Judging by their answers on public opinion surveys, many Russian
citizens favor democracy, at least as long as the stakes are not too high
or rights are not being extended to people they do not like (e.g.,
Tikhonova 2005, 39; Colton and McFaul 2001; Gibson 1998). But
Russians' behavior at times belies those findings. Ordinary
Russians expressed little outrage when the first president of independent
Russia, Boris Yeltsin, bombed the parliament in 1993. Nor did they
forcefully protest the actions of their second president, Vladimir Putin,
when he restricted personal freedoms, strengthened executive power, and
undermined the electoral process. Indeed, Russians continue to give Putin
high approval ratings (Fond Obshchestvennoe Mnenie 2006). Russians' electoral choices also have not
tended to favor democrats. In many local elections and in elections to the
State Duma throughout the 1990s, significant numbers of Russians chose
Communists, near-fascist nationalists, or others of questionable
democratic credentials to represent them. Liberal democratic parties fared
poorly in a number of elections and in the 2003 Duma elections failed to
win a single seat. Since 2003, support for liberal parties declined still
further (Levashov 2006, 10).