ‘law of peace’, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello.

The ongoing development of diverse maritime autonomous vehicles for varied ocean activities—ranging from scientific research, security surveillance, transportation of goods, military purposes and commission of crimes—is prompting greater consideration of how existing legal frameworks accommodate these vehicles. This article brings together the core legal issues, as well as current developments in relation to commercial shipping, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security. This article captures how these issues are now being addressed and what other legal questions will likely emerge as the newest technology impacts on one of the oldest bodies of international law.

The conventional wisdom has been that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS] Part XV dispute settlement system is narrowly restricted and this reflects the drafters’ intent. Thus, tribunals should cautiously interpret Part XV, giving broad effect to its jurisdictional limitations. The unanimous award in South China Sea deals this approach a blow. Indeed, it assumes a fundamentally different orientation to interpreting UNCLOS: one which implicitly takes the foremost principle of Part XV as being its compulsory and comprehensive character. This approach is rooted in a very different understanding of UNCLOS as a “package deal” and the consensus it reflects. Indeed, I argue that any interpretation of ambiguous provisions of UNLCOS is necessarily coloured by one’s view of the struggles involved in its negotiation. Further evidence of this difference of approach in South China Sea is found, in particular, in its treatment of the regime of islands.

In my remarks I would like to draw attention to the role of history in the Tribunal's reasoning concerning the regime of islands, both as regards its approach to historical uses of maritime features and in particular its approach to determining what it was the drafters of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) intended. My contention in these remarks is that the Tribunal took an unashamedly developing-state oriented view in its conception of the object and purpose of the regime of islands, thus foregrounding perspectives that were present at the time of the negotiation of UNCLOS but which are not necessarily given much attention in the contemporary English-language literature. Before turning to this perspective, one must closely scrutinize the Tribunal's reading of UNCLOS Article 121.

On September 18, 2013, several Greenpeace activists, bearing ropes and posters, attempted to board a Gazprom oil platform, the Prirazlomnaya, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Russian Federation. They did so in inflatable craft launched from a Greenpeace vessel, the Netherlands-flagged MV Arctic Sunrise. They were soon arrested by the Russian Coast Guard. The following day, armed agents of the Russian Federal Security Service boarded the Arctic Sunrise itself from a helicopter, arresting those on board. The Netherlands was apparently informed of Russia’s intention to board and arrest the vessel shortly after the original boarding of the platform. Over the next four days, the vessel was towed to Murmansk. Russian authorities charged the thirty detained persons (the so-called Arctic 30) with “piracy of an organized group.” Although President Vladimir Putin acknowledged that the protesters were “obviously... not pirates,” he also noted that “formally, they tried to seize our platform.” On October 4, the Netherlands announced that, under Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it had commenced arbitration proceedings against Russia over the detention of the Arctic Sunrise and the legality of its seizure. On October 21, the Netherlands filed with the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) a request for the prescription of provisional measures pending the constitution of the Annex VII arbitration tribunal.