This chapter argues that the particular variety of populism in effect in Italy that has been labelled PopSovism is interesting to comparative lawyers for many reasons. The chapter explains that in the Italian case, restrictions of migrants’ rights represent a form of democratic decay in populist time. This phenomenon was particularly evident during the first Conte government, when Italy became the first European country in which two self-styled populist forces formed a coalition government, but its roots can be found even earlier. Italian populism has ancient roots and restrictions of migrants’ rights preceded and continued after the populist wave. At the same time, the nativist approach to migrants should not be seen as the only manifestation of democratic decay in Italy, which is broader in nature. As a consequence, resilience through legislative reforms is not likely to be forthcoming. More success can be expected if resilience is pursued through judicial remedies both at national and international level.

Throughout this book, I have maintained that populism and constitutionalism, and in particular post–WWII constitutionalism (of which Italy is a prime example, as seen in Chapter 2) cannot be reconciled, due to the exclusionary, holistic and majoritarian nature of populism. As we saw in Chapter 1, this does not mean that populism and constitutionalism cannot have something in common, namely the importance of emotional reactions and the distrust of political power.

‘Constitutions belong to all but are not “empty” (politically neutral)’.1 With these words an eminent constitutional lawyer reacted to a series of attacks launched on the Italian Constitution by some political parties at the beginning of the new millennium. Indeed, the irony in this is that the new wave of populisms has been obliging constitutional lawyers to deal with some long-standing issues, including that of the neutrality of constitutions. Instead of embarking on a large-scale comparison, which may risk missing the historic roots of these phenomena, in this volume the analysis will be carried out by focusing on some important instruments of constitutional democracy –referendums and the prohibition of the imperative mandate, among others – and this will ensure consistency and coherence with the comparative law analysis carried out throughout the book. In this sense, while the present book has a precise focus on the Italian case, this does not exclude the possibility of framing this national case in a comparative perspective, as it is an ideal case study of post–World War II (WWII) constitutionalism.

For research like that carried out in this book, diachronic comparison and historical research are essential to show why some of the ambiguities that remained after World War II favoured the emergence of different waves of populism in Italy. The aim of this chapter is twofold: on the one hand, I shall clarify why the Italian case is so important to study the relationship between constitutionalism and populism. On the other hand, Italian political culture partly explains the variety of populisms experienced in the country.

In this chapter, I will analyse a case study that is crucial to exploring the way in which populists understand identity politics, while in subsequent chapters, I will investigate the perspective of politics of immediacy. The concepts of mimetism and parasitism presented in Chapter 1 will be tested, and the notion of sovereignism (‘sovranismo’) – frequently alluded to in the Italian debate and elsewhere – will be used as a case study.

In this chapter, I shall investigate the aspect of the politics of immediacy, exploring how populists understand the referendum. Following an idea endorsed by Davide Casaleggio, the mastermind of the Rousseau platform,1 former Minister Riccardo Fraccaro2 denounced the insufficiency of classic representative democracy and stressed the need for more direct democracy, especially with the advent of new technologies.

This book is the outcome of two projects that I have coordinated over the last four years. The first one is a Jean Monnet project called European Public Law-ius (Eur.Publ.ius), which was funded by the Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency of the European Union. The project, which ended in 2019, was devoted to the current challenges faced by the European Union, and of course among them there is the rise of authoritarian populisms in Hungary and Poland with the well-known rule of law crisis.

In this chapter, I shall undertake an in-depth analysis of how in-office Italian populists understand parliaments. Before going into the technicalities of constitutional law however, it is necessary to frame the issue in a broader perspective and mention the kind of politics that the Five Star Movement has in mind.

‘We will open up parliament like a can of tuna fish’.1 This is what Grillo said before the general election of 2013, when the Five Star Movement obtained its first representatives in the parliament. In the rhetoric of the movement, direct democracy is frequently understood as inevitably enriched by the use of new technology and in the long run, according to the Five Star Movement, this will reduce the centrality of parliaments.