Less than a decade after the American Civil War, the United States signed the 1874 reciprocity treaty, imposing its first restrictions on Hawaiian sovereignty. Whereas most scholars take for granted US interests in controlling Hawaii, we ask how this interest emerged in 1874. We argue the answer lies with American entrepreneurs like Henry A.P. Carter. The rise of commodity prices - first in sandalwood, then in whale oil, and finally, in sugar - drove American entrepreneurs to Hawaii. When threats to their enterprises emerged, they formed a lobby to advocate for American imperialism, and shaped perceptions of the costs and benefits of imperialism within Hawaii and the United States.

Why did the United States establish an early American Empire in the Pacific (1856-1898)? This chapter summarizes the argument of this book, explaining why patterns of imperialism demonstrate the influence of commodity prices and entrepreneurs for distinctive patterns of American imperialism. It then addresses 1898. Scholars often suggest that 1898 was the moment when the United States became an empire. This chapter argues that this view is misplaced. Instead, 1898 marks a shift in the US approach to empire, when the US Navy replaced the small entrepreneur as the key figure in US expansion. It then addresses the lessons learned from this book, with an emphasis on the politics of race in the contemporary Pacific and struggles for recognition in the region.

Guano imperialism marked the first major commodity rush into the Pacific. Between 1850 and 1900, the United States claimed over a hundred islands across the world through the Guano Act of 1856. Why did the United States develop a guano empire? Most scholarly attention focuses on state-led explanations for guano imperialism, like the influence of American farmers and naval lobbies on Congress. By contrast, this chapter presents evidence that entrepreneurs led the way into the Pacific. A sudden rise in guano prices led US entrepreneurs to search for guano and threats to their interests from foreign competitors led them to search for government protection.

This chapter provides an entrepreneur-led theory of American early Pacific imperialism. The central argument is that changes in commodity prices provided incentives for American imperialism. It outlines how price changes encourage imperialism through a sequence of three mechanisms: price, threat, and lobbying. The price mechanism posits that commodity rushes led American entrepreneurs to relocate overseas. The threat mechanism describes the turn from entrepreneurs into lobbyists. The lobbying mechanism describes how entrepreneurs built support for their imperial schemes. In making these arguments, the chapter highlights the structural differences between American and European empires in the mid-nineteenth century by drawing comparisons to economic theories developed to explain European empires.

Why did the United States establish an early American Empire in the Pacific (1856-1898)? This chapter first discusses the conventional wisdom that focuses on the role of naval power, trade with China, and missionaries. It shows that these explanations are unable to explain patterns of American imperialism in the Pacific. It then introduces a theory of entrepreneurs and highlights the contributions that an entrepreneurial theory makes to International Relations scholarship, including to theories of empire, territorial expansion, and contemporary struggles for recognition for indigenous peoples in the Asia-Pacific.

Whereas most books emphasize cases of expansion, this chapter focuses on cases in which the United States does not expand. These cases - Fiji, Kiribati, Tahiti, Tokelau, and Tuvalu- challenge grand narratives of America’s path in the Pacific. The islands had strategic value, large markets, and souls to save. Yet, there was little if any interest from the US government in annexation. Using a structured, focused comparison, we attribute these instances of non-expansion to three causes: an island lacks commodities or labor for the entrepreneur to exploit; the entrepreneur dies or is arrested before the imperial lobby matures; or the entrepreneur establishes themselves in territories already controlled by foreign empires who can offer protection from local threats. These cases are interesting, brief stories about the American commercial experience abroad that have been ignored by scholars of American imperialism.

In 1889, almost a decade before the Spanish-American War, the United States, Germany, and Great Britain agreed to enter into an imperial condominium in Samoa. Conventional wisdom credits American imperialism in Samoa to security motives and major economic interest groups within the United States. This chapter argues that American entrepreneurs shaped American imperialism in Samoa. It presents novel evidence that American entrepreneurs - especially H.J. Moors - entered the islands in pursuit of high copra prices and turned to lobbyists after facing threats from German competitors. They pressured officials in Washington and naval captains who visited the islands for action.