It is now a truism to observe that over the last decade religion has reasserted its presence in public consciousness. One must still question just how broad or how deep this reassertion is. Perhaps the secularization thesis – and its contemporary reversal – were only ever plausible in the contexts of Northern European liberal democracies. Perhaps, with hindsight, these societies had only ever experienced a temporary lull in the ‘furiosity’ of their religions (Berger, 1999). Perhaps the religion which is now reasserting itself is a set of peripheral concerns bound to come into conflict with surrounding culture and even masking, or responding to, a general decline (Bruce, 2011). Or perhaps surrounding cultures are themselves changing in ways which make religious beliefs and practices more unusual and more awkward to accommodate. But as all these questions suggest, the public presence of religion is widely perceived to represent a growing problem, which, however one might explain, receives concrete expression in increased political contestation and even litigation.

There are other more general and familiar trends which suggest that ‘the problem of religion’ is new, or at least has new dimensions. The first of these is globalization. Globalization in its technological manifestation enables real-time awareness of movements and events across the world, as well as networks of the like-minded, who might be mere mavericks at home. It is easy to forget that the Internet started being widely used only from the late 1990s. Globalization brings with it a strengthened awareness of diversity, which in turn is reflected in politicization as different options for the public and collective expression of religions vie for adherents. The sacred canopy has become a contest of importunate umbrella salesmen. Politicization in its turn feeds juridification, as disputants seek solutions by reference to legal norms and processes in desperate recourse to the only remainder of society’s ‘crumbling cement’ (Habermas, 1999).

The area ‘other faiths and Christian ethics’ raises many questions, only three of which I shall deal with in this chapter. The three areas overlap and the divisions are artificial, but they serve a pedagogical purpose. First, there is a phenomenological question: Do other faiths have similar material ethical goals to those of Christianity? The allied question is whether other faiths also share formal similarities, in terms of ethical reasoning and the understanding of ethics. The way in which these questions are answered on an empirical-historical basis may or may not affect theological considerations, and it may well be the case that theological assumptions generate a particular way of reading the significance of empirical findings. I believe the latter is true. This leads to the second area: are Christian ethics sui generis? On the one hand, there are those who would argue that whatever the historical-empirical findings, Christian ethics are sui generis and phenomenological comparisons are of limited value, and especially so in coming to theological assessments of other religions. On the other hand, there are those who argue that Christian ethics have much in common with ethics from other religions, and therefore the phenomenological findings are important theologically and feed into broader questions. For example, can Christianity make unique claims about ‘holiness’ and ‘salvation’, when other religions have the capacity to produce ‘saints’ that equal or better Christian saints? The third area has, in part, developed out of the second: can the religions support a common understanding of universal human rights? This question feeds into broader philosophical discussion as to whether human rights is a child of modernity and actually inimical to religious conceptions of virtue and duty.

The area 'other faiths and Christian ethics' raises many questions, only three of which I shall deal with in this chapter. The three areas overlap and the divisions are artificial, but they serve a pedagogical purpose. First, there is a phenomenological question: Do other faiths have similar material ethical goals to those of Christianity? The allied question is whether other faiths also share formal similarities, in terms of ethical reasoning and the understanding of ethics. The way in which these questions are answered on an empirical-historical basis may or may not affect theological considerations, and it may well be the case that theological assumptions generate a particular way of reading the signifcance of empirical findings. I believe the latter is true. This leads to the second area: Are Christian ethics sui generis? On the one hand, there are those who would argue that whatever the historical- empirical findings, Christian ethics are sui generis and phenomenological comparisons are of limited value, and especially so in coming to theological assessments of other religions. On the other hand, there are those who argue that Christian ethics have much in common with ethics from other religions and therefore the phenomenological findings are important theologically and feed into broader questions. For example, can Christianity make unique claims about 'holiness' and 'salvation', when other religions have the capacity to produce 'saints' that equal or better Christian saints? The third area has, in part, developed out of the second: Can the religions support a common understanding of universal human rights?