Paradoxically, at roughly the same time in the Netherlands the amendment bill to introduce constitutional review by the judiciary of acts of parliament lapsed in 2018, the State Commission on the Parliamentary System recommended that such review be introduced. This Article analyzes Dutch exceptionalism on the topic of prohibiting constitutional review and comes to the conclusion that it cannot be justified. Focusing on the nature of constitutional change in the country, the recommendation is made that the quest for reform should start with the courts, and not with the constitutional legislature, as has been the case to date.

Which element of democracy is to prevail in the composition of parliament: an accurate reflection of minorities and their ideas, or a strong bond between citizens and their representatives? The answer, it seems, is to be determined to a large extent by the national political culture. The political history of the Netherlands makes strict proportionality the highest principle in this regard. Over the years, various attempts at fundamental electoral reform have been left stranded. It seems that the current system of proportional representation will remain intact in the Netherlands in spite of periodic attempts at change, as it probably best reflects the Dutch culture's longing for maximum inclusiveness.

One could be forgiven for thinking that constitutional review by the judiciary is invariably part of modern constitutionalism. Gone are the days that constitutions contained provisions that prevented the courts from testing the constitutionality of legislation, such as section 59 of South Africa's now repealed Constitution of 1961 that forbade the courts from inquiring into or pronouncing on the validity of legislation. It has come to be accepted in many quarters that a constitution presupposes judicial review in some form or another in gauging the integrity of legislation, instead of only relying on legislative wisdom as before. An attitude that echoes the views expressed in Marbury v. Madison by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, that by its very nature a written constitution implies judicial control. However, the Constitution of the Netherlands proves to be an exception in this regard, as section 120 states emphatically that:

Analysis of the justifiability of general burqa bans in public – Comparative study of burqa bans in France, Belgium and concept legislation in the Netherlands – Evaluation of burqa bans in light of the Article 9 ECHR, the right to freedom of religion – Evaluation of grounds for introduction of bans, including public safety, public order and the protection of rights and freedoms of others – Conclusion: general burqa bans diffcult to justify in the light of ECHR standards