Accountability for developing, deploying, and using any emerging weapons system is affirmed as a guiding principle by the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems. Yet advances in emerging technologies present accountability challenges throughout the life cycle of a weapons system. Mindful of a lack of progress at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons since 2019, this essay argues for a mechanism capable of imputing accountability when individual agent accountability is exceeded, forensic accountability unreliable, and aspects of political accountability fail.

The classic, theological tradition of just war reasoning (JWT) is not exhausted but needed more than ever in the shadow of global risks, when facing “hybrid” war, and when the difference between war and peace is said to be blurring. The tradition does not speak with one voice but debate within the tradition about the (un)acceptability of military action under conditions of uncertainty sheds light, in at least three ways, on ways of approaching the range of unorthodox tactics threated in conflict today:

1. 1. How to be fearful. Fear and anxiety in an age of risk are potential threats to reason. The JWT has resources with which to consider “how to fear” wisely.

2. 2. How to grapple with issues of classification, including what constitutes an attack equivalent to an “armed attack” under UN Charter Art 51. When, for instance, are cyber-attacks better dealt with under civilian, international commercial law, and when the laws of war?

3. 3. How to approach new challenges in a principled manner. Are different principles or criteria needed to govern action (e.g., the criterion of intensity) or do immediacy and necessity remain the most critically important principles in our moral arsenal?

Richard Hooker's theology of law was rarely far from pragmatic concerns. He wanted to promote a peaceful and prosperous human community before God while holding that moral right consists in conformity to the divine will. In this paper, we tread a narrow path between Hooker as ‘villain’ because of his role in preparing for the modern separation of ethics from metaphysics and as ‘unqualified hero’ whose ethically substantive and teleological theology of law took inspiration from Holy Scripture and the angels' worship of God. The claim is that Hooker's theology of law still provides a fertile environment in which to think practically today about questions such as: What is the nature of divine authority? What is law for? What should characterize the human exercise of authority?